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Abstract 
This thesis examines one area of welfare in one rapidly industrialising country-
Malaysia- in order to explore the nature and impact of key economic, social and 
institutional pressures on a key component of the Malaysian welfare system: the 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF). The fundamental question is can the Malaysian 
EPF meet its core objective which is to ensure that all of its members have financial 
security in their old age? The thesis identifies four key challenges: first, can the 
current pensions system meet its stated aims despite external global economic 
pressures which can impinge on the way states configure their welfare systems; 
second, how will population ageing impact upon current pensions policy and third, do 
class and ethnic changes matter? 
The fourth challenge is the EPF itself which - in common with core institutions in 
other welfare systems is itself 'institutionalised' -though having been in existence for 
over 50 years, needs to change in order to fulfil its primary objective of ensuring 
financial security for its members in old age. Continued reliance on individual 
provision alone will increase inequality based on gender, age, class and ethnicity. 
The demographic shift to an ageing population combined with widening income 
inequality- itself a product of Malaysia's engagement with the global economy- will 
result in too few people will having amassed the required level of savings to fund a 
lengthening old age. 
The thesis concludes that neither expansion of the EPF's remit nor inaction are viable 
options. A new social insurance based scheme which guarantees a minimum level of 
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income for all, regardless of class or ethnicity should be introduced. Such a scheme, 
though expensive, would be both effective and equitable, and would be consistent 
with the EPF's own stated objectives. 
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Preface 
This thesis examines the nature and impact of key economic, social and institutional 
pressures on one significant component of the Malaysian welfare system: the 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF). The overriding question is whether or not the EPF 
is likely to meet its core objective, which is to provide its members with financial 
security in old age? This is not simply a question about what the Malaysian state 
should be doing to ensure that the increasing numbers reaching old age avoid poverty 
or financial hardship, rather the thesis is concerned with whether the EPF, reliant as it 
is on individual monthly contributions, is 'fit for purpose'. 
This thesis identifies four major challenges to the EPF: 
The first challenge is the nature of the EPF itself which- as with key institutions in 
other welfare regimes is itself 'institutionalised' - it is argued, needs to change in 
order to fulfil its stated primary objective of ensuring financial security for its 
members in old age. The socio-economic changes which have taken place as a result 
of social policy reform over the last 30 - 40 years or so have resulted in increased 
inequality based on class combined with ethnicity and gender. Continued reliance on 
individual savings will exacerbate such inequalities and will result in more EPF 
members failing to amass sufficient resources to fund a lengthening old age. 
The second challenge is whether the current pensions system will be able to meet its 
stated aims despite external global economic pressures which can impinge on the way 
states configure their welfare systems? The Malaysian state has enthusiastically 
embraced the global economy and as a relatively small, though largely open economy, 
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Malaysia is at risk of wider, global economic trends. Three decades of impressive 
economic growth came to an end with the 1997 regional economic crisis and 
Malaysia has found it difficult to recapture both previous levels of economic growth 
and pre-1997 rates of inward investment. Economic globalisation offers both 
opportunities and restriction for welfare reform and it is the nation state and its 
institutions which mediate the effects of external pressures. 
The third challenge is represented by how population ageing will impact upon current 
pensions policy? Demographic developments which have taken place as the 
Malaysian economy has grown include a massive increase of mainly young, rural to 
urban migration in search of increasingly insecure employment. In addition to this 
Malaysia is experiencing the near global phenomenon, or 'crisis', of a demographic 
shift to an ageing population. There are real concerns regarding the cost implications, 
both in terms of increased health costs and ineffective income levels, for those 
reaching old age in increasing numbers and for many of whom old age is equated with 
an extending period of economic inactivity. 
The fourth challenge examines the development process which has seen Malaysia 
move from a primarily ethnic based society, to one in which ethnicity combined with 
class and gender has resulted in increased inequality in Malaysian society. It is this 
particular form of growing inequality which again calls into question the efficacy of 
the EPF and its claim to ensure that members have financial security in old age. 
In seeking to examine these four challenges, the thesis 'naturally' falls into three 
sections: 
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Part One: Chapter 1 will provide the reader with the rationale for the thesis, that is 
does the EPF remain 'fit for purpose' and can it can adapt to, and survive four key 
challenges of population ageing; class and ethnic changes global economic pressures 
and institutional stasis? The exogenous and endogenous factors which have a bearing 
on the problems faced by Malaysia will be examined- primarily the perceived effects 
of economic globalisation and the tensions created by institutional stasis. This 
chapter will also review the methodological considerations. 
Chapter 2: gives the reader historical context to the contemporary welfare system, 
noting its historical and colonial roots and examining the political economy of 
Malaysia. This in effect deals with how Malaysia got to the EPF and (in part) why the 
political establishment has thus far shied away from welfare expansion. 
Chapter 3: examines the institutionalised pension system which is the EPF, its aims 
and objectives, development and mechanism. This chapter also highlights the 
shortcomings of an over reliance on individual savings for old age. 
Part Two: Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine the remaining 3 three key challenges namely 
the impact of globalisation, ageing and class, ethnicity and gender and how all three 
represent challenges to the current EPF. 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of globalisation and argues that social policy reform 
cannot take place without some regard to the prevailing global economic conditions. 
However, it concludes that domestic institutional and political arrangements are likely 
to have a mediating effect on the influence, or otherwise, of external economic 
conditions. 
Chapter 5 seeks to explore the extent to which a demographic transition to an ageing 
population can be regarded as a 'crisis'. In doing so it examines what it is that 
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constitutes an ageing population, the rapidity and extent of this phenomenon and, with 
reference to Southeast Asia in general and Malaysia in particular, whether this 
demographic shift should be labelled as a 'crisis'. The themes explored in the chapter 
are concerned with issues of demography which incorporates ageing, changing family 
structures, increasing female participation in the formal labour market linked to 
adequacy of income in old age, retirement, culturally specific responses to old age and 
the way forward for developing societies increasingly enmeshed in the global 
economy. 
Chapter 6 examines the development process which has seen Malaysia move from a 
primarily ethnic based society to one in which ethnicity, class and gender combine to 
give greater insight into the growing inequality in Malaysian society. This growth in 
inequality calls into question the efficacy of the EPF and its claim to ensure that 
members have financial security in old age. 
Part 3: Chapter 7 presents Singapore as a comparator case which faces similar 
challenges of an institutionalised pension system; exposure to global economic trends; 
a rapidly ageing population; and increased ethno-class based inequality. The chapter 
notes the continuing issues facing the CPF which serve notice to the EPF of possible 
pitfalls of continued reliance on the provident fund mechanism as the main source of 
pensions prov1s1on. 
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter which reviews the thesis and suggests policy 
recommendations which would address the identified weaknesses of over reliance on 
the EPF. 
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Chapter One 
Malaysian welfare under pressure? 
This thesis looks at one area of welfare in one Newly Industrialised Country (NIC)-
Malaysia- in order to explore whether or not the approach adopted towards old age 
pensions is able to survive four key challenges: First, can the current pensions system 
meet its stated aims despite external global economic pressures; second, how will 
population ageing impact upon current pensions policy; third, do class and ethnic 
changes matter; and fourth, will the combination of these factors continue a reluctance 
to adapt or reform existing structures to take account of wider social and economic 
changes which will affect the historical institutionalised (and path dependent) nature 
of Malaysian society? 
In short, the thesis is seeking to address a fundamental question: Can the Malaysian 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF), as presently constructed, provide sufficiently for 
the Malaysian population in old age? This is not a normative question about what the 
Malaysian state should be doing to secure financial stability in old age for its citizens, 
but one which asks whether the EPF is actually 'fit for purpose' according to its stated 
objectives. According to the EPF Annual Report, 1999 (EPF, 1999), the 'purpose' of 
the Fund is to provide retirement benefits for members through mandatory savings in 
the form of monthly contributions. The Chairman's Statement (EPF, 1999: 13) makes 
it clear that 'the primary responsibility of the EPF is to ensure that its members have 
financial security in their old age in the form of adequate savings to support their 
retirement'. This comment is reflected in the organisation's mission statement, which 
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notes that, for the fund's members 'Our primary mission is to provide retirement 
benefits to our members through the management of their savings in an efficient and 
reliable manner' (EPF, 2004: 5). Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that, although 
charged with the provision of retirement income to its members 'the EPF is 
essentially an implementing agency and its policymaking powers remain with the 
Ministry of Finance' (Asher, 2002: 86). 
A quick perusal of Malaysian official statistics, which detail the decline of poverty in 
Malaysia, a key policy objective of the New Economic Policy (NEP), reveals that 
poverty rates dropped from a high of 49.3 percent in 1970 to 5.1 per cent in 2002. 
This would seem to offer a snapshot of successful anti-poverty measures based upon 
economic growth, a decline in the agricultural sector of the economy and a subsequent 
expansion of the export-orientated manufactures-based industrial labour force 
(Crouch, 1996; Mid-Term Review, 81h Malaysia Plan (MTR8MP) 2003). However, it 
is argued elsewhere (Chapter 3: 128/9) that poverty affects not only those generally 
classified as poor, with reference to earnings power within the formal labour market, 
but also those whose position in the stratification system could have been expected to 
afford them a greater degree of financial security beyond retirement. As 
Rueschemeyer et al (1992: 273) state, 'one class can never be understood in isolation 
from that of all other classes, states and international actors in the historical situation' 
(my emphasis). This particular phenomenon has much to do with the ways in which 
ethnicity combines with class to privilege a particular section of Malaysian society, 
namely the educated 'new' middle class Malays. Such a system has been 
institutionalised by the state through active intervention strategies, in particular the 
NEP and its successors. However, it is also the case that far larger sections of society 
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are at risk of poverty in old age due, in the main, to relatively low wages during the 
contributory phase, increased life expectancy and the 'natural' erosion of savings by 
inflation. These factors conspire against a contribution-based system such as the EPF, 
where account balances are seen as failing in the task of providing an adequate 
alternative to wages beyond retirement and income throughout the contingency of old 
age - and indeed where balances fall far short of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) preferred replacement rate of 60 per cent for the vast majority of 
members. In addition, there is growing concern regarding the increased level of 
income inequality in Malaysia which, it is suggested, will reduce the real levels of 
savings for the many who do not command high salaries (Hashim, 1998; Jomo, 2001). 
Such a situation, it is argued, will have serious implications for the continued relative 
stability of Malaysian society. 
This chapter will provide a snapshot of the different challenges facing current 
Malaysian pensions policy. In doing so, it will first seek to place the issues facing old 
age incomes in Malaysia in context. At a general level, the exogenous and 
endogenous factors which have a bearing on the problems faced by Malaysia will be 
examined - primarily the perceived effects of economic globalisation and the tensions 
created by institutional stasis. More specifically, the factors of ageing, class and 
ethnicity will be assessed to give a broad description of issues affecting both current 
pension policies and future reform paths. There will be a short discussion which will 
conceptualise the Malaysian welfare regime and attention will be focussed on the 
problematic nature of transferring regime analysis from its more usual sphere of 
'northern' advanced industrial societies to those of the 'southern' developing nations. 
The chapter will conclude with an examination of both the methodological 
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considerations pertaining to the thesis and the methodological tools employed in its 
production. 
Placing Malaysian pensions policy in context 
For more than fifty years the dominant form of income provision for life into old age 
has been individual savings through membership of the Employees Provident Fund. 
Generally, this arrangement has been held in good regard (Ramesh with Asher, 2000; 
Gough, 2000a; Yaacob, 2000) although there remain questions regarding both its 
coverage and its efficacy. Many of the issues facing the contemporary EPF are-
inevitably- a consequence of its history. By this it is not meant that the fund is 
preserved in aspic, rather that changes which have taken place in Malaysian society 
have not been mirrored and addressed by more recent reforms to the original EPF Act 
(1951). Although the fund currently operates under more recent amendments, these 
do not fully answer those nagging points of coverage and efficacy; indeed elsewhere 
the thesis argues that such reforms have contributed to greater inequality in old age. 
The development from an agricultural to industrial economy and the accompanying 
shift from a rural to an urban population has increasingly placed strain upon the 
ability of the EPF to function as a de facto private sector pension provider. In short, 
there are more people who require coverage and for a longer period, as dependency 
upon the labour market has increased and a lengthening old age has become a 
commonplace risk which needs to be planned for and insured against. As noted, the 
EPF has developed and will continue to do so. However, there is an almost 
perceptible tension between what this thesis argues are necessary reforms to old age 
incomes policies, in part brought about by greater engagement with the wider global 
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economy, and the domestic 'institutional' brakes which are applied to such a reform 
process. Furthermore, it is argued here that progressively it is socio-economic class 
combined with ethnicity, which is the focus for inequality, and that increasingly it is 
class -despite the continued 'plural' nature of Malaysian society- which will prove 
to be the arena for future discontent. This is not to discount the institutionalised 
notion of ethnicity as a vital concept in understanding Malaysian society, however. 
Malaysia is an ethnically divided society with relatively rigid ideological, social and 
cultural practices which favour Malays over others and which prolong what we shall 
later define as communalism. Rather it is to recognise - and emphasise - an 
important dislocation in the specific link between employment and ethnicity and the 
increased prominence of paid labour as the locus of inequality. It is against the 
backdrop of this altered internal dynamic that the current structure of the EPF 
attempts to continue in its central role as the mechanism by which individual 
Malaysians save for their old age. 
Pension policy reform in Malaysia: exogenous and endogenous factors 
Examining Malaysian pensions' policy, there are two distinct groups of factors which 
interact to produce tension and instability in a previously relatively stable 
environment. In the first instance, there are a number of external factors, which have 
been identified as aspects of the processes of economic globalisation, and which have 
specific implications for social policy reform in general and moreover which carry 
with them individualised implications for Malaysia. Secondly, there are the specific 
internal institutional factors which, it is argued here, relate both to the nature of 
Malaysian society and to its social, political and economic institutions, which could 
be the source of increased tensions as inequality (both real and perceived) increases. 
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It is the combination of these factors which tends towards stasis and a reluctance to 
adapt or reform existing structures to take account of wider social and economic 
changes. 
Economic globalisation can, for the purposes of this thesis, be described loosely as the 
processes by which increased liberalisation and expansion of the global economy has 
produced external pressures on welfare regimes. This heightened economic 
interconnectedness includes increased speculative flows of short-term capital based 
on currency trading, increased levels of long-term foreign direct investment (FDI), the 
interconnectedness of production due to advances in technology and increased world 
trade accompanied by policies designed to reduce barriers and facilitate the further 
expansion of trade flows. Many writers have argued that the growth, or spread, of 
economic globalisation has important implications for welfare reform as the options 
available are limited by the growth of power of international capital (Deacon et al, 
1997; Mishra, 1999; Rodrik, 1997). However, a contra position has been put forward 
by Hobson and Ramesh (2002: 8), who argue that globalisation processes have both a 
positive and negative relationship vis-a-vis states and welfare reform. They contend 
that 'states are purposeful agents that shape and determine the global system within 
which they reside and, conversely, that the global system shapes states. In short states 
and globalisation are mutually reflexive and are embedded in, or are eo-constitutive, 
of each other'. Furthermore, they infer that such a dualistic approach confers 
opportunities as well as constraints: 'The global realm is simultaneously both a realm 
of constraint that defines parameters to which states must adapt and a resource pool 
into which states-as-agents dip in order to enhance their power or interests either in 
external or internal realms' (Hobson and Ramesh, 2002: 8- my emphasis). It is this 
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dualistic nature of economic globalisation which offers both opportunities to, and 
imposes constraints upon domestic economies which calls into question the efficacy 
of the current Malaysian pension arrangements whilst simultaneously creating the 
space and conditions for possible state led reform. 
Later in this chapter (p35) economic globalisation is identified as one of five 
explanations of the development path of social policies in Southeast Asia, and the 
influence of globalisation is examined more thoroughly in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
However, such is the influence of the wider global economy on the economic and 
social development of Malaysia in general and its pension policies in particular, that it 
would be odd to omit reference to such processes from a headline list of exogenous 
factors. Indeed to quote the Eighth Malaysian Plan (8MP, 2001: 39), 'Being an open 
economy Malaysia's prospects ... will be influenced by developments in the 
international economy.' There is evidence to suggest that since Malaysia was caught 
up in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis it has, in common with other regionally affected 
economies, found it difficult to recapture previous high levels of economic growth, 
despite projected levels of economic growth as averaging a healthy 7.5 per cent per 
annum (8MP, 2001: 40). In part, this slowdown can be seen as a response to the 
manner in which Malaysia sought to weather the turbulence by imposing capital 
controls, thereby restricting dis-investment, a form of economic management which 
did not please either the global market or global financial organisations. 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1997 regional economic crisis Malaysian FDI rates 
appeared to return to similar pre-crisis levels though this recovery did not last. This 
fluctuation has introduced newer risks to the labour market, such as increased 
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employment insecurity and vulnerability, particularly in the low skills end of the 
electronic manufactures industry. In the longer term Malaysia, in common with most 
of its regional competitors, has seen a reduction in streams of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as the booming Chinese and Indian economies continue to attract 
high levels of foreign capital. Figures from the World Bank bear this out, noting that 
Malaysia's flow of FDI decreased by 40 per cent between 1999 and 2003. As the 
Bank states 'In U.S. dollar terms, FDI inflows into Malaysia decelerated steadily from 
a recent peak of $3.9 billion in 1999, to $3.2 billion in 2002 and to $2.5 in 
2003 ... while Malaysia is still an attractive destination for FDI, the country's relative 
performance has waned slightly, more so in recent years' (World Bank, 2004: Box 2). 
Increased employment insecurity naturally impacts upon individuals' ability to 
procure incomes in old age, and this has led to a possible future increased risk of 
poverty and social exclusion based upon age and employment record. The cost 
implications of such labour market insecurity have so far been borne by existing 
structures, including inadequate informal arrangements (Jomo, 2001). However, there 
is a growing likelihood that this may not hold as both the expansion of the formal 
sector is slowing down and the claims on the revenue streams increase as the EPF 
continues to move away from its central remit (Omar, 2005). Added to this is the oft-
stressed need to maintain and grow returns via greater exposure to the global financial 
market on both an individual and corporate basis. This in turn introduces greater 
levels of risk and uncertainty of returns due in part to market volatility as well as 
investor inexperience. It is this notion of increased economic risk and uncertainty 
which places greater emphasis upon the domestic pension arrangements and 
furthermore calls into question the ability of existing institutions and 'ways of doing 
welfare' to provide sufficiently for the Malaysian population in old age. 
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Endogenous factors, primarily those concerned with Malaysia's socio-economic 
transformation, necessarily impact upon domestic pensions policy. In such an 
examination, a degree of emphasis is placed upon the socio-economic transformation 
in Malaysia's domestic economy. This saw a shift from a mainly agricultural 
economy- reliant on the export of raw materials in the form of tin, rubber and palm 
oil - to export led growth as industrialisation placed increased significance on 
manufacturing. More recently there has been a drive towards a services based 
economy in which 'value added' and 'knowledge' have become the contemporary 
watchwords. As the Third Outline Perspective Plan (OPP3, 2001: 154) states, 'The 
future growth and development of the economy will be driven by knowledge-based 
industries in all sectors, particularly the manufacturing and services sectors.' 
Demographic developments which mirror the change in direction of the Malaysian 
economy include a massive increase of mainly young, rural to urban migration as 
younger cohorts leave behind relatively unprofitable though stable agricultural 
employment in favour of more insecure wage labour in the increased manufacturing 
sector of the economy centred predominantly around electronics. A concomitant 
aspect of the shift in the domestic economy has been increased employment choices 
open to women, again primarily in the electronics manufactures sector as well as the 
burgeoning services sector. Here again the link between the economic and social 
aspects of Malaysian society are intertwined as the OPP3 notes; 'As more women 
pursue higher levels of education or training, the overall fertility rate, which is the 
number of children that a woman will bear during her child-bearing age, will continue 
to decline. In addition, delayed marriages, increasing urbanisation, higher cost and 
improved standards of living is expected to reduce family size' (2001: 149-50). This 
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at a time when Malaysia is experiencing a shift to an ageing population, which calls 
into question the ability of traditional support mechanism to continue as previously. 
One final aspect of development in Malaysia which has direct impact upon the 
development of old age incomes policy has been the changes to the class structure, in 
part as a 'natural' aspect of the processes of industrialisation, although these have 
been exacerbated by the discriminatory policies of NEP and the increased 
interweaving of class and ethnicity in light of economic development. As Ramesh 
(2000: 5) notes, 'Industrialism draws people out of self employment and into 
wage employment, with attendant risks of exposure to unemployment, 
sickness ... Urbanisation and ageing are trends that accompany industrialisation and 
further compound the need for expanding the state's role in income maintenance'. In 
part this socio-economic approach is informed by the theoretical approach of new 
institutionalism in general (and more specifically historical institutionalism) which 
emphasises the concept of path dependence in particular, which is present throughout 
this thesis. Here it is suggested that ethnicity and communalism persist due, in no 
small measure, to the developmental path taken by Malaysia and the continued effects 
of the NEP and later active 'social' policies such as the National Development Policy 
(NDP) and Vision 2020. 
These general endogenous 'institutional' factors are further investigated specifically 
in relation to the following key themes: 
1. Poverty and social exclusion in old age 
2. Women beyond retirement 
3. Ethnicity and class 
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4. The changing political establishment 
1. Both poverty and exclusion combine to form one of the central concerns of the 
thesis and as such it is argued that the likelihood of a growing number of elderly 
Malaysians, including not only those who are regarded as hardcore poor but also those 
from the expanded lower middle class, will face the reality of increasing poverty and 
social exclusion unless reforms to the funding mechanisms for old age are brought 
about. Figures from the MTR8MP (2003) show that households headed by the elderly 
and female headed households register a higher incidence of hardcore poverty at 4.9 
per cent and 9.4 per cent against a national level of 1.0 per cent for 2002. As the 
review states 'The overall decline in poverty was the result of Government's 
continued efforts in implementing povetty eradication programmes, particularly the 
promotion of income generating projects' (MTR8MP, 2003: 60). The field trip which 
was undertaken as part of the research process was concerned not only with gauging 
attitudes to the so-called 'crisis' of old age, but also questioning the current 
commitment to an individualised approach to funding life beyond retirement, and the 
onward ability of traditional forms of support to effectively continue in their role. 
2. Whilst women will naturally be included in the above section, this thesis argues 
. 
that such are the problems facing women, and those from low income backgrounds in 
particular, that an explicit examination of their situation with regards to insecure 
employment and the ability to save for life beyond retirement is important. In brief, it 
is the dual burden of low paid and interrupted employment and domestic care 
responsibilities which, combined with the increase in life expectancy, reduces 
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women's ability to provide an adequate independent income stream for life beyond 
retirement. 
3. In a multi-ethnic society such as Malaysia, a core issue is the extent to which life 
chances are determined by an individual's ethnicity. Examples of such concerns are 
commonplace in the media in Malaysia and can be drawn from areas such as 
education, employment and politics. For example, as a result of the active 
discriminatory policies quotas exist which reserve Malays places in tertiary education, 
public sector employment and business licensing (Case 2004). This theme is 
addressed in other chapters, most notably Chapter 6 which deals with the NEP and its 
aftermath. A key point is the role ethnicity plays in the provision of income beyond 
retirement- the key question being whether class transcends ethnicity as the major 
determinant for the quality of life in old age? 
4. During the period of research for this thesis economic crisis has rocked the 
Malaysian economy; Dr Mahathir has stepped down after 18 years as Prime Minister 
and yet on the surface little appears to have changed. The Internal Security Act (ISA) 
is still rigorously enforced, political opposition remains weak, mainstream media are 
somewhat neutered and the priority of restoring strong economic growth remains key. 
Despite this, some aspects of cronyism have been tackled and Prime Minister Badawi 
appears less isolationist than his predecessor. However, authoritarian populism 
remains as the main mode of governance (Munro-Kua, 1996) and Case (2002; 2004: 
87) argues that Malaysia continues as a 'pseudo democratic regime' restricting civil 
liberties in order to maintain electoral victories. A key challenge to the 
institutionalised political establishment may come from the expanded (Malay) middle 
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classes when they begin to fully experience the effects of an inadequate pension 
system and demand greater involvement and action from the state. 
Having reviewed the core challenges to the EPF, it is important to examine key 
explanations regarding the development of social policy provision in Southeast Asia 
in general, whilst, taking Malaysia as the main focus. Each of these explanations will 
be briefly reviewed in the subsequent section below, although it should be noted that 
added emphasis is given to globalisation and institutionalist approaches. Indeed it is 
the interaction of both globalisation and historical institutionalism which threads its 
way through the thesis. Of key interest here are the ways in which both global 
economic phenomena and 'local' institutionalised practices can act as catalysts or 
impediments to welfare reform. This discussion further strengthens the position taken 
in this thesis, which is that the tension between external economic forces and internal 
institutional pressures provides the best framework for examining the main challenges 
outlined above- ethno-class tensions, increased inequality, an ageing population and 
traditional welfare arrangements under pressure facing Malaysia- each of which will 
be fully explored and developed in subsequent chapters. 
Social policy development and reform in N/Cs 
Explanations given for the development path of social policies in Southeast Asia 
generally differ in their emphasis and for the purposes of this thesis can be categorised 
into five main approaches, these being: 
1. Cultural perspectives 
2. Political explanations 
3. Socio-economic factors 
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4. Globalisation 
5. Institutionalism and welfare reform 
1. Cultural perspectives 
The development of cultural explanations regarding the path of social welfare reform 
in Southeast Asia has focused to a greater extent on finding common strands within 
divergent cultures. Most explanations of the success of Japan and the NICs will touch 
upon the subject of shared cultural traditions, and it is to be expected that the 
discussions will revolve around Confucianism and its beliefs and attitudes. 
The distinction must be made between the philosophical teachings of the originator 
and his followers and 'popular' Confucianism, which in this context is both more 
general and open to reinterpretation in differing societies (Chow, 1986; Jones, 1993; 
MacPherson, 1993 and Goodman and Peng, 1996). The common underpinnings of 
this cultural analysis is based on ethnicity in the case of states such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan (and latterly China itself), and to this list one could add in part 
Malaysia, and is based on acculturation through the adoption of Confucian values in 
the case of Korea and Japan (Goodman and Peng, 1996). The focus rests firmly on 
the role of the family, or its substitute in the form of the family business or 
corporation, as provider of welfare based on the Chinese traditional values of duty, 
obligation and above all the ethic of filial piety. The growth of urbanisation that has 
accompanied the rapid industrialisation of the region has transformed the traditional 
family structure away from the extended or stem family structure, which in agri-rural 
societies was the main, and often sole, provider of welfare. 
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It is difficult to overstate the importance and centrality of the family within the 
Chinese cultural tradition. Not only does the structure of the household inform 
welfare provision (combining notions of solidarity, loyalty, patriarchal authority, 
female subordination and strict gender role segregation), but it is argued it also 
informs the way in which the larger society should be run. Jones ( 1990) coined the 
phrase 'Oikonomic Welfare States' to describe the form of welfare provision linked to 
economic performance that, it is claimed, exists in the region of East Asia. The 
concept here is one in which Confucian values and beliefs inform the manner in 
which welfare provision is initiated and linked not only to the role of the family as 
provider, but family as model. To paraphrase Jones ( 1990, 1993), the state is run 
along the lines of the traditional family structure in which beliefs and values play an 
important role in the provision of and demand for welfare. Corporationism (not 
corporatism, organised labour being effectively restricted for much of the latter half of 
the twentieth century) has been employed to describe the manner in which the states 
of the Pacific Rim have sought to 'manage' their societies. 
Whilst this is an inherently attractive approach, placing as it does the focus directly 
upon local factors, it does not fully explain the ways in which welfare regimes in Asia 
have developed (White and Goodman, 1998), and in particular it is ill suited to the 
case of Malaysia. In the first instance, it is too general and seeks to apply Confucian 
values and beliefs to nations which are clearly something other. Asian cultures are 
both too diverse and too vibrant to be easily subsumed under one classificatory label. 
In the case of Malaysia such an explanation fails to take account of the Malay 
political hegemony which has existed since independence, and the primacy of Islam 
within the majority Malay culture. Dr Mahathir did in the past employ the rhetoric of 
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Asian cultural values as part of his anti-western, anti-welfarism stance, but he 
demonstrated little real affinity in practice (Korff, 2001 ). Rather it would appear that 
he employed such tools as were beneficial to his political aims. In this way his use of 
Asian values enabled Malaysia to tap into the political and economic alliances in the 
wider region and deflect international criticism of welfare arrangements, whilst at the 
same time promoting Islamic/Malay credentials to a home audience who were 
displaying greater affinity with the approach put forward by his main domestic 
political rivals in PAS. 
2. Political Explanations 
Political explanations of the development of social policies in Southeast Asia tend to 
emphasise the nature of the political state and the role of class conflicts and 
democratic accountability of policy makers to a broad electorate as determining 
factors. In the case of Malaysia, as is noted elsewhere in this thesis, the nature of the 
political state can be characterised as 'popular authoritarianism' (Munro-Kua, 1996), 
in which the use of the Internal Security Act (ISA) - colonial in its origins -continues 
to enable the UMNO led Barisan Nasional government to quell political unrest 
(Aliran, 2001; Korff, 2001 ). In terms of social policy reform, the major development 
that has sprung from the political system could be argued to be the instigation of the 
NEP and its successors. Through these broad ranging initiatives, which have sought 
to advantage the Bumiputera community over other ethnic groups, Malays have found 
themselves to be beneficiaries of positive discrimination practices both in education 
and employment. 
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It is difficult to argue for a more precise link between the political economy and social 
policy reform, due in part to the reactive nature of political initiatives in the face of 
public discontent. As with Dr Mahathir's somewhat opportunistic use of the rhetoric 
of Asian values, which was picked up and dropped when circumstances or audience 
changed, so too it is somewhat problematic to attempt to pin down a Malaysian 
commitment to an ideological position relating to social policy reform. That is to say, 
expediency can inform political decisions which affect the lives of everyday 
Malaysians. Examples of this can be provided through the work of the Citizen's 
Health Initiative (Chan, 2000), which has been successful in lobbying against a 
transformation of the Malaysian health service into something resembling the 
American model in which private health insurance affects the level and standard of 
treatment available. However, it should be noted that this residual/privatisation 
approach to policy reform has not gone away. 
Historically Malaysia has had a rather weak organised labour movement and has not 
been the repository of traditional forms of class conflict. The Malaysian Trade Union 
Congress (MTUC) has little real political influence and the state has enacted 
legislation both in the early 1960s and the mid 1980s to prevent the formation of large 
general unions (Crouch, 1996). Rather such conflict as has existed, has been in the 
main ethnically based. In the Latin American case, Ramesh with Asher (2000) cite 
Meso-La go ( 1994) as arguing for the importance of competition amongst social 
groups in the development of social welfare programmes but, this has limited appeal 
in the case of Malaysia because of the discriminatory approach of the NEP, which has 
skewed any notion of social group competition towards a greater emphasis on inter-
ethnic competition. Instead, it is argued that class and ethnicity are in fact part of the 
33 
same material process and that it is this conjoining, combined with a somewhat 
neutered labour movement, which determines policy reform and by default the 
resultant quality of an individual's life beyond retirement. 
Similarly the notion of democratic competition as a fundamental factor in the 
development of social welfare in Malaysia has limited impact. The idea that political 
competition between parties for the votes of the electorate will result in a closer 
alignment with the wishes of voting public does not take account of the hegemonic 
power of the ruling coalition and a lack of a real 'left' alternative alongside numerous 
other factors, both social and political, which affect the development of public policy 
in Malaysia. Ramesh (2000) argues against the notion that elite ideologies can be 
applied to the development of social security in Southeast Asia 'Not too much can be 
read into the ideological predilections of Southeast Asian governments, whose leaders 
subscribe to and depart from their principles according to convenience. The same 
ruling elites that proclaim the superiority of the free market and the need to uphold 
individual responsibility show few qualms about denying both in practise' (Ramesh, 
2000: 10-11). 
3. Socio-economic factors 
Socio-economic factors emphasise the role that the industrialising process has on the 
development of social welfare programmes, essentially the traditional 'convergence 
thesis' (Wilensky, 1975). In short, the argument runs that as a society undergoes 
industrialisation and the attendant urbanisation and demographic shift towards an 
ageing population, so social policy reform expands to meet the needs arising from this 
tripartite process (Castles, 1998). The increasing reliance on waged employment, and 
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the nature of that employment with attendant risks, requires the state to provide a 
wider scope of welfare services in order to maintain economic competitiveness 
(Rimlinger, 1971 ). 
This approach, however, views the process of industrialisation as a somewhat uniform 
phenomenon and so fails to take account of the variety of paths which lead to a 
similar end. It is difficult to see the similarity in the routes to industrialisation and 
developed nation status within the Southeast Asia region, let alone on global scale. It 
can, however, be argued that the ageing of populations in Southeast Asia and in 
Malaysia particularly will, by necessity, result in the expansion of social welfare 
spending as traditional providers of welfare fail to meet the growing needs and 
demands of the elderly. There is as yet, little convergence of approach to this 
common issue. 
4. Globalisation 
Globalisation is a multi-faceted term (Dicken, 1998, 2003; Held et al, 1999; Gough, 
2000a) as identified above, and one that requires some definition before use. In the 
context of this thesis globalisation refers to economic globalisation and pays less 
attention to the notion in its more cultural form, though even the most casual observer 
will note that a 'westernisation', or more accurately 'Americanisation' of youth 
culture has developed in Malaysia through the presence and seeming popularity of the 
a line-up of the usual suspects such as MacDonald' s, Starbucks, Le vis and a host of 
other mainly American originating global players. 
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We should also be careful with our use of economic globalisation as this too has come 
to encompass a variety of meanings. In this context, the term to refers to the 
increasing global connectedness in trade, the internationalisation of production, the 
liberalisation of the financial sector and the increasing power of transnational 
organisations resulting in an possible erosion of the power of the nation state to act 
independently of global players (Mishra, 1999; Scholte, 2000). Somewhat ironically 
it is this last which appears to some most sinister, and which Malaysia has, in its 
unique response to the 1997 regional economic crisis, for the time being staved off. 
Dr Mahathir has not only railed against the immorality of western lifestyles in his 
defence of 'Asian values' (Mahathir, 1998), but also the international economic actors 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), whom he views with suspicion as favouring the West 
(Mahathir, 1999). As Beeson (2000: 339) cogently argues 'the rise of financial 
markets is not seen simply as part of a universal process of secular change driven by 
technological innovation and economic restructuring, but as a process in which 
specific national or even regional interests are being served'. 
However vehement Dr Mahathir was in his attacks on transnational organisations, the 
fact remains that the success of the export led strategy of industrialisation and the 
attendant economic and developmental leap forward that Malaysia has enjoyed over 
the past 25 years, has been as a result of the increased internationalisation of 
production and access to strategic markets in the West. What remains to be seen is 
whether globalisation in this form will lead to the much vaunted process of 'social 
dumping' in the Malaysian context. Indeed, it could be argued that the pressures of 
economic globalisation provide an impetus behind the ongoing debate regarding 
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health service reform in Malaysia. The flip side of this of course is whether, on a 
more positive trajectory, globalisation results in the development of a global social 
policy which takes into account the notion of access to social welfare provision as a 
basic human right (Deacon et al, 1997). As inherently interesting as this notion is, it is 
beyond the remit of this thesis. Rather, in Chapter 4, the discussion will focus on the 
effects of increased openness to the global economy and the pursuit of foreign direct 
investment on a rapidly developing nation such as Malaysia. 
5. Institutionalism and welfare state reform 
March and Olsen ( 1998) offer a useful way of 'opening up' this section by their 
simple explanation of what an institution can be interpreted as, and one which is of 
use in this context. They suggest that an institution 'can be viewed as a relatively 
stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific 
groups of actors in specific situations. Such practices and rules are embedded in 
structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that can explain and legitimize 
particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them ... An institutional 
approach is one that emphasizes the role of institutions and institutionalisation in the 
understanding of human actions within an organization, social order or society' 
(March and Olsen, 1998: 948 my emphasis). For the purposes of this thesis, it is 
useful to insert here within this broad approach a specific focus on welfare regimes 
and the policies and organisations which are concerned with welfare per se. Indeed, 
we can take this notion of rules and practices as contributing to identity and 
communities of belonging. As is clearly stated in Chapter 6 ethnicity is an 
institutional feature of Malaysia, albeit one which is now being undermined by a 
combination of external and internal forces. As March and Olsen (2005: 4) suggest 
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institutions represent 'structures of meaning, embedded in identities and belongings: 
common purposes and accounts that give direction and meaning to behaviour, and 
explain, justify and legitimate'. This brief section is focussed on the ways in which 
the institutionalised ways of 'doing' welfare can inhibit or restrict change or reform. 
(Beland, 2005) However, there are many and varying strands to the broad area of the 
role of institutions and their effects upon social policy reform and not all are taken as 
equal in their explanatory power. 
S. Reich (2000: 501) has argued that 'New institutionalism has become a catchphrase 
concerning an approach to the study of social science. Yet the term conceals a number 
of distinct approaches that compete with one another as explanations of political 
behaviour'. Ellison (2006: 2) states that the underlying contention which informs the 
institutionalist position is that 'the embedded organisational structures on which 
particular policies rest, together with the assumptions and expectations about the 
nature of 'welfare' that develop over time among interested parties, conspire to make 
radical reform difficult'. Paul Pierson ( 1996, 2000a, 2000b ), Beyeler (2003) and 
Camp bell (2004) present useful accounts of the approach taken by the New 
Institutionalist school of thought which stands contra to the position which links 
greater economic globalisation with the welfare state retrenchment as a taken for 
granted situation. What these authors suggest, is that both political systems and 
administrative bureaucracies remain key players in the processes which determine 
social policy reform in individual nation states. It is the relative resilience of existing 
welfare state programmes, in both developed and developing nations, in the face of 
the processes of economic globalisation, which would appear to give some degree of 
substance to the New Institutionalist approach. 
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To develop this further, it is worth noting that there are many 'institutionalisms' each 
seeking to lay claim to greater explanatory power. S. Reich (2000) offers four 
characterisations of institutionalism, as do March and Olsen ( 1998), whereas Nielsen 
(200 1) cites DiMaggio (1998) as distinguishing three 'types' of institutionalism. 
However, the strand or variant most relevant to this discussion is that of historical 
institutionalism (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). This is not to negate the value of other 
positions, as S. Reich (2000: 517) puts it 'each of the four variants of institutionalism 
provides keen insights into a particular slice of politics.' Rather it is the historical 
institutionalist approach, with its consideration of path dependency, which appears 
best suited to explain the relationship between exogenous pressures and endogenous 
welfare resilience with reference to the Malaysian EPF. The notion of path 
dependency forms the backdrop for the section below, and here it is enough to 
highlight what Paul Pierson (2000b) terms the 'consequences of path dependence'. 
Pierson argues that change is not only difficult to achieve in institutions but that 
'Individual and organizational adaptations to previous arrangements may also make 
reversal unattractive. When actors adapt to the new rules of the game by making 
extensive commitments based on the expectation that these rules will 
continue ... Rather than reflecting the benefits of institutionalized exchange, 
institutional continuity may reflect the rising costs over time of adopting previously 
available alternatives' (2000: 491 - 2- original emphasis). It may be as Beyeler 
(2003) suggests, that external pressures may appear to demand change, although 
domestic considerations and arrangements may prevail. Indeed Campbell (2004: 148) 
goes further, citing Esping-Andersen, (1999) and Swank (2002) as providing evidence 
that 'suggests that national institutions mediate global pressures'. 
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In summary then, it may appear difficult to ascribe primacy to one or other of the 
above approaches in order to explain the path taken by the Malaysian state in the 
development of social welfare reform. There are indications that each can contribute 
something to our understanding of where Malaysia finds itself now. For instance 
there are without doubt strong links between the deep cultural tradition and an 
institutionalised approach to welfare provision, which places such emphasis on 
individual self-reliance and the role of the family and community. However, as noted 
above, how can such a multi-ethnic society conform to the expectations of the cultural 
explanation, whilst avoiding the charge of generalisation? To which cultural tradition 
should we ascribe primacy? It is the pluralistic nature of Malaysian society, both past 
and present, which weakens the explanatory power of this approach. 
There is some value also in parts of the socio-economic explanation, although here 
too one must be aware of the singular nature of industrialisation Malaysia-style 
(Jomo, 1997). The most appealing aspect of this argument is the attention that is paid 
to the expansionary effect on social spending that would be expected to accompany 
the demographic shift to an ageing population (Gough, 2000a). Indeed this is one of 
the central claims of the thesis that, as currently structured, the key objectives of the 
EPF will not be met unless social policy reform takes account of the impact of an 
ageing population combined with the inability of traditional sources of support to 
cope with such a rapidly changing society. 
The political thesis may have more to offer in the contemporary setting with the 
arrival of a seemingly united multi-ethnic opposition coalition, although the very real 
threat remains that this unity will fragment along ethnic lines. It is undeniable that 
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Malaysia is undergoing a process of change with regards to the political economy. 
And despite the prolonged, though ultimately peaceful, transition of power to 
Abdullah Badawi, there is as yet little indication as to the final outcome. Little has 
transpired to indicate that the current regime will be any more willing to relinquish the 
firm grip which characterised Dr Mahathir's authoritarian rule, and which was 
consistent in its opposition to meaningful political freedom. Indeed Korff (200 1) 
argues that the new perceived threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism which is seen 
as a component part of the 'global' war on terror has been employed to argue for the 
ongoing use of the ISA as a means of social control. 
There are, as has been briefly sketched, elements of each of these explanations in the 
Malaysian case; however, there is less by which to gauge the trajectory of future 
policy and need. Rather it is to the two remaining explanations -economic 
globalisation and historical institutionalism - which may offer a more rounded 
account of recent and future paths of social policy reform in Malaysia. The 
explanatory power of these two perspectives is further enhanced in part because they 
tend to incorporate and build upon elements found in the other three approaches. 
It is the nature of economic globalisation with its rapid flow of capital, 
internationalisation of production and liberalisation of financial markets which have 
done so much to take Malaysia along the road to developed nation status, whilst 
simultaneously exposing Malaysia to the risks and vagaries of international markets. 
As mentioned above, there is another, more positive side to economic globalisation 
which may see the establishment of some form of global social policy, treating 
welfare rights as basic human rights. However, this would still have to be seen within 
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the context of Malaysia and would of necessity have to pass through political, social 
and cultural filters. At this point the preferred choice of the historical institutionalist 
approach is appropriate. Here are found ways of explaining not only the development 
and reform trajectory of Malaysian social welfare, but also the arguably necessary 
endogenous counterweight to the exogenous influence of Malaysia's increased 
connection to the global economy. There is an inherent tension here, which can both 
advance social policy reform, as well as inhibit the reform process due to the 
'institutional capital' that is invested in contemporary social welfare institutions. 
Primarily, in terms of old age incomes, this thesis focuses on the EPF, but it also takes 
account of the ethnic and cultural institutionalised traditions and practices which are 
concerned with the ways of doing welfare and how this contributes to the need for 
reform of the EPF in particular and social welfare in general in Malaysia. This 
tension between the endogenous and the exogenous pressures would not a priori 
result in a high degree of homogeneity between regional welfare systems, nor a 
continuation of the status quo in the Malaysian case, but it is this dynamic that this 
thesis argues will shape future policy reform. 
Locating a Malaysian welfare regime? 
Current welfare arrangements in Malaysia are both historically well established and 
embedded, and relatively complex in their organisation. In the case of the former, the 
influence of the colonial administration is evident in both the continued use of the 
provident fund mechanism and a health service which has a degree of similarity to the 
UK National Health Service, at least in so far as it is publicly funded and available to 
all, despite the increase in private provision and the employment of over 50 per cent 
of all registered doctors in the private sector (Gough, 2000b) In respect of the latter, 
42 
the complexity springs, in part, from the ethnically plural nature of Malaysian society. 
By complexity, it should be understood that the 'private' welfare arrangements of the 
three main communities, Malay, Chinese and Indian, as well as the ethnically based 
provision of some aspects of 'public' welfare services presents us with an obscured 
picture of coverage and adequacy. 
It is this complexity which negates the tag of 'welfare state', limited as it is in its 
suitability to incorporate the varied means by which welfare is provided and 
consumed. Castles (1998: 146) employs a definition of welfare state coined by Briggs 
(1961: 228) as 'a state in which organized power is deliberate! y used ... in an effort to 
modify the play of market forces .. .It must provide individuals and families with 
income guarantees that obviate poverty on any major scale, it must remove the causes 
of insecurity by ensuring that individuals and families have sufficient resources to 
meet social contingencies such as sickness, old age and unemployment and finally it 
must offer all citizens access to a certain agreed range of social services.' Perhaps in 
the case of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
members this conception broadly holds true, however, in the case of developing 
nations in general and Malaysia in particular, the lack of state power used to fulfil the 
first three of Briggs' activities, by singularly failing to offer state guarantees against 
poverty and insecurity except through economic development, reduces the efficacy of 
the term 'welfare state'. 
A more sensitive descriptor of welfare arrangements can be found through the 
employment of the term welfare regime as formulated by Esping-Andersen ( 1990, 
1999). In his much read Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism Esping-Andersen 
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( 1990: 2) suggests that 'the concept of the welfare state is too narrowly associated 
with the conventional social amelioration policies'. Rather he argues that three 
welfare regime types can be identified in post-World-War-Two advanced capitalist 
nations. There are certain core characteristics which enable individual nations to be 
grouped together, the most important of which is the degree of de-commodification 
or, put another way, the extent to which welfare outcomes are not reliant upon market 
forces. Esping-Andersen identifies the three regime types (and their main exemplars) 
as liberal (U.S.A.), conservative-corporatist (Germany) and social democratic 
(Sweden) (1990:26-9). 
However, well received though the thrust of the 'three worlds' typology was, Esping-
Andersen has not been without his critics. For some, he is at fault for trying to 
squeeze some countries into too restrictive a typology. So Castles and Mitchell 
( 1993) argue in favour of an Antipodean welfare regime incorporating Australia and 
New Zealand and based upon wage earner rights. Liebfried ( 1992) suggests a further 
Mediterranean regime based upon the prevalence of social assistance programmes and 
Jones (1993) makes a case for an East Asian regime as personified by Japan and its 
strong Confucian tradition of filial piety and loyalty. Feminist critics of the 'three 
worlds' have argued that it ignores both gender relations and the family as the 
principle source of welfare. It is women's unpaid domestic labour, regardless of 
geography, which establishes a gendered division of labour leading to a reproduction 
of inequalities between men and women in both the public and private spheres 
(Esping-Andersen 1999; Gough 2000c citing O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999). 
Further Gough (2000c: 5) suggests that Esping-Andersen's 1990 work has been 
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criticised for its sole focus on class analysis and thus ignores other sources of 
stratification such as religion and ethnicity. 
Esping Andersen's response to such criticisms was incorporated in to his 1999 book 
Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies, in which he accepted that the case 
for a Mediterranean model had some worth although he dismissed calls for an 
Antipodean or East Asian model arguing, in the case of the former, that 'the passage 
of time is pushing Australia- and certainly New Zealand- towards what appears as 
prototypical liberalism' and in the case of the latter that Japan is something of a 
hybrid, although Japan's 'unusually accentuated familialism, makes a strong case for 
assigning Japan squarely to the conservative regime' (1999: 89-92). In response to 
the second featured criticism Esping-Andersen argues that he accepts the importance 
of the household economy ( 1999: Chapter Four) and employs a concept similar to de-
commodification, that of 'de-familialisation' or the extent to which an individual's 
welfare is independent of kinship (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Gough, 2000c ). In 
response to the third area of criticism we have to rely upon a rather unsatisfactory 
contention in a personal communication between Esping-Andersen and Gough (as 
cited in Gough, 2000c) in which the former suggests that the third sector (community, 
be it ethnically or religiously based) plays a marginal role in advanced industrial 
countries. 
More recently Esping-Andersen has argued that 'A welfare regime can be defined as 
the combined, interdependent way in which welfare is produced and allocated 
between state, market and family' ( 1999: 34-5). It is this recognition of the threefold 
relationship within the concept of welfare regimes which enables both a broader scope 
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of analysis, through the incorporation of the family into the equation, and a more 
narrowed focus on the patterns and outcomes of welfare production and consumption. 
This carries greater relevance for the conceptualisation of a Malaysian welfare regime 
in particular and the analysis of the development of social policies in NICs in general. 
In doing so the thesis will critically examine recent attempts by Gough (2000a,b,c) to 
adapt welfare regime analysis to Southeast and East Asia. 
At first glance, the applicability of applying welfare regime analysis to developing 
nations appears marginal as Gough (2000b: 3) himself acknowledges. In the first 
instance the role of the welfare state, which is central in the case of OECD nations, is 
minimal in the developing nations of Southeast Asia. Secondly the concept of de-
commodification is of minor importance in states with significant agricultural 
populations. Gough (2000b: 3) further argues that the impact of external factors such 
as the global economy and supra-national institutions is greater than in OECD nations 
and finally that the 'the role of formal welfare institutions in shaping stratification 
outcomes and interest group formation is small'. That said, Gough suggests that, with 
a degree of reformulation, welfare regime analysis has its place in examining NICs 
precisely because of the acceptance of a broader welfare mix which includes state, 
private and households. Furthermore, it examines social policy reform in terms of 
power, employing as it does a political economy approach and finally it gets away 
from the view that uniqueness or individuality is the norm when analysing the welfare 
characteristics of developing nations. 
In the first instance this approach seems appealing. To be able to cluster states 
together on the basis of similar welfare features is promising and certainly attempts to 
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get away from the notion that either all developing countries are individual in their 
approach or that a one sized descriptor fits all. However, Gough's approach is 
somewhat limited, in part because the corollary of 'variations' appears regularly. By 
variations, Gough is implying individual policy profiles and although his use of 
Holliday's (2000) description of East Asian Tiger economies as examples of 
productivist welfare capitalism and applying this to Southeast Asia is accurate, he is 
unable to construct a welfare regime 'type' which applies to and is able to include all 
the states under discussion. In part this is because the level of variation present in 
both the welfare mix and the welfare outcomes degrades the applicability of the 
concept of welfare regimes as employed in advanced industrial nations. Even taking 
into account, as Gough (2000a: 5) does, that the Esping-Andersen's welfare regime 
model 'needs drastic modification' if it is to have any chance of working, the result is 
similar to the conclusion reached by Wilding (2000) in his study of the viability of an 
East Asian welfare model. The concept is helpful as long as it is not pushed too far. 
In conclusion then Gough's work on developing a framework to enable the concept of 
welfare regimes to be applied to developing nations is important as it goes beyond the 
approach which views the developing world as an aggregated mass, and calls for 
'qualitative historical studies of selected countries' (2000c: 16). This is indeed the 
kind of approach adopted by this thesis, and through the production of a qualitative 
case study examination of Malaysia, and the use of Singapore as a comparator case, a 
key aim of this thesis is to locate the Malaysian welfare 'regime' in a general sense 
and, in light of this, analyse the adequacy or 'fit for purpose' of it's current pensions 
policy in particular. 
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So far this chapter has set out the field for enquiry with which the thesis is concerned, 
the adopted approach which takes into account exogenous and endogenous factors on 
the reform process as well as noting the influence of economic, socio-cultural and 
political institutional arrangements. The next section describes the research process 
which was, to a greater extent determined not by a philosophical or theoretical 
allegiance to one 'type' of method over others, but which was influenced by the case 
study approach which places a greater emphasis on openness in the adoption of a 
research methodology (Mabbett and Bolderson, 1999). 
Methodological considerations 
Having employed the above section to set out briefly the theoretical approach 
employed in this thesis, the 'what' as it were, we must now address ourselves to the 
more practical 'how'. This thesis makes no great claims with regard to the 
development or testing of theories to explain how and why particular institutional 
arrangements exist in the case of Malaysia. Although a case study approach was 
employed in the production of this the central concern was not to examine or test a 
particular theory of welfare development. Rather this study, which is evaluative in 
nature, seeks to avoid 'an emphasis on 'testing' (which) imposes competition on 
theories which can be made to be complementary.' Furthermore, 'In historical case 
studies theory is the servant rather than the master, generating explanations and 
guiding the search for data. A feature of this work is its willingness to grapple with 
the historical and institutional specifics of the countries under study ... case studies 
often ... aim for commonalities in their explanations whilst acknowledging 
idiosyncratic features.' (Mabett and Bolderson, 1999: 35-36). 
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In the context of this thesis, it is important to underline the fact that the methods used 
were determined by both the subject matter in hand and the employment of a case 
study approach. By this is meant simply that the methods employed were those which 
are most commonly found within the framework of a case study approach and which 
were both manageable and would be best suited to yielding the depth and breadth of 
data required. Bryman (200 1: 48) contends that 'The basic case study entails the 
detailed and intensive analysis of a single case'. By examining the 'fit for purpose' 
nature of the EPF, particular research methods such as secondary data analysis and 
documentary research were selected as the most appropriate in order to achieve such 
an analysis. It was such methods which would enable the exploration of both the EPF 
as the de-facto pension system in Malaysia as well as facilitating the production of a 
case study of Malaysia which takes account of the social, political and ethnic 
dimensions of welfare arrangements. As stated by Mabbet and Bolderson ( 1999: 36-
7), evaluative studies can often focus on a 'narrowly defined set of intervention, such 
as cash benefits for various contingencies. A grounding in social policy is reflected in 
the care taken to describe the allocation system ... and in an evaluative underpinning 
concerned with the effectiveness of the government in achieving an allocation of 
resources which meets needs ... researchers are usually interested in, for example, the 
adequacy of provision, the coverage of population, and the equity or otherwise of 
treatment of different groups in the population'. 
To examine the 'fit for purpose' nature of the EPF in light of the four key challenges 
identified on page one required an analysis of a particular set of data. Clearly data 
produced by the EPF was in itself central to any exploration of its efficacy as a 
pension provider; this included examining a number of Annual Reports as well as 
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articles and chapters by other authors who have explored similar themes. In 
particular, quantitative data which detailed the levels of savings, coverage of the 
scheme and authorised investments were key to determining whether or not the EPF 
was able to meet its clearly stated aim. In addition to these data, further data on 
demographic projections, poverty rates and levels of unemployment as well as 
composition and performance of the Malaysian economy were collated from a 
number of sources. These included the Malaysian Departments of Statistics, Social 
Welfare, Manpower and Women and Development, a number of Malaysian 
Development Plans and United Nations organisations amongst others. 
Thus the main research methods employed in this thesis are documentary research and 
secondary data analysis. Documentary analysis can be both a valid tool for the 
production of questions and ideas in the developing research process, and a 
complementary method which enables the furthering of investigation within the 
framework of the case study approach. Indeed as Bryman (200 1: 52) notes 'Case 
study research frequently includes a longitudinal element... by analysing archival 
information'. Both aspects of this method have deployed, and this has enabled not 
only the grounding of the thesis within of a wider academic context, but also has lead 
to the development of a less general and more precise focus for the study. 
Clearly there are alternative research methods which could have been employed but 
which were not for very good reasons. As an example, survey research in the form of 
a structured questionnaire administered to a representative sample of the EPF 
membership could have produced very useful quantitative primary data. However, it 
was not possible to employ such a method as this would have, at the very least, 
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required multi-language skills which the researcher does not possess. In addition to 
this, Malaysia is a very structured and status-oriented society and the author did not 
have the required status to gain access to the membership rolls which would have 
been required to generate the sample. Some success was possible in generating a list 
of suitable interviewees, although as is noted below this was as a result of tapping into 
the international academic network, which in part circumvented the issue of status. 
Malaysia was chosen for a variety of reasons, which though not necessarily 
compelling in isolation, combined to provide convincing evidence from which to 
proceed. Bryman (200 1: 51) argues that 'Cases are often chosen not because they are 
extreme or unusual in some way but because they provide a suitable context for 
certain research questions to be answered'. In short Malaysia fitted the profile of a 
rapidly industrialising, urbanising nation and importantly, it was not one of those 
countries identified as tiger economies. It was ranked in the low-middle income 
bracket (World Bank, 1994) in which increased income inequality was, despite rapid 
reductions in poverty rates, a growing concern for an ageing population (7MP, 1996). 
Social policy reform that had taken place had, on the whole, focussed on the 
expansion of education and health (Roemer, 1991) with the NEP acting as the 
overarching social policy, which sought to advantage the Malays over other ethnic 
groups (Teik, 2001 ). The result of these factors encouraged further study, focussing 
on how so apparently liberal a regime could address the growing problem of shortfalls 
in income provision for the elderly not only amongst the poor, but also those middle 
class Malaysians for whom old age should not have presented so financially 
precarious an existence. Implicit in this is the role played by the state in offering 
financial support to the elderly. It is argued here that in light of the effects of 
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economic globalisation which Mahathir's, and now Prime Minister Badawi's, 
Malaysia has positively accepted, the rapid industrialisation and exponential growth 
of urban centres in the last 30 years combined with the attendant demographic shift 
towards an ageing population, has resulted in serious issues concerning the ability of 
individuals to fund their now extended old age. 
The case study approach 
Bryman (200 1) comments on the blurred boundaries which can incorporate a number 
of research designs, each of which can go under the name of case study. He argues 
strongly that the term 'case study' should be employed only in 'those instances where 
the 'case' is the focus of interest in its own right'. Comparative social policy studies 
seek to describe, analyse and map different states' welfare responses to common 
issues. Those projects which employ a case study approach do not make great claims 
to theoretical development or to the construction of models which are transferable or 
representative 'Instead case study researchers ... generate an intensive examination of 
a single case, in relation to which they engage in theoretical analysis' (Bryman, 2001: 
52). Furthermore, the case study 'allows a researcher to tell a country-specific story, 
and thereby escapes the problem of operationalising concepts in a uniform way.' 
(Mabbett and Bolderson, 1999: 55). And despite Amenta's claims (1993:760) that 
'case studies and close comparisons of countries have been and will remain the main 
means for understanding the development of public spending policies', it should be 
noted that employing a case study approach does not result in problem free research. 
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• Advantages 
In this instance it is worth citing the claims put forward by Mabbett and Bolderson 
( 1999). They argue that the case study approach is suitable for those researchers who 
have neither a strong theoretical direction nor the luxury of long-term immersion, 
which would allow issues to reveal themselves. This approach allows the researcher 
to focus on one or two cases and gain intimate knowledge of the case in question. 
Further this enables a greater degree of openness in the adoption of a research 
methodology which, though remaining systematic, is 'open in its approach to 
gathering comparative material' (Mabbett and Bolderson, 1999: 51). 
• Disadvantages 
There are a number of well known disadvantages to the use of the case study 
approach, the central concerns being issues of access and affordability and 
generalization. In the case of the former, and as Mabbett and Bolderson ( 1999: 51) 
suggest, in all studies 'which try to get closer to culture-specific factors, there are 
problems of applying the methodology.' In part this is due to the location for sources, 
data require 'on-site visits and face-to-face interviews' and 'these are especially 
resource intensive in the cross-national context.' (ibid) This study made full use of 
the range of data sources available for the case study approach. In particular, during 
the process of research, this study employed a short field trip, or research safari 
(Hantrais and Mangen, 1996; Mabbett and Bolderson, 1999) supplemented by 
documentary data gathered from both national and international sources. 
Issues of generalisation, or more accurately in the context of this study, this being the 
manner in which the findings of this piece of research can be said to be applicable to 
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other similar cases, was dealt with in two main ways. Firstly there is a recognition 
that the findings of this study may be somewhat individualistic. Indeed Bryman 
(1988: 88) cites the observation given by Bulmer (1986) that a 'researcher's ability to 
have an impact on social policy through the use of the case study can be diminished 
by a belief that the findings may be idiosyncratic.' This can be countered in two 
ways. Firstly, there is little point in suggesting that this researcher aimed to make any 
impact upon current social policy arrangements in Malaysia. This research, whilst 
being on the whole evaluative, does seek to illuminate genuine concerns whilst 
remaining wholly pragmatic regarding the impact that any results will have. In 
general this study is contributing to the wider academic debate regarding the adequacy 
of current policies for old age incomes and the emphasis on individual arrangements, 
not only in the specific context of Malaysia and Southeast Asia but in the developed 
world also. Secondly, in an attempt to counter any claims that the scope of the study 
is too limited to be of use, Singapore is employed as a comparator case in order both 
to widen the field of research and challenge the view that the current development 
path of old age incomes in Malaysia would lessen the possibility of poverty and social 
exclusion amongst the future elderly. Furthermore, there remains the underlying 
recognition that evaluative research requires comparing like with like (Mabbett and 
Bolderson, 1999), and as this thesis clearly demonstrates in the case of Malaysian and 
Singaporean use of the provident fund mechanism there is enough similarity to make 
the comparative element of the study both useful and worthwhile. 
As stated above, the primary methods of data collection have been a mixture of 
documentary research, secondary data analysis, which were supplemented by a small 
number of semi structured interviews which took place during the short field trip to 
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Malaysia and Singapore. The thesis employs a case study approach and in doing so 
subscribes to the view put forward by Mabbett and Bolderson ( 1999: 49) who argue 
that 'In the context of comparative social policy, the characteristic feature of a case 
study approach is that the research examines the specific institutional, historical and 
political features of each country covered, instead of imposing a standardizing 
framework whereby only pre-selected items of data are accepted for incorporation 
into analysis. Furthermore, case studies allow an open view to be taken about causal 
linkages, with historical analysis often used to examine how events unfold.' By 
employing such an approach, the thesis seeks to illuminate issues facing Malaysia in 
particular, and NICs in general, as they deal with increased exposure to the various 
forces exerted through the processes of globalisation, a demographic shift towards an 
elderly/greying population and more pertinently how issues such as risk of poverty in 
old age can be ameliorated by the actions, or otherwise, of the state. 
It is this latter point which provided the main focus for choosing Malaysia as the case 
to study and which also resulted in the use of Singapore as a 'comparator case' with 
reference to the preferred employment of the provident fund mechanism in both 
instances. Hantrais and Mangen (1996: 4) argue that the case study approach is well 
suited to research which involves the investigation of a small number of countries, 
and 'where researchers are required to have intimate knowledge of all the countries 
under study.' It is this comparative element which gives the thesis an added degree of 
rigour and which allows for a degree of generalization to take place. By looking at 
the structures for old age incomes in both Malaysia and Singapore the thesis seeks to 
challenge the view expressed in some quarters (Gough, 2000a) that the provident fund 
mechanism in general and the EPF in particular could become a regional model for 
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pension provision. On a recognisably basic level, the question was posed, 'Should 
Malaysia follow the example of Singapore?' If so, then should Malaysia seek to 
enlarge the scope of issues addressed through the provident fund mechanism, or 
should some other approach be adopted in order to deal with the combination of 
factors brought about by rapid industrialisation, the effects of economic globalisation 
on a relatively open economy and an ongoing demographic shift? 
Malaysia then met the defined criteria and presented the added challenge and 
opportunity of an investigation into the preferred path of reform of the provident fund 
mechanism. This in effect meant that the central reason for members continuing to 
pay into their account was no longer simply security in old age, although this remains 
a central feature of the fund, but rather was to meet the ongoing needs across the adult 
life course. In this way the logical comparator selected itself and so Singapore, which 
has set the precedence for enlarging the scope of the provident fund remit, was 
decided upon. 
Documentary research 
Documentary research is both a valid and useful tool from which to generate 
hypotheses and also as a stand-alone research tool it has its own intrinsic value. The 
method has a long and distinguished history and is often noted to as the primary 
method in the work of Marx, Weber and Durkheim (Macdonald and Tipton, 1993; 
Tuchman, 1998). In the course of the research for this thesis a variety of documentary 
evidence was utilised including historical accounts, media reports, both print and 
electronic, previous research by individuals and organisations and official 
governmental publications and statistics. 
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One of main the concerns associated with this method is that of evaluation and 
interpretation. Many documents are produced to be read in a certain manner in order 
more easily disseminate information and to get a specific message across and this 
does not confine itself to official publications (Bryman, 2001 ). In the case of 
Malaysia the print media is on the whole owned or controlled by members of the 
Barisan Nasional. There is little critical journalism and the government line is 
blatantly touted. To offset such bias one has to rely on electronic media mainly in the 
form of malaysiakini.com and the electronic version of Aliran for, on the whole, 
objective reportage. It could be suggested that Malaysian electronic media is as open 
to bias or distortion (Macdonald and Tipton, 1993) as traditional print formats such as 
The Star or The Sun, however the fact that malaysiakini has been subject to attack 
from government sources at least frees it from one charge of bias and evens the field 
somewhat. The result is some degree of balance from which an impression of 
contemporary Malaysia has been garnered during the period of the study. 
One the whole it was context, knowledge and understanding which was sought from 
the process of documentary research. The advantage of this method is the ability to 
source large amounts of data in a manageable and cost effective manner. The often 
over looked negative aspect of documentary research; however, is precisely the 'cost' 
in terms of time that is required to select and discard, process and analyse, and finally 
employ examples in the process of writing. Also as Bryman (200 1: 216) points out 
there is some 'unease' about certain types of official data, and indeed the statistics 
which detail the success of poverty reduction schemes in Malaysia do contain 
weaknesses (see Chapter 3: 125 and Chapter 6: 218-220 below), although Bryman is 
clear that documentary research in the form of secondary data analysis presents few 
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other disadvantages. A final inconvenience, which was associated with the use of 
documentary research, was access to official data sets. This was important not only 
for the actual data itself, but to enable evaluation of other research to take place using 
the original data sets where possible. In part this was overcome by the collation of as 
wide a series of data as possible through secondary sources, and obtaining published 
primary data from the Department of Statistics in Kuala Lumpur in person, which 
formed one of the key aims of the field trip. 
As alluded to earlier, a variety of methods were employed in order to give a greater 
degree of understanding, depth and context to the study. Whether we use the term 
multiple strategies (Burgess, 1984) or triangulation (Bryman, 1988; Macdonald and 
Tipton, 1993; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998) the objective is the same, that is 'The 
combination of multiple methods, empirical materials, perspectives and observers in a 
single study is best understood, then, as a strategy that adds rigour, breadth, and depth 
to any investigation.' (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 4 ). To complement the 
documentary method and secondary data analysis a short self-funded field trip was 
arranged which fits the 'safari' approach as described by Hantrais and Mangen ( 1996) 
where a single researcher carries out research in a small number of countries. The 
field trip, though not unproblematic, was undertaken in order to achieve a variety of 
aims. These included gaining access to hard to source data, interviewing key 
individuals and the representative of the main organisations, namely the Malaysian 
Social Security Organisation (SOCSO) and the EPF, and gaining a sense of place 
through casual observation. 
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Interviews 
An important point to note is that due to the nature of the case study approach and, in 
part, due to the constraints affecting the trip such as time, expense and problems of 
access to desired interviewees, the interviews themselves contributed contextual 
understanding only. This applied to prior documentary analysis and in turn prompted 
further documentary research upon return. The interviews do not, in any way, form a 
major part of the analytical element of the thesis. However, the field trip was 
invaluable, not only in the production of context and access to data, but in terms of 
improving knowledge and understanding that could be brought to the analysis and the 
final product, the thesis, itself. 
In order to generate a suitable 'sample' for the interview schedule two aspects of one 
sampling method were employed. It was decided that snowball sampling would be 
the most effective method by which to gain access to the desired sample (Macdonald 
and Tipton, 1993). In the first instance direct mailing was used to Malaysia based 
individuals and organisations. However, this resulted in a very poor response rate. 
Fortunately an alternative sample was generated through email to a small randomly 
selected group whose names were generated through the process of documentary 
research and who were accessible through the international academic network. The 
resulting initial interview schedule was further supplemented by cold-calling 
individuals and organisations, whether in person, through email, door-stepping or via 
the telephone throughout the duration of the field trip. It should be noted that 
representatives of the major political parties, the National Council of Senior Citizens 
Organisation and the MTUC could not be included in the sample due either to non-
response or the constraints of time and expense. 
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The interviews themselves were conducted on a semi-structured basis. There were 
very definite reasons for employing this particular method, and the subject matter was 
by far the overriding consideration. What was sought from the interviews was 
information about the ways in which both individuals and organisations viewed the 
issue of old age incomes. In part the aim was to elicit information and opinions from 
regional based experts (Kvale, 1996; Esterberg, 2002). There were certain core 
topics, which were covered in all interviews, although the format of the questions and 
their timing within the interview differed depending upon the interviewee. This gave 
a degree of flexibility to the interviews, which enabled the interviewee's freer rein to 
discuss their own individual viewpoints, which was in part a core aim of the meetings 
(Kvale, 1996; Wengraf, 2001; Hall and Hall, 2004). The interviews were recorded for 
later transcription, however, it should be noted that on two occasions this was not 
possible due to location in the first instance, which precluded any quality audio 
recording, and spontaneity in the second, which saw the interviewer unprepared. In 
both instances handwritten notes were taken which were written up immediately after 
the interview. 
A research diary was kept to record events and appointments, and also to record 
impressions of place. There were instances during the field trip, which seemed to 
capture previously documented situations, whether it be the general ethnic divide, or 
the eo-joining of ethnicity and class. Similarly expected impressions were altered or 
reversed. All of which, despite the limited data that was generated through 
interviews, resulted in a useful and worthwhile exercise enhancing both the process 
and the product. 
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Conclusion 
The core argument of this thesis is, in short, that one of the major stmts of Malaysia's 
welfare system is under pressure from the combined impact of pressures stemming 
from economic globalisation, on the one hand, and others grounded in accepted 
domestic institutional arrangements, on the other. Global economic pressures have 
changed the socio-economic stmcture of Malaysia, resulting in a highly urbanised 
population employed in an increasingly insecure and volatile labour market. Large 
scale urbanisation has increased pressure on traditional forms of support and informal 
welfare arrangements (Jomo, 2001). The socio-economic changes which have taken 
place in Malaysia have seen class begin to combine with institutionalised ethnic 
divisions as the main locus of inequality. Increased wage inequality and insecure 
employment calls into question the ability of the EPF to fulfil its central remit. This 
chapter has highlighted key themes which will be explored in this thesis and this will 
be achieved by employing a dual approach which privileges globalisation and 
historical institutionalism as the 'best fit' approach to answer the question 'Can the 
Malaysian EPF, as presently constmed, provide sufficiently for the Malaysian 
population in old age?' 
The case study approach employed in the production of this thesis was also examined 
in this chapter along with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this 
approach. It was argued that the methods chosen are those best suited to yield the 
depth and breadth of data required and which also allow the researcher to tell what 
Mabbet and Bolderson ( 1999: 55) refer to as a 'country specific story'. It was 
acknowledged that there are alternative methods which could have produced useful 
primary data, such as a stmctured questionnaire delivered to a representative sample 
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of the membership of the EPF. However, such a method was unworkable due to a 
lack of language skills and a perceived relatively low status of the researcher in the 
Malaysian context. 
Looking ahead, Chapter 2 examines the institutionalised nature of the Malaysian 
political economy and places the Malaysian welfare regime in an historical 
perspective. Employing an historical institutionalist approach, it is argued the 
moribund nature of Malaysia's political economy has inhibited the reform process and 
so allowed the Malay political elite to remain in power. The chapter argues that 
current welfare arrangements are a consequence of path dependence (Pierson, 2000b) 
and that the 'ways of doing of welfare' in Malaysia, are a result of historically 
institutionalised political, social and cultural arrangements. 
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Chapter Two 
Malaysian welfare regime in historical perspective 
Malaysia has been politically stable since independence with only a brief hiatus in 
1969. However, the effects of colonial immigration policies, negotiations at the time 
of independence coupled with the active pro-Malay strategies of policies such as the 
New Economic Policy ( 1971-1990) and subsequent legislation have had long lasting 
and wide ranging effects on both the political and socio-economic nature of 
Malaysian society. March and Olsen (1998) have suggested that a legitimation of 
political rule can be found in the embedded structures which have developed over 
time and which give meaning and order to society. Malaysia clearly has an 
institutionalised political economy and it is argued here that the form in which it 
currently exists is a consequence of path dependence (Pierson, 2000b) and 
subsequently, that the 'ways of doing of welfare' in Malaysia, reliant as they are on 
historically induced political, social and cultural arrangements, are institutionally 
bound. 
The EPF was formed as a colonial institution in 1951 and was eo-opted and 
maintained by subsequent governments since independence in 1957. It is interesting 
to note, that the single most important reform to the EPF came in the shape of the 
1991 Employees Provident Fund Act which made provisions for the increase use of 
equity investments by the EPF Board. Furthermore, given recent political events such 
as the Reformasi movement of the late 1990s, the Malaysian polity is clearly resistant 
to change in that it reflects and favours the interest of a distinct ethno-class faction 
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namely the majority Malay, and increasingly middle class, population. In this 
instance, as was suggested in Chapter 1, historical institutionalism is the most 
appropriate and illuminating strand of what has been termed 'New institutionalism' (S 
Reich 2000). It is as a consequence of decisions taken during the colonial period, at 
the time of independence and later during the early 1970s which created embedded 
social, ethnic and political structures which still determine the way in which Malaysia 
does politics at the beginning of the 21 51 century. That is not to say that the political 
establishment in the form of the Barisan Nasional has not come under pressure from 
political opponents, rather that it is adept at eo-opting 'popular' positions without 
necessarily changing its ways of doing politics. Two clear examples of this are the 
adoption of the Islamic revival movement of the 1970s and 1980s and the politically 
expedient use of the rhetoric of 'Asian values'. However, an institutionalist approach 
reinforces the complexities of embedded welfare policies such as the EPF in 
Malaysia, intertwined as they are with political, social and cultural arrangements, 
which mediate the effects external pressures are likely to have on any reform process. 
The growth of the Malaysian economy and the countries rapid rise as one of Southeast 
Asia's 'little tigers' has resulted in an increasingly urbanised population, as the lure of 
paid employment has proved irresistible to those previously 'employed' in small scale 
family agricultural businesses. There has been a significant increase in the numbers 
of female employees in the new semi-skilled manufacturing enterprises, although this 
state of affairs is by no means guaranteed to continue as the crisis that rocked the 
Malaysian (and regional) economy in 1997 has proved. The previously admired 
growth rate in the economy of above 7 per cent, consistent for 8 years during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, has predictably slowed as foreign free floating capital has 
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drifted away leaving shortfalls in predicted economic growth. A feature of this 
urbanisation has been the influx of Malays into previously Chinese dominated urban 
settings. A major feature of the post 1969 NEP included the Islamisation of what has 
been termed the 'new' Malaysian middle class. 
An underlying theme of this chapter then is the notion that this process of middle 
class construction along ethnic lines may yet lead to calls from within this 
numerically larger section of society for greater governmental responsibility for the 
welfare of all Malaysian citizens, and in particular the elderly (Asher, 2000). 
However, radical reform is likely to be made more difficult by both previous 
arrangements and the very policies which gave rise to the growing Malay middle 
classes. To be clear, it is not suggested that a Malay middle class is a new 
phenomenon, rather that the structure of Malaysian society has been altered to 
privilege a certain ethnic grouping and this has resulted in a broadening of this socio-
economic class faction. Central to this shift in the social structure of Malaysian 
society has been the role of active policies such as the NEP, the National 
Development Policy (NDP- 1991-2000) and the National Vision Policy (NVP-
2001-2010). Through these three initiatives the state has sought to promote the 
interests of ethnic Malays, which as Torii (2003) argues has 'set aside the principle of 
equal opportunities and instead skewed opportunities and the distribution of the 
growth pie in the direction of the Bumiputera through the implementation of priority 
distribution based on an ethnic quota system'. To this end, class is defined by 
occupation in relation to status and power, and in particular it is argued that the 
process of middle class expansion, which took place against a background of a 
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'reinvention' of Malay or Bumiputera tradition, sought to enhance the primary role of 
Islam and the centrality of the family in contemporary Malaysian society. 
To counteract this notion of an 'Islamisation' of Malaysia one must also take into 
account the role that tradition, religion and ethnic difference must play in the 
ethnically diverse society that is modern Malaysia. The following discussion will 
focus on the two (numerically) main ethnic groups, Malay and Chinese, and will only 
make passing reference to the Indian community. The chapter is framed by the notion 
that reinvention of tradition includes as a by product the reluctance of the state to 
engage in full blown Western style welfare initiatives, however, a future challenge to 
this implied evasion may come from an increasingly economically insecure middle 
class producing a more vocal demand for greater state support. 
What must be resisted however is the notion that western models of welfare are to be 
viewed as 'ideal' and thereby transportable to areas of rich and divergent historical, 
cultural and economic difference. It is at this point cogent for the author to take 
exception to the notion proposed by Esping-Andersen ( 1990) in the influential text 
'Three Worlds of Welfare'. The ideas promulgated in this text infer that the 
complexity of welfare provision can be reduced to three identifiable models, with 
roots firmly embedded in the 'western' concept of welfare statism (albeit in three 
markedly different models). This is believed to be both short-sighted and displaying 
the kind of western-specificity that is best consigned to an historical perspective, one 
dated, acknowledged and dismissed. To acknowledge difference is to open the debate 
to influence and diversity of opinion. One can recognise the influence of colonial and 
external notions of welfarism, but it would be quite wrong to stop there. The 
individual nature of welfare provision is apparent and culturally specific. To lump 
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together divergent states as representative of one form or another misleads and 
obscures the true features of the manner in which emerging nations can be seen to 
cope with the increasing demands of a rapidly developing urban culture. 
Furthermore, as was stated earlier in Chapter l, a form of welfare regime 
development, namely that which has been termed productivist welfare capitalism 
(Gough, 2004; Holliday, 2000; 2005) is both descriptively flexible and economically 
accurate and as such is operationalised as the preferred term in this thesis. 
At present Malaysia is governed by the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO) dominated Barisan Nasional, a multi-ethnic coalition formerly led by the 
long serving Or Mahathir Mohamad, and now under the direction of the current Prime 
Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The nature of Malaysian parliamentary 
democracy thus far, although undoubtedly authoritarian in nature, has been a struggle 
to include all ethnic communities, whilst simultaneously promoting the interests of the 
numerically superior Malays or Bumiputera (sons of the soil). That matters have been 
further complicated by religious (mainly Islamic) revivalism since the 1970s has been 
well documented and will be addressed briefly below. It would be nai've (aside from 
being fundamentally incorrect) to assume that this balancing act has always been 
successfully accomplished and some attention must be paid to the nature of Malaysian 
democracy in order to document incidents that have threatened fragile intra-ethnic 
stability. The alternative is probably best substantiated by the evidence of the post 
election riots of May 1969 in Kuala Lumpur between the two main ethnic groups, the 
Malays and Chinese. 
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To fully explain the need for this institutionalised intra-ethnic alliance, one must first 
take a historically backward glance to uncover the fundamental causes of the current 
state of ethnic division in contemporary Malaysia. What is the root cause of ethnic 
division that still plays a major role in the internal politics of a modern, rapidly 
developing nation state? As with many other areas of Asia the fundamental cause can 
be traced to the none too distant colonial past and the measures taken by the British 
administration during its 150 year tenure. It should be noted that this section is 
intended to be both brief and necessarily selective in identifying the factors that have 
contributed to the formation of the contemporary Malaysian state. 
British Colonial Malaya 
In common with many other colonial territories, the raison d'etre for the incorporation 
of the Malay peninsular into the sphere of British imperial control was simply a 
question of economic security and expansion. Initially the acquisition of Penang as a 
trading port by the British East India Company in 1786, was as much to do with the 
need to secure open sea lanes and access to the straits of Malacca, as safe harbourage 
for the British Navy during the annual monsoon season. This initial solution proved 
unsatisfactory and in 1819 a treaty was negotiated which granted the British East 
India Company the right to establish a trading settlement on the island of Singapore. 
This arrangement was far more suitable, and despite a brief disagreement with the 
Dutch, the company was able to secure passage through the lucrative shipping lanes 
plying trade between India and China. It is from this secure base that the British 
increased their influence throughout the peninsular. 
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The British were initially, at best, uninterested in extending their power and influence 
over the Malay peninsular although this attitude had changed by the signing of the 
Pangkor Treaty in 1874. The main reason for this shift can be traced to concerns in 
London that other European powers, particularly Germany, were intent upon 
extending their influence towards Southeast Asia (Andaya and Andaya, 1982). 
Although the colonial office began to take greater interest in the internal affairs of the 
peninsular, influence was never fully extended to cover the entire region. The 
peninsular was divided between the Federated Malay States (FMS) which were 
closely co-ordinated by the colonial office and the Unfederated Malay States (UMS) 
which maintained their own systems of administration. This pattern remained intact 
until the outbreak of World War Two and the subsequent Japanese invasion. 
The British involvement in Malaya resulted from economic and imperial necessity 
and it is the former rather than the latter, which can be seen as the engine behind the 
ethnic diversification of peninsular Malaya. It would be foolish to ignore the earlier 
migrations of non-indigenous ethnic groups to the peninsular, be they Indian, Arab, 
Chinese or Indonesian, which stretches back centuries before the British involvement. 
However, these migrations were far fewer in number and left fainter imprints on the 
demographic nature of the population. Traditionally Malay peasants were agricultural 
and wedded to the land, it fell to the Chinese to exploit the tin industry as 
entrepreneurs and, later and in greater numbers, as workers. The peninsula's other 
main economic potential of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
derived from rubber. It was this industry which led to large-scale immigration of the 
Indian, mainly Tamil, population. 
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It is during this 'middle' colonial period that the now embedded ethnic foundations of 
contemporary Malaysia were established. Due in patt to the need for labour, the 
British colonial administration engaged in an open door immigration policy from 
Mainland China and in the form of indentured labour from the Indian Subcontinent. 
These economic migrants were never intended to become permanent statistics in the 
Malayan makeup, and indeed the British failed in their attempts to woo Chinese and 
Indian farmer to invest in the emergent rice industry, precisely because of its long 
term nature (Andaya and Andaya, 1982). This wage labour immigration remained a 
feature of economic expansion until the 1930s when the effects of the worldwide 
recession restricted demand for Malayan tin and rubber. The 1931 census shows just 
how successful this policy had been, reducing Malays to a numerical minority (44.7 
per cent) in relation to the Chinese (39 per cent) and Indian (14.2 per cent) aggregate 
population (Nagata, 1979: 11). 
What the colonial administration did succeed in, however, was the creation of an 
institutionally embedded and ethnically divided labour force. During the pre-colonial 
period ethnicity was of less importance 'as a basic identity and was one aspect of a 
broader set of economic and political consideration' (Nagata, 1979: 10). The colonial 
period saw the division of labour along more clearly ethnic lines with Malays 
employed in the civil service and agriculture, the Chinese as urban entrepreneurs and 
tin miners, and the Indians as mainly employed as plantation workers in both the 
rubber and sugar industries. N agata ( 1979) argues that it is at this point that ethnicity 
becomes 'crystallised' into effective boundaries of demarcation, linking identity to 
economic, political and legal status, which clearly resonates throughout the 
contemporary political scene in Malaysia (Nagata, 1979; Munro-Kua, 1996). A point 
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of conflict was created; communalism ensured that ethnic difference would be the 
central feature of an independent Malaya. This notion was re-enforced during the 
Japanese occupation and post-war state of emergency. From 1948 and continuing for 
nearly two years, the mainly Chinese Malayan Communist Party (MCP) sought to 
destabilise the country by means of a radicalised trades union movement and use of 
violence through guerrilla warfare. The British retaliated by the declaration of a 
nation-wide state of emergency that lasted until 1960, post independence, and in some 
respects set the precedent for authoritarian responses to internal communally based 
threats, real or otherwise. One crude aspect of the emergency was the Briggs Plan 
whereby more than 500,000 Chinese were forcibly relocated into barbed wire 
surrounded and guarded 'New Villages' to prevent aid reaching the jungle based 
guen·illas of the MCP. 
Post war moves towards independence 
The 1946 Malayan Union foundered on ethnicity as Malay concerns grew regarding 
their status, being seen not as a nation but rather as a community or ethnic group. The 
1948 Federation Agreement saw ethnicity as a central feature, granting power and 
jurisdiction to the Sultans and providing special educational training for Malays, 
thereby enabling their maintenance of position in the sphere of politics and 
administration. Munro-Kua (1996) argues that the 'Emergency' was to have a 
profound impact on the future development of an independent post-colonial State. 
Thus resulting in 'a nationalism founded on a 'national security' ideology in which 
communalism became a central element. .. a rationale for rejecting debate on 
democratic rights ... a communal perspective of uneven economic development' 
(Munro-Kua, 1996: 11). 
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The tricky notion of citizenship reinforced ethnic identity and culture as the basis for 
qualification, over and above the place of birth. Thus all Malays automatically, by 
law, became citizens whereas non-Malays, regardless of place of birth had to apply 
for citizenship. There were exceptions for those who habitually spoke Malay and 
conformed to Malay customs, thus conferring citizenship on many resident 
Indonesians. The Federal Agreement succeeded in making ethnicity the central issue 
(Nagata, 1979; Andaya and Andaya, 1982). 
The Bargain 
The sharply delineated ethnic boundaries existed in political as well as economic 
institutions and the national Alliance Organisation which came together to broker the 
bargain for independence in 1953 reflected this. The United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan 
Indian Congress (MIC) formed the bulk of the Alliance party (formed in 1957) 
members representing the communal ethnic bourgeois population. The first national 
elections to the Legislative Council in 1955 confounded British hopes for a truly 
multi-ethnic party and the Alliance was recognised as the best workable alternative. 
Clearly UMNO was to be the dominant partner seeking to reassert Malay interests in 
the face of numerical minority status, and with the incentive on independence 
looming large the three parties entered into intense negotiations resulting in what has 
been termed the 'Bargain'. 
In short the Bargain institutionalised political dominance for the indigenous Malays in 
return for relatively socio-economic freedom for non-Malays. The majority of the 
agreed points made it into the constitution; Islam was to be the state religion although 
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religious freedom was guaranteed. Under article 153, special rights were accorded to 
the Malay population in the form of quotas in the areas of land acquisition (at least 
50% of land in each state to remain under Malay ownership), education (later to 
include university admissions) and employment in the public services and the armed 
forces. The specific rationale for these privileges was to enable the Malays to 'catch 
up' specifically with the Chinese population. In return the non-Malays achieved their 
main desire, namely citizenship based on country of birth (Nagata, 1979; Milne and 
Mauzy, 1986). 
The Constitution legislated for a federal system of parliamentary government, headed 
by a constitutional monarch (Paramount Ruler- Y ang Dipertuan Agung) elected by 
the Conference of Rulers (Durbar) to serve a five-year term. Parliament was to 
consist of a more powerful House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat) and a less 
powerful appointed Senate (Dewan Negara). There was to be an in dependent 
judiciary and although parliament was to be the supreme law making body reliant on a 
two thirds majority, the states retained areas of autonomy such as Islamic law, land, 
mining, forestry and local government. Article 150 of the new Constitution made 
provision for extensive powers under a declaration of a state of emergency by the 
elected monarch acting on government advice, including the suspension of 
parliamentary rule. Under an Alliance government headed by Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, the Federation of Malaya became an independent state on August 31st 
1957. 
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Towards Malaysia 
In the immediate post-independence period the Alliance government maintained both 
ethnic and economic stability. The 1959 Federal elections, however, indicated the 
ethnically divisive nature of the political scene. The Alliance maintained its majority, 
winning 74 of the 104 seats but its popular vote declined to just over 51 per cent 
(Milne and Mauzy, 1986). The Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia or 
PAS) built on its gains in the preceding state elections to achieve the largest 
opposition bloc of seats (13). As in the state elections PAS invoked Malay nationalist 
fears and accused UMNO of selling out the birthright of Malays and the Alliance was 
clearly rattled by internal strife (notably a split in the MCA) and the federal losses. In 
1960 the Emergency came to an end and was immediately replaced by the equally 
repressive Internal Security Act (ISA). Under both these measures economic stability 
and vital foreign investment were ensured through anti trade union legislation and the 
extensive use of detention without trial. The Alliance relied on its two-thirds majority 
to pass the ISA and thus refute criticism. We will look more closely at the 
authoritarian nature of Malaysian politics in a later section, making note of the so-
called populist approach adopted by the ruling coalition since May 1969. 
In 1961, the Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman announced the proposed expansion 
of Malaya to include Singapore, North Borneo (later Sabah), Brunei and Sarawak. 
Elements of this proposal were by no means new as far as Singapore was concerned, 
but this notion had previously been dismissed due to fears of incorporating 
Singapore's predominantly Chinese population and risking upsetting the ethnic 
balance within Malaya. These fears expressed by UMNO members were now 
partially allayed by the possibility of including the Muslim Borneo states and thus 
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maintaining the ethnic balance. The proposed move was favoured by both the 
Singaporean government and its people and received popular endorsement via a 
referendum. The Borneo states took a little more persuasion, but North Borneo and 
Sarawak agreed after receiving guarantees regarding degrees of autonomy at state 
level. These included control over immigration, concessions regarding language, 
education and religious practice, and formed part of the 1963 Malaysian Constitution. 
The victories of the Sabah Alliance and the Sarawak Alliance in the 1963 state 
elections resulted in entry into negotiations to enter the Federation. Brunei withdrew 
from the proposal due to differences concerning oil revenues and the Sultan's 
eligibility for the post of Yang Dipertuan Agung (Milne and Mauzy, 1986; Andaya 
and Andaya, 1982). The Federation of Malaysia was officially formed on the 161h 
September 1963 in the face of continuing opposition from the neighbouring states of 
Indonesia and the Philippines. However, the configuration did not last long. Amid 
damaged relations between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore due to the political 
ambitions of the Chinese dominated Peoples Action Party led by Lee Kuan Yew, calls 
for a Malaysian Malaysia and the very real threat of communal violence, Singapore 
was officially separated from the Federation in August 1965. Malaysia had withstood 
diplomatic and military pressure, but had succumbed to the threat of violence from its 
own peoples. 
The period 1964 to 1969 was dominated by ethnic concerns. The solution to the 
threat of communal violence was to be the formation of a Malaysian citizenship 
encouraging loyalty to the nation rather than the ethnic group. The interpretation of 
what constituted the new Malaysian citizenship became a contentious issue. The 
Alliance, dominated by UNMO, decided that traditional culture and heritage in the 
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form of Malay language and culture should form the basis of the new citizen. Quite 
naturally other ethnic groups argued for a stronger Malaysian identity that would truly 
reflect the multi-ethnic composition of the country. One of the flash points was to be 
the instigation of a national language due in 1967. The 1957 constitution had 
included a provision that would see Malay as the sole official language after 10 years; 
in the case of Sabah and Sarawak this was to be ten years after their entry into the 
federation. The Alliance government compromised on the issue of language, in the 
form of the 1967 Language Act, which did little to satisfy the communal elements of 
each ethnic group. The Malays viewed the instigation of Bhasa Malaysia as both a 
source of cultural pride and a means of obtaining the advantages needed to enable 
ethnic Malays to keep pace with the increased rate of development. The Chinese 
community saw the language issue, alongside that of education, as yet another step 
towards the disintegration of Chinese culture. 
The 1969 Federal elections were fought against a highly charged backdrop of ethnic 
concerns over language and education. For the first time the Alliance was unable to 
unite against a common external threat, which had previously diverted attention away 
from greater communal concerns (Andaya and Andaya, 1982; Shamsul, 1986). The 
formation of new ethnic and pan ethnic parties in the form of the Chinese Democratic 
Action Party (DAP) and the non-communal Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian 
Peoples Movement) along with the performance of PAS resulted in the Alliance 
losing its two thirds majority in the Dewan Rakyat. The day after the elections 
vicious ethnic riots took place on the streets of Kuala Lumpur between OAP and 
Gerakan supporters and the supporters of UMNO. The rioting in the capital lasted 
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four days before order was restored, and sporadic ethnic clashes continued for two 
months. 
The Constitution was suspended and a national emergency declared. Power was 
transferred to a National Operations Council (NOC) headed by the Deputy Prime 
Minister Abdul Razak, later to become leader of UMNO and Prime Minister. The 
main task facing the NOC was to construct a united Malaysia, a nation that took 
account of ethnic differences but did not fragment under communal pressure. The 
May riots dispelled the myth of the 'bargain' and signalled the end of the Alliance. 
The Chinese vote was split; the MCA were shown to be powerless to defend non-
Malay interests in the face of UMNO pressure, similarly the Indian community felt 
poorly served by the MIC. Although Malay political hegemony became open and 
apparent, the decision to return to parliamentary rule was only taken after the 
convening of the newly established National Consultative Council (NCC). The 
declared aim of the NCC was to initiate greater inter ethnic co-operation, discussions 
were held in which coalition government received approval under the clear leadership 
of UMNO. The Alliance was dead and was in turn replaced by a broader based 
coalition under the UMNO directed Barisan Nasional (registered 1974). Many 
opposition parties including PAS, Gerakan and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) 
joined forces with those of the old Alliance party under an initial arrangement of 
notional power sharing. PAS eventually left the Barisan Nasional in 1977 and has 
since been seen as a real threat to the UMNO led Barisan. The final years of Dr 
Mahathir's political tenure were marked by ongoing tribulations following the sacking 
and prosecution of former Deputy Prime Minister An war Ibrahim, PAS once again 
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threatened to erode UMNO support in the following two elections and this, somewhat 
ironically, led to a swing in the Chinese vote behind the ruling UMNO coalition. 
The May 1969 riots were attributed in part to the economic inequality experienced by 
Malays and thus the response of the NOC was the formulation of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) ( 1970-1990) which sought to redress this imbalance. It is worth noting 
at this point that the NOC had carefully prepared the ground through the introduction 
of the Sedition Act 1970 (amended 1971 ). The terms of this act in its final form made 
it an offence to publicly debate issues classed as 'sensitive', namely those which 
might arouse racial emotions centring on the Malay language, the special position of 
Malays and citizenship rights (Munro-Kua, 1996). The 1971 amendment limited the 
discussion of such issues in parliament, narrowing the opportunities to criticise 
proposed legislation and therefore limiting perceived unrest anticipated as a result of 
the implementation of a clearly communally defined legislative programme. Malay 
political hegemony was ensured due, in part, to the introduction of the Sedition Act 
which, argues Munro-Kua (1996), saw the narrowing of democracy, favouring Malay 
interests and given strength through the amended ISA. 
The main aim of the NEP was the achievement of national unity through the 
eradication of poverty regardless of race. This manifested itself in a fundamental 
restructuring of society in an attempt to achieve economic parity primarily between 
Malay and Chinese citizens. It was in effect a two pronged approach resting to a 
greater degree on the second objective, namely legislating to provide greater 
opportunity for the Malay population in the form of positive discrimination (including 
reserved places in higher education). The policy was presented in the Second 
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Malaysian Plan (2MP) (1971-1975) to the newly restored parliament and elaborated 
in the Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) ( 1971-1990). Its focus on the eradication of 
poverty ensured minimal political opposition, although the two-thirds majority 
enjoyed by the Barisan Nasional ensured safe passage through parliament. (Hua Wu 
Yin, 1983; Munro-Kua, 1996; Gomez and Jomo, 1997). 
The basis of this UMNO led strategy was to increase Malay participation in the 
economy and the government set targets so that 'Malay corporate ownership would be 
30 per cent, non-Malay 40 per cent and foreign 30 per cent in contrast to 1.9 per cent, 
37.4 per cent, and 60.7 per cent respectively in 1970' (Jesudason, 1989: 1-2). This 
process has involved both the modernisation of rural life and rapid and mass 
urbanisation in order to provide the workforce for a rapidly expanding economy. It 
has been claimed by UMNO that the NEP has by and large been successful in its 
stated aim of reducing poverty, although both the focus, in terms of the 
communalisation of poverty, and the measures employed are open to discussion and 
will be addressed later. In crude terms then the OPP envisaged a reduction in the 
official rate of poverty for Peninsular Malaysia from 49 per cent in 1970 to 16 per 
cent by 1990 and the rate has in fact fallen well below this level in subsequent years. 
The main target of the economic policies enshrined in the NEP was in fact foreign, 
particularly British, capital. The notion that the 1969 riots sprang from the obvious 
economic imbalance between the Malay and non-Malay (Chinese) communities 
detracted from the true picture of an economy dominated by foreign capital. 
Therefore it was hoped that possible discomfort felt by the non-Malay communities as 
a result of the NEP could be ameliorated by reducing the levels of foreign capital 
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share ownership. The success of the NEP was based on rapid economic growth and 
the UMNO led government was at pains not to discourage foreign investment 
(Jesudason, 1989). It was envisaged that the inflow of foreign capital investment 
would provide sufficient resources and opportunities to instigate the desired growth in 
Malay participation in the modern economy, whilst enabling the non-Malay 
communities to continue on a path of growth albeit at a slower pace. This aim, based 
on positive discrimination in favour of the Malay community, was somewhat limited 
in scope as a result of the 197 4 Petroleum Development Act and the 197 5 Industrial 
Co-ordination Act. These two pieces of legislation acted as disincentives to both 
domestic and foreign inward investment and are regarded as producing a stifling 
effect on the economy in general (Snodgrass, 1980; 2002; Jesudason, 1989; Gomez 
and Jomo, 1997). 
The effects of world wide recession and the subsequent slow down in direct 
investment as multi-nationals sought ever cheaper manufacturing bases led to a policy 
shift away from public sector involvement and towards the private sector. Both the 
Fifth ( 1986-1990) and Sixth ( 1991-1995) Malaysia Plans emphasised a shift away 
from redistribution of wealth, to the creation of wealth with government expenditure 
increasingly directed towards infrastructure projects designed to encourage and 
enhance private sector development. This policy shift was also present in the medium 
and long-term strategic aims of the National Development Policy (NDP) and Dr 
Mohamad Mahathir' s Vision 2020 plan. The main aim of this plan is for Malaysia to 
achieve 'fully developed country' status by the year 2020 primarily through 
accelerated industrialisation, growth and modernisation (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). 
However, as noted by Gomez and Jomo ( 1997), Vision 2020 differed from the NEP in 
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other ways most notably in the role expected of individuals and a curtailing of state 
responsibility with regards to welfare provision. The NEP emphasised government 
interventionist policies and a redistributi ve welfare role for the state. Dr Mahathir' s 
plan, and his espousal of 'Asian values', rested on institutionalised welfare 
arrangements in the form of the EPF, which placed greater emphasis on the 
family/individual responsibility, to which we will return in a later section. 
Islamic revivalism and UMNO eo-option 
The power of UMNO has to a greater extent resided in its ability to muster support 
from the large rural Malay community and to project itself as the only party capable 
of maintaining the fragile peace between the different ethnic groups in contemporary 
Malaysia. A great strength of the organisation is to eo-opt populist strategies that play 
to the wishes of the Malay population. An example of this has been the manner in 
which UMNO has neutered opposition through the use of repressive measures in the 
interests of 'national security', before assuming the clothes of that same opposition. 
The trick has been to appeal to the Malay population without alienating the non-
Malay populations and UMNO has to some extent achieved this by presenting the 
alternative as extreme. This is of course something of a paradox. By assuming the 
cloak of Islamic Malay identity, for example, UMNO has increased ethnic 
polarisation and thereby reinforced the political divide between Malays and non-
Malays. The case examined here is that of the Islamic revival of the 1970s and the 
way in which UMNO eo-opted the dakwah movement for its own political gain. 
The dakwah movement has been seen to coincide with the growth of the Malay 
middle class, which had seized control from the more conservative 'old guard' after 
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the 1969 riots. This new ruling elite, anxious to pursue a more communalist line in 
favour of Malays, employed the rhetoric of both the traditional rulers and the 
increasingly influential Islamic groups. Islam has traditionally been the dominant 
ideology of the Malay ruling class and as such has been a powerful instrument for 
ideological and behavioural control (Lee, 1995). However, it is important to reflect 
that at the time of independence Islam was enshrined in the constitution as the official 
religion of the new Malaysian state and as such gave context to the notion of Mal ay 
identity, as all Malays were 'officially' deemed to be Muslim. As noted above, this 
was not to the detriment of other religions, which were guaranteed freedom, but in the 
aftermath of the 1969 communal riots Islam again became a focus of Malaysian 
identity- the difference between Malays and the other ethnic groups. 
With the instigation of the NEP and wider access to tertiary education guaranteed for 
Malays, those students who migrated from the religiously conservative rural areas 
came into contact with and were influenced by new Islamic ideas. Islam in the wider 
context was also reasserting its influence through events in the Middle East. The 
increasing numbers of Malay students attending overseas universities bore witness to 
the resurgence of Islamic states on the world stage, culminating in the 1979 Islamic 
revolution in Iran. The dakwah movement itself was part of this resurgent Malay 
identity and Islam became a rallying point for the new Malay middle classes and an 
outward sign of their identity (Nagata, 1979; Crouch, 1996). It would however, be 
wrong to portray the dakwah movement as unitary, this has simply not been the case 
and a quick perusal of contemporary reports will yield evidence that the Islamic 
community in modern Malaysia is fractured between supporters of mainstream 
political parties and Islamic 'interest' groups. Hussin Mutalib (1990: 74)) argues that 
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the 'dakwah is the propagation of the Islamic message and call on Muslims to upgrade 
their Islamicity' (See also Nagata, 1984; Chandra Muzaffar, 1987; Jomo and Cheek, 
1992; Lee, 1995; Crouch, 1996; Shamsul, 1997). 
For the purposes of this chapter, the focus will be on two of the largest and most 
influential organisations representing a Muslim identity, that is the Malaysian Islamic 
Youth Movement (ABIM) and PAS. The intention is not to simply give a potted 
history of these two organisations; more authoritative authors than myself have 
already employed this type of approach. Rather I intend to employ selective evidence 
from the experience of these Islamic organisations, in an attempt to identify factors 
which have led to the notion of an Islamisation of contemporary Malaysia and a 
marked shift in the approach of the ruling coalition. This is evidenced in the eo-
option by UMNO of Anwar Ibrahim as well as attempting to appeal to its core 
constituency, namely the rural Malays, who have been targeted by PAS. The aim 
here is not to introduce the theme of Islamisation to the analytical thread of the thesis 
as a whole, rather it is to contribute to the historical institutionalist approach and to 
examine a political economy dominated by a ruling coalition which is willing to adopt 
'populist' strategies to maintain power and which advantages the Malay population 
over others. 
Both ABIM and PAS have striven to establish a society based on the principles of 
Islam, although the members of ABIM have always attempted to make clear the 
distinction that sees them not as a political force, but rather an Islamic social/welfare 
organisation lobbying the political arena for change. This is not to suggest that the 
organisation exists solely as a lobby group. ABIM has initiated education 
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programmes and set up schools and nurseries (Jomo and Cheek, 1992), and has 
actively campaigned for PAS most notably in the 1978 general election. PAS on the 
other hand has maintained its stance as the main Islamic opposition party despite its 
short lived accommodation within the Barisan Nasional during the mid 1970s. PAS 
pre-dates and has outlived ABIM as a major political force in contemporary Malaysia. 
ABIM was formed in 1971 and similarly to PAS, saw the growth of its influence 
attract unwelcome attention from the governing Barisan Nasional. Indeed both 
organisations have endured the detention of prominent members under the auspices of 
the ISA, including the then president of ABIM An war Ibrahim, for a period of two 
years ( 1974-76) for his part in student demonstrations against the policies of the 
Barisan Nasional (Munro-Kua, 1996). That ABIM rose to such prominence during 
the middle of the 1970s can, in part, be seen as a result of PAS joining the Barisan 
Nasional and thus leaving open the position of legitimate Islamic opposition. This 
accommodation of PAS in the governing coalition enabled ABIM to absorb 
disgruntled PAS supporters, and its electoral support of PAS, after that party left the 
Barisan Nasional in 1978, enabled it to gain ground in rural areas. 
ABIM's approach was seen as less confrontational and more accommodating to non-
Muslims, a view given substance by its vocal opposition to the NEP. It was this broad 
appeal that cut across the rural/urban divide. Affiliation with PAS cemented ABIM's 
acceptance in the more conservative rural areas enabling it to break out of its 
traditional urban constituency. ABIM's non-communalist approach led to Anwar 
Ibrahim being invited to address the leaders of the OAP (Jomo and Cheek, 1992). 
Mutalib (1990), Jomo and Cheek (1992), Hefner (1997) and Shamsul (1997) have 
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concluded that the influence of ABIM was so closely linked to the rise in prominence 
of Anwar Ibrahim, that his decision to join UMNO in 1982 signified the high water 
mark for ABIM (See Jomo and Cheek, 1992 for a more detailed account of this 
somewhat opportunistic move). 
In essence what the dakwah movement has achieved is the institutionalisation of 
Islamic concerns in mainstream Barisan Nasional government policies. The roots of 
many government initiatives can be traced to the pressure exerted and the examples 
shown by the many dakwah organisations, not the least ABIM. We began this section 
by commenting that the strength of UMNO lay in its ability to eo-opt the opposition 
and adopt its clothes to maintain power. The decision by Anwar Ibrahim to switch to 
UMNO can be seen as an example of this process in action. In order to capitalise on 
the broad appeal of ABIM the Barisan Nasional, and more particularly the Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad, eo-opted An war to make use of his appeal to lend 
credence and an air of legitimacy to the ongoing process of Islamisation. This is not 
to simply assume that that there is little thought or belief behind the drive to 
Islamisation. On the contrary one could argue that the communalist policies of the 
UMNO dominated Barisan Nasional simply found expression in one of the 
fundamental facets of Malay culture, namely the Islamic religion. That by promoting 
Islam, UMNO was in fact adding a cultural dimension to the NEP, satisfying the 
needs of the Malay population without alienating the non-Malays. Crouch (1996) 
suggests that contrary to the line proposed by PAS, UMNO opted for a more 
'inclusive' notion of Islam as a prime factor in cultural evolution of contemporary 
Malaysia. 
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To fully appreciate the ways in which UMNO achieved its aim of adopting the 
language of the dakwah movement and adding Islamic credentials to its image, one 
must take account of the influence of the long serving Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad. It was his accession to the Presidency of UMNO and thus the office of 
Prime Minister in 1981, which saw the process of Islamisation receive official 
backing through the offices of the Barisan Nasional. Within months of assuming 
office Dr Mahathir introduced the twin policies of Look East, indicating a rejection of 
Western influence, and an assimilation of Islamic Values announced at the 1982 
UMNO general assembly (Milne and Mauzy, 1986; Shamsul, 1997). This coupled 
with the announcement of plans to set up an International Islamic University, an 
Islamic Bank and later an Islamic insurance company, as well as minor restrictions 
such as prohibiting Muslims from entering the Genting Highlands casino, enhanced 
the Islamic image of the Barisan Nasional (Jomo and Cheek, 1992; Crouch, 1996; 
Shamsul, 1997). However, as Crouch (1996) suggests this image enhancement had 
little effect on the non-Malay population and therefore fears were somewhat allayed. 
Concern continued to centre around the possibility that the government was intent 
upon instigating moves towards an Islamic state, in reality these moves were intended 
to prevent such an outcome. UMNO can be seen to have assumed the clothes of 
Islam in order to neuter the opposition. In doing so both parties entered into an 
ongoing process whereby PAS criticises the government for its un-Islamic approach 
and the government in turn criticises PAS for presenting a singular, and in their 
opinion false, interpretation of Islam. One of the side products of the Anwar switch 
has been the decline in influence of ABIM on the general political stage. Much 
support was lost in rural areas as people drifted back to PAS, many ABIM leaders 
joined PAS and the remainder 'felt they had little choice but to follow Anwar in 
86 
furthering Islamisation within UMNO and the government' (Jomo and Cheek, 1992: 
93). What is undeniable is that Anwar quickly climbed the ladder within UMNO 
before assuming the role of deputy Prime Minister and Dr Mahathir' s heir apparent. 
What is equally undeniable is the swiftness of his downfall culminating in arrest in 
September 1998. This led to his eventual conviction on charges of interference with 
police investigations after allegations that he had had an affair with the wife of a staff 
member and had sodomized his wife's male chauffeur and adopted half brother. It is 
these latter allegations which formed the basis of his second and successfully 
prosecuted trial. 
The controversy surrounding his arrest and six year sentence continues to resonate 
and the inference that his supposed political challenge to Or Mahathir was the real 
reason for his incarceration refuses to die down. Indeed Anwar's wife Wan Aziza 
Wan Is mail helped form and became leader of a new political party Parti Keadilan 
Rakyat (People's Justice Party) in September 1998. The street protests, which led to 
the arrest and eventual prosecutions of Anwar lbrahim, continued sporadically. On 
the nineteenth of September 1999, the anniversary of Anwar's arrest, thousands 
demonstrated outside the National Mosque in Kuala Lumpur, culminating in violent 
clashes with the police and the subsequent arrest and detention of up to fourteen 
opposition leaders under the ISA. The then deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi dismissed fears that the protests would spark a large-scale crackdown by the 
authorities similar to Operation Lalang in 1987, during which one hundred and six 
people were detained (Straits Times, 27/09/99). It is the longevity of Or Mahathir as 
first a member of the Barisan Nasional and later as Prime Minister which is examined 
next. 
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The Mahathir effect 
To trace the possible future progression of Malaysia, politically, culturally and in 
terms of ethnic co-existence, it is necessary to turn attention to the late 1960's. The 
first incident that is noteworthy is the expulsion of Dr Mahathir from UMNO by the 
then Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein. This expulsion resulted 
from a letter written by, and demonstrations organised by, Dr Mahathir and suppmted 
by Musa Hitam (Deputy Prime Minister 1981-1986) and other Malay UMNO 
backbenchers. Both actions publicly criticised the Prime Minister Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, blaming him and his multi-ethnic policies for the 1969 riots (Jesudason, 
1989; Munro-Kua, 1996). At this time, Dr Mahathir published a book outlining his 
grievances with the Tunku's Alliance administration, which the ruing coalition 
promptly banned. In The Malay Dilemma (1970) Dr Mahathir pointed to the 
impoverished position of the Malay majority, in relation to the relative wealth of the 
(mainly) Chinese minority. It was argued that it was this imbalance of economic 
resources which led to the outbreak of racial violence in May 1969, and which would 
lead to such an eventuality if the imbalance were not quickly addressed. According to 
Mahathir the solution to this problem was the positive discrimination which soon 
became enshrined in the NEC 'racial equality can only be said to exist when each race 
not only stands equal before the law, but also when each race is represented in every 
strata of society, in every field of work, in proportion more or less to their percentage 
of the population' (Mahathir, 1970: 79 quoted in Crouch, 1996: 25). 
The expulsions (Mahathir and Musa) however were short lived. The 'old guard' in 
UMNO was soon eclipsed and the former 'radicals' were found places within the new 
post-emergency administration. With the implementation of the NEP, the 
88 
communalist tendencies of those individuals were realised. Dr Mahathir progressed 
from the backbenches to become Minister of Education in the early seventies and it 
was he who oversaw a clampdown on the series of protests by campus based student 
groups at the University of Malaya and others. The government's reaction to this was 
the implementation of Universities and University Colleges Act 1975 which 'for both 
students and lecturers, proscribes political involvements, limits the type of 
society/meeting which is allowed and thus removes all remnants of student union 
autonomy' (Munro-Kua, 1996: 83). It is this heavy-handed approach, which has 
earned the Malaysian political economy the term authoritarian populism (Munro-
Kua, 1996). 
Or Mahathir ascended to the post of president of UMNO and Prime Minister due to 
the resignation on health grounds of his predecessor Datuk Hussein Onn. He had 
occupied the position of deputy Prime Minister since early 1976, after the death of 
Tun Abdul Razak had led to the elevation of Hussein Onn. The transition in 
leadership was not altogether plain sailing as there was a challenge for the position of 
deputy president of UMNO and therefore deputy Prime Minister. Or Mahathir' s 
favoured candidate was the minister of education Datuk Musa Hitam and he was 
challenged by the then minister of finance Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. This was a 
damaging contest, and laid the seeds for the eventual and relatively short-lived split in 
UMNO in the mid 1980s. Due to extensive lobbying and financial support on the part 
of Or Mahathir Musa's campaign was successful, although he enjoyed only a small 
majority over his rival. Crouch ( 1996) argues that the breakdown in relations between 
Mahathir and Musa began almost as soon as the vote was completed. Or Mahathir 
preferred to keep the defeated Razaleigh on side by re-appointing him to the cabinet, 
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in the position of Minister for Trade and Industry. Musa on the other hand wanted 
Razaleigh out of the government. The net effect of this rift resulted in the two former 
opponents joining forces to oust Dr Mahathir in the party elections in 1987. Dr 
Mahathir and his running mate Ghafar Baba were victorious, but the matter did not 
end there. A challenge was made as to the validity of the results, claims were made 
that branches of UMNO had not been properly registered and thus the delegates from 
these branches were ineligible to vote in party elections. 
The resulting chaos saw the two factions trying to re-register their groups under the 
UMNO name. Mahathir' s supporters won, not least because they were able to time 
their re-registration thanks to the register of societies being part of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs of which Dr Mahathir was minister. Razaleigh formed a new party, 
Semangat '46 (Spirit of '46) in 1989 and formed an alliance with PAS to fight the 
1990 elections (Crouch, 1996; Munro-Kua, 1996). Crucial to the victory of the 
Mahathir faction in both the party elections and the national elections in 1990 was the 
system of patronage. This in effect ensured that those who wanted to continue 
enjoying security and preferential treatment with regards to contracts, licences, loans 
and locality of employment (Crouch, 1996) voted UMNO. Only in the state of 
Kelantan were Semangat '46 and PAS in control of the machinery of patronage, thus 
ensuring victory. 
Perhaps the most important outcome of the 1990 elections was the notion of an inter-
ethnic alliance, in part, being successful at the polls. PAS, Semangat '46 and the DAP 
had shared a platform and to a greater or lesser degree co-operated despite 
overwhelming differences. The most startling difference was again religion, with the 
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DAP objecting to the call from PAS to establish an Islamic state. Although officially 
denouncing such a notion the DAP still campaigned on the same ticket. Crouch 
(1996) argues that this tactic enabled PAS to mobilise its rural Malay supporters and 
left the DAP free to appeal to its urban Chinese and Indian supporters (For a fuller 
account of the 1990 election see Crouch, 1996: 121-129). This inter-ethnic element 
has re-emerged forcibly in response to the arrest and imprisonment of the former 
deputy Prime Minister Anwar lbrahim and the formation of Keadilan. Perhaps almost 
inevitably this alliance between PAS and Semangat '46 was relatively short-lived. 
The alliance did continue throughout the 1995 elections however Razaleigh soon after 
rejoined UMNO and then sought to challenge his erstwhile political allies in the state 
of Kelantan in the run up to the much anticipated 2000 elections. 
Or Mahathir took much credit for his strong and decisive leadership following the 
Southeast Asian currency crisis in 1997, although he simultaneous! y attracted 
condemnation for his denouncement of the alleged damaging activities of 'foreigners' 
in general and the currency speculator George Soros in particular. The results of Or 
Mahathir's neo-Keynesian economic policies proved to be relatively a short-lived 
economic recession followed initially by respectable levels of predicted economic 
growth, which though proving lower in reality, still managed to post positive figures. 
Ironically it has been the Bumiputera business community that suffered most during 
the 1997 crisis with corporate ownership falling from 20.5 per cent in 1995 to 19.4 
per cent in 1998 (7MP). On October 1th 1999, Dr Mahathir issued a call to the 
Chinese business community to help the Bumiputeras regain their lost ground in his 
address to the 53rd AGM of the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce (Straits 
Times, 13/10/99). This disadvantage to the Bumiputera community has led to Dr 
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Mahathir claiming that the work of the NEP has to some extent been undone and that 
the NEP must be re-instituted to enable the Malay business community to recover lost 
ground. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has taken a broad overview of the development of some of the many 
strands present in contemporary Malaysian cultural, social and political life which, it 
is suggested, has resulted in an institutionalised political economy in which one ethno 
class faction is privileged over others. The chapter argued that the current state of the 
Malaysian polity is as a result of path dependence, in that decisions take at different 
points in history have led to embedded political ethnic and cultural structures which 
continue to give meaning to and legitimate the contemporary political economy. It 
was suggested that this process of institutionalisation was begun under the British 
colonial administration. It is to this point historically that the ethnic divisions that are 
the focus of much debate, policy and conflict can be traced. With the expansion of 
British economic interest in the region came imported labour from mainland China 
and the Indian sub-continent. This heralded the introduction of the explicit link 
between ethnicity and economic, legal and political status, which continues to focus 
many minds in the contemporary Malaysian political scene. Furthermore, it was the 
British colonial administration which founded the EPF and in doing so laid the 
foundations for individual provision of old age incomes which remains the case today. 
Moves towards independence saw the Malay community seeking to and succeeding in 
re-establishing itself in the prime political position through the machinations of the 
Bargain and the subsequent declaration of the Federation of Malaya in August 1957. 
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This was superseded by the declaration of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, which 
saw territorial expansion take in Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore. Singapore's 
membership however was short-lived due to the political ambitions of the Chinese 
based Peoples Action Party led by Lee Kuan Yew and calls for a Malaysian Malaysia 
which resulted in the very real threat of communal violence. Singapore exited the 
Federation 1965. 
Attention then shifted to what can plainly be described as the defining moment in 
modern Malaysian history, the communal riots of May 131h 1969. The after effects of 
this period of civil unrest were massive. Democracy was suspended, the instigation of 
pro-Malay positive discrimination was enshrined in the NEP and the expansion of 
authoritarianism was achieved through the introduction of the Sedition Act ( 1970) and 
amendments to the ISA. This period also bore witness to a shift towards modern 
bourgeois political figures replacing those drawn from the traditional ruling class. As 
was noted this shift marked a change in the nature of the democratic state and gave 
added impetus to the dakwah movement and its eventual eo-option by the UMNO 
dominated Barisan Nasional under the leadership of Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad. It was this re-assertion of Malay Islamic credentials which, it is argued, 
was likely to appeal to both UMNO's core constituency the rural Malays, but also the 
new Malay middle classes. 
The ability of Dr Mahathir to hold onto power through a variety of means formed the 
final section in this chapter. Despite a number of challenges Dr Mahathir continued 
to retain a firm grip over the Barisan Nasional until October 2003. He has followed 
the UMNO trait of eo-option and institutionalisation of popular initiatives that 
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reinvigorate UMNO's Malay credentials whilst simultaneously placating the fears of 
other ethnic communities. The example looked at was that of the shift towards the 
embrace of Islamic values, thereby satisfying the upsurge in Islamic revivalism 
amongst the Malay population, but stopping well short of any ambition to the notion 
of the establishment of an Islamic state. With the succession of Ahmad Badawi such 
Islamic credentials were given greater prominence as the UMNO party machine made 
great play of his scholarly knowledge of Islam and the Koran. For the ethnically 
divided electorate thus far, it appears to have lead to a situation of better the devil you 
know in the form of UMNO, than the devil you don't whether that be the stalled 
multi-ethnic Keadilan or the Islamist PAS. 
The ways of doing politics and the ways of doing welfare are inextricably linked to 
the development of an independent Malaysia and the rapid economic development 
since the 1970s. In effect Malaysia's approach to welfare is a consequence of past 
decisions both pre and post independence and an example of what Pierson (2000b) 
characterises as 'path dependence', as a result of which political economic and ethno-
class institutions restrict or hamper the reform process. 
The colonial immigration policies of the early twentieth century resulted in an 
institutionally embedded and ethnically divided labour force. The instigation of 
Malay political rule by the British colonial administration in the aftermath of World 
War Two, together with the introduction of the EPF laid the foundations of key 
political, socio-cultural and economic institutions which, in the case of the latter two 
are relatively unchanged today. However, positive discrimination policies such as the 
NEP and NDP have altered the relationship between ethnicity and labour, and given 
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rise to new and expanded Malay middle classes which have enjoyed privileged access 
to higher education and public sector employment. That the ruling Malay political 
elite have enjoyed continued legitimation and support across the ethnic communities 
is in part a result of the embedded structures in Malaysia which, over time, have 
developed to give meaning to Malaysian society (March and Olsen, 1998). The eo-
option of the mainly middle class Islamic revival of the 1970s and 1980s by the 
Barisan Nasional coupled with the adoption of the rhetoric of Asian values-
espousing family/individual provision under the auspices of both the EPF and the 
Islamic zakat- not only institutionalised Islamic concerns within Barisan Nasional 
policies but also reinforced the complexity of welfare arrangements which privilege 
the individual and the family over the state thus mediating external economic 
pressures which otherwise could result in expanded welfare provision. 
However, the privileging of one ethno-class faction, the new Malay middle classes, 
over others has exposed both their vulnerability to exogenous global economic 
pressures in the form of employment insecurity and the weaknesses in the 
institutionally embedded mechanism for the provision of economic security in old, the 
EPF. Such weakness calls into question whether the EPF is 'fit for purpose' for the 
twenty first century. The next chapter examines the development, objectives and 
mechanisms of the EPF and highlights the shortcomings of this key socio-economic 
institution. 
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Chapter 3 
The Malaysian Employee's Provident Fund: a model to meet 
future challenges? 
In Chapter 1, the two concepts of economic globalisation and historical 
institutionalism were identified as offering a more rounded account of the difficulties 
involved in adapting to current economic and social changes in Malaysia. Chapter 2 
examined the historical institutionalised nature of the Malaysian political economy 
and placed the Malaysian welfare regime in an historical perspective. The ongoing 
influence of the colonial period was examined in relation to the contemporary socio-
cultural, political and ethnic institutions in Malaysia. It was noted that during the 
colonial period the ethnic composition of Malaysia was irrevocably altered and that 
the negotiations leading up to independence resulted in the institutionalised Malay 
political hegemony. Positive discrimination in the form of the NEP and pragmatic eo-
option of populist ethno-cultural movements- namely the Islamic revival of the 
1970s and the rhetoric of Asian values - reinforced the limited role of the state in 
welfare services. Rather the family/individual were privileged as key sources of 
welfare, most notably in the form of the EPF. 
The aim of this chapter then, is to concentrate squarely on Malaysia and its preferred 
embedded institutionalised mechanism for old age protection, namely the Employees 
Provident Fund (EPF). This is achieved through a brief discussion of how the 
Malaysian state aims to utilise policy to avoid exclusion of its growing elderly 
population, mainly through the National Policy for the Elderly (NPE, 1995), 
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emanating from the Ministry of National Unity and Social Development. There then 
follows a section which offers a brief review of selected sources of old age income 
provision in Malaysia, before moving on to a fuller description of the development 
and current structure of the main source of income in old age, the Employees 
Provident Fund. The penultimate section highlights the shortcomings of an over 
reliance on individual savings, whilst the final section focuses on some simple 
measures which would go some way to making the EPF 'fit for purpose' in the twenty 
first century. 
Ideological and cultural foundations of social security in Malaysia 
The spectacular rise of the Asian economies throughout the 1980s and 1990s was to a 
great extent built upon the increased level of inward investment which was actively 
sought as the means by which developing nations could achieve their wider economic 
and more domestic political and social goals. The increased levels of cost for 
manufacturing production in the North coupled with the unshackling of capital 
facilitated the rush to greater industrialisation and its attendant urbanisation 
throughout the region. 
So at first viewing it could be concluded that the processes of globalisation have the 
upper hand in terms of explanatory power when analysing the socio-economic 
changes which have undoubtedly taken place in Southeast Asian states such as 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. However, this does not reveal the whole picture, 
and what one does not get is any sense of decision making at a national level. 
Globalisation is not a take-all package there are aspects of the globalisation debate 
which can fare less well under scrutiny and it is the cultural reductivist approach, 
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which argues that a global culture is seeking to obscure national and regional 
differences as major brands dominate the global consumer market. 
Institutional factors such as culture and cultural difference have often been cited as 
the reason why, for example, social policy reforms have taken second place to 
economic objectives. It is not that Southeast Asia is jam packed with ardent neo-
liberals shunning the needs of the poor in the search for more US dollars. Rather, it is 
the institutionalised social and cultural mores of the region which place self-reliance 
and the family at the centre of welfarism both large scale and small. Furthermore, this 
approach is mirrored in the embedded institutional base, namely the EPF, which 
operates the main mechanism for old age savings in Malaysia. As was noted in the 
Chapter 2, the EPF was founded in the colonial era and is, in part, something of a 
hangover from that period. Its original form has changed and, perhaps more 
importantly, the EPF has adopted a central role in how the majority Malaysians save 
for retirement, buy houses and fund tertiary education. However, despite the first 
objective of the EPFs mission statement claiming the primary mission to be the 
provision of retirement benefits to its members through the management of their 
savings (EPF, 2005) the scope of uses such savings can be put to has expanded. 
Indeed, the organisations vision statement in part claims that the EPF aims 'To be a 
leading social security organisation in the world' (EPF, 2005). Furthermore, the EPF 
has in the past been used as a ready source of cash by successive governments to both 
rescue ailing national companies, to fund mega-projects and to meet budget deficits 
through the requirement of the fund to invest heavily in Malaysian Government 
Securities (MGS). It has, in effect, become an institutionalised aspect of Malaysian 
economic and socio-cultural life. 
98 
National Policy for the Elderly (NPE) 
It was not until relatively recently that the Malaysian state acknowledged the 
necessity of social policies specifically targeted at the growing elderly population. 
Previously the 1990 National Welfare Policy incorporated the needs of the elderly 
within its remit and it is worth noting, that despite the 1995 NPE the primary 
provider(s) of care remain the family and the community. Indeed, included in the 
publication of the Seventh Malaysia Plan (7MP, 1996) was a brief review of the NPE 
which stated that the policy aimed at 'creating a society of elderly people who are 
contented and possess a high sense of self worth and dignity, by optimizing their self 
potential and ensuring that they enjoy every opportunity as well as the care and 
protection of members of their family, society and nation.' (7MP, 1996: 571 ). This 
was followed up in 1999 with the publication of the Action Plan for the National 
Policy for Older Citizens which again reinforced the 'care' line for older people as 
being the family first, followed by the community and then the State. Mazanah and 
Mazalan ( 1999: 2) suggest that the policy incorporated 'very strong objectives with 
the ultimate aim to increase the dignity of, and respect for, older people' which were 
the subject of a wide range of programmes including education and training under the 
auspices of the Social Welfare Department, an agency of the Ministry of National 
Unity and Social Development. The efficacy of this emphasis on education and 
training related schemes has been challenged by Ong (2002: 115-6) who states that 
'Although the policy has been a great step forward in preparing Malaysia for a 
transition to an ageing society, the 1999 Plan of Action does not adequately cover 
employment and income security'. It is this shortfall in planning for income security 
which is of key concern in this chapter. 
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It is worth noting in passing that there are ideological, historical and cultural parallels 
between the states of Southeast Asia, which are reflected in their approach to the 
broad thrust of social policy per se and social security in particular. In Chapter 1 (p 
47), it was argued that, at present, the term productivist welfare regime (Holliday and 
Wilding, 2003; Gough et al, 2004; Holliday, 2005) best describes the developmental 
trajectory of a Southeast Asian regime type. It should be stressed again that this is not 
in any way to over simplify the diversity contained within the region. Instead the aim 
is to enable this discussion to draw parallels of experience and development which 
goes beyond the alternatives which can be characterised as either lumping divergent 
experiences together under an unsuitable and inaccurate Asian model of welfare, or 
throwing ones hands up in the face of diversity. Rather this approach goes some way 
to explaining why some aspects of social policy reform have lagged behind the more 
expansive models found predominantly in the advanced industrial nations. However, 
one particular policy area which has been the main beneficiary of state spending 
across the majority of the Asian region has been education. Although as Gough 
(2004: 171) notes public social expenditure has remained at relatively low levels 
compared to more the developed industrialised nations as 'East Asian governments 
have consistently emphasised the central role of education in economic 
development. .. The general verdict is that the allocation of resources is more 
effectively targeted on basic education than in other developing nations', though not 
as yet income security. 
In Malaysia, the recently depatted Or Mahathir periodically castigated the industrial 
nations of the North for attempting to impose their own (lower) values and moral 
standards on developing nations, whilst arguing that Asian values placed 'greater 
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stress on economic and social rights and ... they took less account of individuals, and 
gave more regard to the interests of the community' (Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 137). 
Asher ( 1999) has argued that various Southeast Asian states, Malaysia included, have 
based their social security systems on a common set of assumptions which include: 
• Social security as secondary to economic growth 
• Social security provision as essentially a concern for individuals, families, 
communities and employers 
• The state as concerned with the whole population and not the needs of 
individual groups or members. 
It is this notion of an institutionalised 'local' filter, through which the varying strands 
of globalisation must pass, which informs subsequent discussions in this thesis. 
Economic globalisation is affecting social policy choices in both the North and the 
South, but its effects may yet remain muted as national governments set their own 
agendas. That provident funds remain popular, particularly in Asia, is unsurprising 
given the stress on individual provision and self help over government intervention. 
Malaysia operates the oldest national provident fund (NPF) in the region and has 
periodically, and without consultation of the fund's members, made use of the large 
cash reserves to fund either budget deficits or to finance large scale infrastructure 
projects. Furthermore, the EPF has enabled many Malaysians to become home 
owners, as individual members are able to access not only the funds they have 
contributed but also those monies paid into their account by employers. These two 
uses of monies accrued through individual savings has, to an extent overshadowed the 
original purpose of such mechanisms, that being the self provision of income into old 
age. This set of arrangements has led Dixon (1996: 74) to contend that 'The 
juxtaposition of economic, social and social security objectives has ensured the 
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survival of NPFs in Asia'. An overview of selected sources of income for the elderly, 
which sees the resilience of Malaysian welfare provision as a response to exogenous 
pressures of economic globalisation due, in part, to the existence and pivotal position 
of entrenched bureaucratic institutions, is covered briefly in the next section. 
Selected sources of incomes provision for the elderly in Malaysia 
There exists in Malaysia a broad spectrum of social security schemes that differ 
philosophically in their approach (Asher, 1994 ). Some schemes subscribe to the 
notion of social insurance, primarily legislated for under the Employees' Social 
Security Act 1969 (SOCSO). The Employment Injury Insurance Scheme and the 
Invalidity Pension Scheme were created by the Employees' Social Security Act 1969 
and implemented in 1972 and 1974 (Peninsular Malaysia) respectively. The Act 
covers all employers employing one or more persons and relates to those employees 
earning less than RM2000 a month. Recent figures indicate that the total membership 
of SOCSO for 1999 stood at 8,598,005 (cumulative) while the total number of 
registered employers was 355,916 (SOCSO, 1999). Once covered by the scheme 
employees remain insured against work-related injury, invalidity or death, even if 
subsequently the employees' earnings rise above the qualifying threshold. 
The Employment Injury Scheme is currently fully financed through employers' 
contributions at a rate of 1.25 per cent of the employees' monthly salary. The 
Invalidity Pension Scheme is financed through contributions from both employers and 
employees currently set at 0.5 per cent of monthly wages. In short SOCSO operates 
as little more than a workers compensation scheme, and as such cannot be regarded as 
a main contributor to income in old age. 
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Other schemes rely on the principles of individual provision for old age under the 
Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) which we return to below. It is this which best 
represents the dominant political philosophy as often proclaimed by the long serving 
Prime Minister Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad, who has periodically spoken out strongly 
against western forms of welfarism, arguing that economic growth should be the route 
to an affluent society, in which individuals and their families are rightfully regarded 
as the mainstays in the provision of care and old age income. It would appear that 
thus far, there is a degree of continuity between the former and current Prime Minister 
Abdul Ahmed Badawi. Whilst in character Ahmed Badawi appears less 
confrontational, nevertheless the fundamental principle would appear to remain that 
old age income is the responsibility of the individual and the family. Consequently, it 
remains the case that it is the EPF that provides the greatest extent of cover for 
individuals seeking to fund life beyond retirement. 
The family and intergenerational transfers 
Whilst it is correct to state that the EPF plays a central role in the provision of income 
security for the elderly in Malaysia, it is also important to acknowledge the role that 
the family has played, and continues to play, in the support of the elderly. The main 
concern here, are the roles that informal social care arrangements and intra-family 
intergenerational transfers play in the provision of income for the elderly beyond 
retirement. It can be argued that the family in Malaysia is the central welfare 
provider, both in monetary terms and in the provision of social care (Da Vanzo and 
Chan, 1994; Lillard and Willis, 1997; Schulz, 1997). The latest available data 
suggests that it remains common practise for adult children to eo-reside with their 
parents. Data drawn from the Second Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS-2) 
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(Haaga et al, 1993) indicates that more than two thirds of Malaysians aged over 60 eo-
reside with an adult child. Indeed there are economic incentives in place, in the form 
of tax rebates, to encourage the continuation of this practice (Da V anzo and Chan, 
1994 ). However, the dual processes of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation may 
have a detrimental effect on the ability of the family to offer support to those more 
vulnerable members. In practical terms, the higher cost of living in urban areas, 
insecure employment experienced by the majority of recent migrant workers, 
compounded by other demands on income such as education, may leave little or no 
monies remaining to send back as remittances to rural based family members. Added 
to this, there is an ethnic dimension to future old age poverty. In Malaysia, it is the 
rural elderly, the majority of whom are Bumiputera and female (Yaacob, 2000), left 
behind by the migration of the young to urban areas in search of employment who are 
most at risk. It is true that intergenerational transfers continue to play a vital role in 
this instance, indeed Yaacob (2000: 72) argues that a common religious and cultural 
ideology of balas jasa (repaying parents) is present across all ethnic groups in 
Malaysia, and it is this which accounts for the continuing central role of 
intergenerational transfers as a source of old age income. 
However, it is as yet unclear as to what the long-term effects of the changing family 
structure, both as a result of urbanisation, the shift to nuclear families, increased 
female participation in the labour force and a declining birth rate will have on 
attitudes to the support of the elderly. Indeed Jomo (200 1) has argued that societal 
change has left widening gaps in the informal traditional safety net previously 
provided by families and communities. Schultz ( 1997) contends that both 
geographical dispersion and the growing trend for smaller family units may require an 
104 
extension of formal social protection to fill the role traditionally associated with the 
family. Furthermore, as recently as 2003, the EPF Chief Executive Officer Datuk 
Azlan Zainol, commenting upon a review of the withdrawals procedures argued 
against the phasing out of early withdrawals for children's education, claiming that 'It 
is our hope that the children, once they get jobs, would look after their parents' (New 
Straits Times, 11/12/2003). Such statements are in keeping with national sentiments 
as voiced in the OPP3, here it is envisaged that 'The family unit will continue to be 
pivotal in inculcating positive values and its efforts will be supplemented and 
complemented by non-governmental organisations, community based organisations 
and other voluntary organisations ... Towards this end, motivational and attitudinal 
based family and society oriented programmes, which emphasize positive values will 
be intensified to induce good behaviour and morality' (OPP3, 2001: 166- my 
emphasis added). Clearly the ongoing intention is for the state to play a minimal role. 
The provident fund mechanism 
In general terms, provident funds can be described as fully funded compulsory saving 
schemes with fixed contributions from employers and employees, proportions of 
which are directed to dedicated accounts (Ramesh with Asher, 2000). The 
accumulated funds, with added interest or dividends, are returned to the members 
upon retirement either in the form of a lump sum or periodic payment until such 
balances are exhausted. In many systems members are able to access funds prior to 
retirement age, usually for the purposes of housing or health care, although in some 
instances educational fees and individual investments are catered for under provident 
fund schemes. The emphasis on individual provision through paid labour is a clear 
principle of the provident fund mechanism and, due to its fully funded nature, there is 
105 
no chance of such schemes running into deficit (Dixon, 1996; Ramesh with Asher, 
2000). 
There are a number of primary drawbacks to the provident fund mechanism; these 
include a risk to member's savings from inflation. Such is the long term nature of 
provident funds that savings may indeed be reduced due to inflation, the only 
safeguard for members being the dividends which are pegged at a minimum to 
inflation. This situation is compounded when members cease paid work and 
withdraw all funds from the scheme. Similarly, such schemes do not seek to ensure 
that all members receive benefits which are adequate for subsistence into old age. 
Benefits reflect a member's individual contributions history and as such will be 
insufficient for those on low incomes during their working life. As Ramesh with 
Asher (2000; 37) note 'This is problematic because the basic purpose of social 
security is to provide income to those who are unable to earn it in sufficient quantity 
in the marketplace. It is arguable that the well-off can and do save sufficiently even 
without provident funds. The arrangement also makes no allowance for different life-
spans of different people; those living longer will have less funds available during 
retirement'. 
However, in balance to such possible negative aspects, there are a number of 
positives. Provident funds increase domestic public savings, though this is at the cost 
of reducing private savings. The accumulated funds have significant financial and 
economic implications for the state, both in terms of funding large scale infrastructure 
projects and the meeting of, or reducing, budget deficits, through the purchase of 
government bonds, in times of economic slowdown. They broadly meet socio-
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economic objectives, such as increased home ownership, and in some cases access to 
quality health care, which as Dixon (1996: 84) suggests is valued by scheme members 
'who are willing to trade off social security protection in their later life'. 
This may well be the case in Singapore where the Central Provident Fund (CPF) is 
broadly acknowledged to be a de facto social security system. However, this is 
relatively easy to achieve with a population of approximately 3 million people who 
are under the direction of an authoritarian regime. Such gains are less easy to 
quantify in larger states. It is true that Malaysians make use of the EPF to increase 
home-ownership. Health is relatively well provided for by the Malaysian health 
system, although despite the earlier rejection of increasing privatisation of health 
services under Dr Mahathir, the issue is well and truly back on the agenda. Aliran 
reported on 30/05/05 that 'Civil society activists are concerned that a proposed 
national health insurance scheme scheduled to take off at the end of next year, while 
catering to well-off Malaysians, will marginalise Malaysia's poor- many of whom 
can barely afford to pay for basic medical services'. As such, for EPF members, there 
is little in the way of a trade off to be achieved. This is not a direct criticism of Dixon 
( 1996), rather a broader point that individual provident funds operate in different 
ways and as such the 'willingness' of individual members of different schemes cannot 
and should not be taken as given. It may be that the EPF will not be used as the 
payment vehicle for the proposed health insurance scheme as the CPF is in Singapore. 
However, the Eighth Malaysian Plan (2001) estimates that approximately 25 per cent 
of households in Malaysia have monthly incomes of less than RMIOOO (US$262), 
with more than 50 per cent of all households having monthly incomes of less than 
RM2000 (US$524), this would place an increased financial burden on those less well 
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placed to cope. Such health insurance policies are likely to be weighted according to 
age and gender, thereby placing increase costs on those who have greater need but 
least resources. Should the proposed health insurance scheme be funded out of 
individuals' EPF accounts then, as figures below indicate, a sizeable minority of the 
Malaysian population would not be covered by such schemes. In order to make such 
reforms palatable, government officials have, according to Aliran (30/05/05), 
indicated that 'one million civil servants, 200,000 disabled, 1.8million senior citizens, 
435,000 pensioners, 25,000 in hard poverty and the unemployed would be exempted 
from making mandatory monthly payments'. A key point to note here is that the 
government sets its' hard-core poverty line at households earning less than RM250 
per month, which in no-way takes account of those on low incomes, or those who 
drift between the formal and informal sectors. 
This chapter is not directly concerned with the perceived shortcomings of the 
Singaporean CPF, which is dealt with as a comparator case in Chapter 7. However, it 
is worth noting in passing that the EPF has much in common with the Singaporean 
CPF, which in turn has been touted as a successful model worthy of imitation 
(Aspalter, 2002) and indeed, the EPF makes a similar claim to be a social security 
system (EPF, 2005). Rather it is the Malaysian EPF which is the focus of this 
discussion and although further parallels have been drawn elsewhere (Asher, 1994, 
1998; Ruyter, 1998; Ramesh with Asher, 2000) that is not the explicit intention here. 
The Employee's Provident Fund (EPF) 
The EPF is a publicly mandated savings plan with contributions shared between 
employers and employees. Originally set up by the former British colonial power to 
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cater for expatriate workers, the Malaysian EPF is the oldest operating provident fund 
dating back to the EPF Act 1951 (272) and currently operates under the 1991 Act 
(452), and subsequently amended in the years 1995 (915), 1996 (958), 2000 (1080), 
2001 (1123) and 2003 (1190). The EPF is a defined contribution fully funded scheme 
and as such differs from other pay-as-you-go social insurance based schemes such as 
those operated by the Malaysian Social Security Organisation (SOCSO). As 
reiterated in the Chairman's statement in the 1999 Annual Report 'the primary 
responsibility of the EPF is to ensure that its members have financial security in their 
old age in the form of adequate savings to support their retirement' (EPF, 2000). 
Furthermore, as this thesis demonstrates, there are issues which prevent the EPF from 
adequately achieving this primary responsibility. 
Structure 
All employees, irrespective of the size of their employer's business, are covered by 
the scheme with both employees and employers contributing to the EPF at a current 
rate of 11 per cent and 12 per cent of wages respectively. The employee contributions 
for the year 2001-02 were reduced by 2 per cent to 9 per cent in an attempt by the 
government to boost consumer spending and give a fillip to a somewhat moribund 
economy. This tactic was again employed in 2003 and was then rescinded in May 
2004. According to figures published in the Business Times (22/05/2003) the 2 per 
cent cut in employee contributions was expected to boost consumer spending by 
somewhere between RM 1.8 billion and RM2.2 billion or the equivalent of 0.4 - 0.5 
per cent of GDP. Coincidentally, this economic stimulation by the EPF coincided 
with the government issuing a half month bonus to one million civil servants to the 
tune of RM500 million. 
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It is interesting to note, that the data in fig 3.1 below indicates that as the Malaysian 
economy stuttered and stagnated, and as the state initiated its first cut in contribution 
rates for employees, so the EPF posted its highest figures for withdrawals, which saw 
approximately RM21.968 billion withdrawn. The EPF itself has put this remarkable 
figure down to the withdrawals by ' a large number of foreign workers (who) had 
withdrawn their savings following the Government's decision to exempt them from 
contributing to the EPF effective 1 August 2001' (EPF 2003). This coincides with the 
repatriation of foreign workers in order to stave off increasing levels of 
unemployment, and as such has wider implications for old age poverty beyond 
Malaysia's borders. 
Fig 3.1: Withdrawals 1999- 2003 
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(EPF Annual Report, 2003) 
As part of the ongoing reform of the EPF, measures introduced in January 2002 to 
replace the less than successful annuity scheme introduces the possibility of each 
member's contributions now being separated into four dedicated accounts, each with 
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specific withdrawal requirements. At present, 60 per cent of contributions are 
deposited into Account I and cannot be withdrawn until the member reaches age 55. 
At age 55, members can withdraw their funds either as a single lump sum, part lump 
sum with balance paid in periodical payments, periodical withdrawal or withdraw the 
dividend annually leaving the balance within the account. A further 30 per cent is 
deposited in Account 2 and withdrawals are permitted for the purchase or building of 
a house, the payment of housing loans or towards cost of education at diploma level 
or above for the member or their children at an Institute of Higher Learning either in 
Malaysia or abroad. The balance of this account, that is total contributions plus 
compound interest, may be withdrawn at age 50. The final 10 per cent is held in 
Account 3 and may only be withdrawn to meet the costs of defined critical medical 
conditions. 
As of 1st January 2002, the newly initiated optional Account 4 allows members to 
transfer in a maximum of 50 per cent of the balance held in Account 1 and then 50 per 
cent of monthly contributions thereafter until age 55. Providing Account 4 has a 
minimum balance of RM24,000 members, upon reaching the age of 55, will be able to 
opt to withdraw monthly minimum payments of RM 100 for a maximum period of 20 
years to age 75. If the balance held in Account 4 is below the threshold and the 
member opts not to top up the balance with monies from Accounts 1, 2 or 3 then all 
four accounts are merged and the total is withdrawn in a single lump sum. 
Coverage 
As at the end of 1999 the EPF had 9.54 million members, this figure included 
approximately 4.78 million active contributors (EPF, 2000). Asher (1998) has shown 
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that the coverage as measured by the ratio of active contributors to labour force as at 
end of 1995 stood at 49.5 per cent. More recent figures, using the same calculation, 
show that the coverage has marginally increased to approximately 53.1 per cent 
(Ramesh with Asher, 2000), thereby implying that approximately 47 per cent of the 
labour force, or just less than one in two workers did not enjoy the basic EPF 
coverage. 
Fig 3.2: Growth in EPF membership 1999 - 2003 
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(Source : EPF Annual Report, 2003) 
However, if one makes use of the EPF's own figures from the 2003 Annual Report, as 
shown in fig 3.2, then the ratio of active members as a per cent of the total labour 
. force shows a decrease from the previous level of 53 per cent to an approximate 
figure of 48 per cent. Two points should be noted here: first, that membership of the 
EPF should continue to rise, albeit slowly, as the formal sector expands in line with 
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sustained economic recovery. It can be assumed that some of the previously active 
members have suffered retrenchment due to the stalling of the Malaysian economy 
since the turn of the century. Secondly it should also be noted that public sector 
employees are, in part, provided for under the Pension Trust Fund (PTF). Estimates 
suggest that the PTF accounts for approximately 5-7 per cent of the work force, which 
increases slightly the overall coverage of the work force to approximately 55 per cent 
again down from the previous high of 60 per cent. However, the picture still remains 
somewhat gloomy, as the figures from the 2003 Annual Report now imply that 
coverage by the EPF has fallen back below the 50 per cent mark 
Investments 
Under the 1991 Act, the EPF can only utilise approved investments. These include 
Malaysian Government Securities (MGS), debenture loans, money market 
instruments, equities and property. Under Section 26B 'Board to invest in 
Government Securities' the Act stipulates in subsection 1 that 'Subject to any 
variation which the Minister (of Finance) may make under subsection 2 (vary the 
percentage specified in subsection 1 ), the Board shall invest or re-invest at least fifty 
per cent of the moneys belonging to the Fund in securities offered by the Government 
of Malaysia provided that the total amount of moneys so invested in such securities at 
any one time shall not be less then seventy per cent of the Fund's total investments' 
(EPF Act 1991). In short then, the EPF is required to invest at least 70 per cent of its 
total funds in MGS, but is restricted from investing more than 25 per cent of its total 
funds in equities. As at the end of 1997, the EPF investments in MGS amounted to 
29.4 per cent compared to 73.6 per cent in 1991. This figure was expected to show an 
increase in the wake of the large budget deficit for 1999 of some RM 16.6billion, part 
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of which is to be met by the EPF. This has in fact been the case as MGS holdings 
rose initially to 31.58 in 1999 before rising further to 37.44 per cent as of September 
2001. Investments in equities again rose to stand at 22.27 per cent by the end of the 
third quarter, 2001 (Asher, 1998; EPF, 2000). However, more recent figures indicate 
that EPF investments in MGS which stood at 39.03 percent in 2004 have since 
declined to 37.62 percent at the end of 2005, equity investments have remained level 
at approximately 20 percent whereas debenture loans have increased to 36.3 percent 
of assets (EPF, 2005). The issue here is not so much the levels of investments, but 
that the Minister of Finance can change the terms of the 1991 Act to enable greater or 
lesser amounts to be invested in MGS and it is this interference by the state which 
hampers the EPF and restricts its ability to determine its own investment strategies 
and introduces a degree of volatility to investment returns. 
Dividends 
Dividends are calculated on a compound basis and are paid annually. The rate of 
dividend is determined by the EPF board, subject to approval from the Minister of 
Finance, under the EPF Act (1991) the dividend cannot be less than 2.5 per cent. The 
real rate of return, that which has exceeded the increase in the consumer price index, 
has consistently been positive. That is, the rate of dividend has exceeded the rate of 
inflation for 48 out of its 52 years in existence form 1951 to 2004. Indeed as the 
figures in table 3.1 indicate, the real rate of return on an individual's savings has 
remained fairly consistent at on or around the 4 per cent mark for the previous 40 
years. 
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Table 3.1: Comparison of nominal and real dividend rates on EPF balances 
Time period Nominal dividend Inflation rate (CPI) Real rate of 
rate(%) (%) dividend (%) 
1961 - 99 6.89 3.45 3.37 
1983-99 7.87 3.03 4.87 
1987- 99 7.68 3.34 4.40 
2000-2004 4.9 1.48 3.42 
Source: Adapted from Asher. M (2000) Table 2; EPF, 2004: 80 - CPI refers to the Consumer Pnce 
Index 
However, as both Valdes-Prieto (1999, cited in Asher 1999: 16) and Iglesias and 
Palacios ( 1999, cited in Clark 2002: 76) have reported, returns on EPF investments 
were below that which could have been achieved on domestic bank deposits. Indeed 
Valdes-Prieto (1998: 8) argues that over the period 1971- 1999, the real rate of return 
to members in the form of dividends was 2.74 per cent as opposed to that obtainable 
from bank deposits of 4.26 per cent, with equity investments topping out at 5.61 per 
cent. Asher ( 1998) has noted that the shift in investments away from MGS to 
alternative investment destinations has affected the ability of the EPF to maintain its 
accustomed high nominal dividend rate. The continued growth in the level of 
investment allocation directed towards equities, which at present are restricted to 
those based on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), will continue to have a 
direct and increasing bearing on the ability of the EPF to produce consistent dividend 
returns to members. Another aspect of this shift away from MGS can be attributed to 
one of the roles that the EPF has assumed in recent years, that of housing provider. 
Asher ( 1998) comments that the amendment to the 1991 Act enabled the EPF not only 
to encourage private home ownership through Account ll, but to act as housing 
provider through the offices of its subsidiary MBSB. Evidence of the success of this 
approach is provided by the EPF (2000), which recorded an increase of 25.59 per cent 
from 1998 figures of withdrawal of savings for housing purposes which totalled 
RM2.54 billion. 
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Whilst it is important to highlight the developments of the EPF investment strategy, 
and the possible impact of this upon the level of dividend payments to its members, it 
should also be noted that the EPF maintains a high degree of efficiency in the 
management of accounts. A common criticism of national provident funds has been 
the often high administrative burden associated with such schemes. As far as the EPF 
is concerned, however, this has been demonstrated not to be the case with operating 
costs amounting to less than 3 per cent of total income (EPF, 2000). That is not to say 
that there is no room for improvement. Great store has been placed upon investment 
in ICTs, not only by the state in general, but by the EPF in particular as it seeks to 
become more responsive and transparent in its dealing with its members. The hope is 
that administration costs can be further restricted as the organisation moves towards a 
greater reliance on non-paper administration and online communications. 
Issues facing the EPF 
Institutionalism and reform 
As was noted in Chapter One, there are varying schools of thought represented under 
the banner new institutionalism. Furthermore, it is historical institutionalism which it 
is argued here corresponds to an endogenous pressure that reflects both cultural and 
political preferences as well as representing the normative expectations of members of 
the EPF. In short, there is a reluctance to radically alter a savings mechanism which 
encompasses such slippery concepts as 'Asian' values, budgetary elasticity and 
leverage and short term (if not long term) realisation of members' needs and wishes. 
It should be stressed again, however, that this has not impeded incremental reform of 
the EPF, rather it has obscured the original central purpose of the fund and has led to 
the development of friction between the varying, and at times vying, constituencies. 
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The EPF has been used by the UMNO led Barisan Nasional as a ready source of cash 
to fund budget deficits, as in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis, and mega-
projects such as the Kuala Lumpur International Airport. Such reforms to the EPF 
which have taken place have seen the fund extend the uses to which members can put 
their savings, such as housing, health, education and investments, and it is the 
popularity both of the prospect of long term savings and short term satisfaction of 
needs which has enabled the EPF to thus far avoid radical reform. However, it is 
pertinent to talk about institutional inertia based upon ethno-class conflict, political 
temerity and public sentiment. The state has benefited both in economic flexibility 
and in less tangible terms, as the EPF has mirrored socio-cultural norms of self 
provision and family support which have been actively promoted by a state 
determined to avoid an expansive welfare regime. As an 'arms length' institution, 
albeit one directed by the Ministry of Finance, the EPF can be viewed as above ethno-
class distinctions. Its stated aim being the provision of old age income for all 
Malaysians enables it to avoid suspicion of promoting or serving the interests of one 
ethno-class faction above any others. In effect the EPF is liked by all. The result is 
that there is neither the political or organisational will, nor at present at least, is there 
the public demand for reform which would address the shortcomings of the current 
arrangements which call into question whether the EPF is 'fit for purpose'. 
In interviews carried out with high ranking members of both the EPF (24/04/0 1) and 
the Malaysian Social Security Organisation (SOCSO, 30/03/01) organisations and 
Professor Mukul Ash er at the National University of Singapore ( 16/04/01 ), this sense 
of institutional conflict was indicated. Both organisations it appeared, doubted the 
ability, capacity or philosophical approaches of the other. On the one hand the EPF 
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was deemed to be antipathetic to social insurance, SOCSO was deemed to lack the 
expertise, whilst the impact of both political decision making and the attitudes of EPF 
members were viewed as, at present, negative towards the implementation of policy 
reform which might eat into the notion of individualism in the former and increased 
contributions in the latter case. 
Campbell (2004: 159) suggests 'Public sentiments consist of broad-based values, 
attitudes and normative assumptions about what is appropriate. They are held by 
large segments of the population and are perceived by decision makers ... Public 
sentiments are often well institutionalised, reside in the background of decision-
making debates and constrain the normative range of solutions that decision makers 
view as acceptable'. Of course the biggest stumbling block to reform is the lack of 
political will to implement the required reforms. Having spent so long decrying the 
notion of expanded western welfarism, it does not sit easily with the Malaysian 
government, even under the leadership of the less vitriolic Ahmed Abdullah Badawi, 
to cast aside its protective buffer of 'Asian values' in recognition of an alternative 
path of social policy reform which it has for so long derided. 
It should, however, be stressed that this is not an 'either or situation'. It is not a case 
of simply dividing power, agency or action/inaction between the development and 
role of institutions versus the influence of exogenous economic pressures in the form 
of the processes of globalisation, the picture is more complex than that. Rather this 
duality forms a broad framework through which ideas of resilience or weakness of 
existing forms of welfare policies (and regimes) can be viewed. In effect, new and 
wider global and economic pressures are impinging upon 'traditional' institutionalised 
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ways of doing welfare, which in the case of Malaysia includes social and cultural as 
well as political arrangements, and makes them less able to withstand the turbulence 
which accompanies change (Jomo, 2001). With respect to the Malaysian EPF then, 
the embedded nature of individual provision and the 'ways of doing' old age income 
makes reform problematic. In the first instance it is the social and cultural norm of 
saving for one's old age which is accepted and reinforced through the provident fund 
mechanism. This is inherent in the 'Asian values' discourse which clearly focuses on 
the distinct cultural arrangements of welfare provision. Similarly the method of 
saving and accessing funds through a variety of means to meet a number of needs, 
housing being the most obvious, restricts the reform capabilities of the EPF in that its' 
members 'prefer' the status quo. To save dividend accruing contributions to the EPF 
and then to raise an interest bearing loan from an alternative financial institution 
raises the idea of a double payment. This does not prevent change and reform; rather 
it implies a particular approach which incorporates both concerns of the institution 
(which here could include both the EPF, the State and the public) and the traditional 
means of achieving such ends- the family. Here it is argued that far from radically 
reforming the provision of old age incomes through the introduction of greater choice 
for members through a wider variety of investment mechanisms, the EPF is in fact 
reacting to the social and cultural norms of individual provision. 
In short, such reforms are located in the historical development of both the fund and 
Malaysian society and are therefore path dependant, further embedding the 
institutionalised nature of Malaysian welfare regardless of whether the EPF is 'fit for 
purpose' in the present and the future. Such challenges have been acknowledged by 
the EPF and indeed the Chairman's statement in the 2005 Annual Report notes that 
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'Traditional schemes that were developed decades ago can no longer be sustained 
viably nor can they provide the financial security for future population' (EPF, 2005: 
29). The Chairman is, however, quick to suggest that questions of viability do not 
apply to the EPF. 
The Malaysian Employees Provident Fund: a limited model? 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with issues regarding the development of 
current arrangements for the provision of income for the elderly in Malaysia under the 
auspices of the Employees Provident Fund (EPF). It argues that as things currently 
stand the EPF is not 'fit for purpose' and that savings accrued are insufficient to meet 
the needs of an increasingly elderly population. In Malaysia, as in most of the rest of 
the developed and developing world, a main concern for both state, non-governmental 
organisations and individuals is the ability of elderly persons to fund life beyond 
retirement. Choices made by both the state and individuals will have a direct impact 
upon the quality of life experienced by the elderly. The proclaimed aim of the 
Malaysian state and other concerned bodies is to avoid excluding from the 
mainstream those who have contributed so much to the present and future prosperity 
and improved quality of life for the majority in Malaysia. Evidence for this can be 
found in the documentation of the National Policy for the Elderly which declares that 
'A united, tolerant and progressive nation with a populace that has strong moral and 
ethical fiber (sic) can help ensure a society that cares for the social well being of all its 
members .... .In this context the status and position of the elderly as important 
members of the family, society and nation has to be recognized. They have made 
significant contributions and as a recognition of their past, present and future 
roles ... their future social well being must be ensured' (Dept of Social Welfare, 1995). 
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There are~ however, real concerns that these aims will be severely hampered, if not 
met, if current institutionalised old age income arrangements persist. 
Malaysia's total population currently stands at approximately 23.27 million, of which 
21.9 qualify as citizens (Dept of Statistics, Malaysia, 2004 ). Classified as an upper 
middle-income country (World Bank, 1997), the per capita income currently stands at 
RM 13,359. This reflects Malaysia's swift recovery from the 1997 regional financial 
crisis, which saw a GDP rate (at 1987 prices) of -7.5 per cent in 1998 recover to +5.4 
per cent in 1999 reaching + 7.2 per cent in the year 2000 (81h Malaysia Plan (8MP), 
2001), before dropping back to +5 per cent in 2001 (Department of Statistics, 2001). 
The population is expected to increase at an average rate of 2.3 per cent, with a 
growth rate for those aged 65 and above estimated at 4.5 per cent (8MP, 2001, Table 
4.1 ). The three main ethnic groups in Malaysia experience varying fertility rates with 
the Bumiputera enjoying a fertility rate of 3.62 reflected in an average increase in the 
Bumiputera population of 3.2 per cent. This far exceeds the increases in the Chinese 
and Indian popu1ations which stand at 1.4 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively, with 
these groups achieving similar fertility rates of 2.57 for the Chinese and 2.55 for the 
Indian communities. Life expectancy in Malaysia has continued to increase from 68.8 
years for males and 73.4 years for females in 1991 (Asher, 1994), to 70.2 years for 
males and 75 years for females in 2000 (Department of Statistics, 2001). The elderly 
share of the population, which currently stands at 7 per cent, is estimated to reach 21 
per cent by the year 2050. This will be reflected in an estimated increase of elderly 
persons age 60 and above from 1.56 million in 2002 to 7.87 million in 2050 (UN 
Commission on Population and Development, 2000 Revision). It is clear from the 
data presented that the Malaysian elderly are living longer and are increasing as a 
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percentage of the population. Despite the recent qualification regarding an increase in 
the retirement age for public sector employees from 55 years to attaining their 561h 
year, there is a real and contemporary need for the establishment of an adequate 
system for securing income for old age which will last the contingency. 
Gender: a dimension of financial insecurity in old age. 
Economic security, both during economically productive years, the time at which 
savings can be accrued, as well as in old age are closely connected with gender. 
Women are, in general, less able to secure a regular and stable income than men. 
Higher proportions of women work in the informal sector or those sectors of the 
economy which are at greater risk from low wages and increased job insecurity. 
Ariffin et al ( 1996) have argued that there were no substantial socio-cultural barriers 
to women's participation in paid employment, and furthermore that there was a 
parallel increase in female production workers and a decrease in women as 
agricultural workers. Data to substantiate this shows that in 1970 women's 
employment in the agricultural sector stood at 68 per cent of the total female labour 
force, by 1990 this had decline to 28 per cent. In contrast however, in the 
manufacturing sector, the figures rose from just 8 per cent in 1970 to 24 per cent in 
1990. Ariffin et al ( 1996: 70) suggested that manufacturing industries preferred to 
hire female workers as they were 'more willing to accept lower wages'. More recent 
figures taken from the 8MP (200 1) show a continuing decline in female employment 
in the agricultural sector, which in 2000 accounted for 14.1 per cent of the total 
female labour force. 
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However, in relation to manufacturing the figures show something quite different. In 
1995 29.4 per cent of women were employed in manufacturing, post 1997; the figures 
for 2000 show that the numbers employed in the manufacturing sector had dropped to 
27.3 per cent. A recent repmt published by the Ministry of Women and Family 
development entitled The Progress of Women Since Independence' (2003) includes 
data which states that in the year 2000, 4 7.5 per cent of all females employed were to 
be found in either three categories of employment, clerical and related workers, 
services and sales. If one adds in manufacturing this accounts for 74.8 per cent of all 
women employed, thereby giving substance to the point raised later in Chapter 5 that 
women, due to their work destinations, are at greater risk from insecure employment. 
Domestic care responsibilities further disadvantage women in their attempts to both 
work and save towards old age. In their 2001 publication 'Social security: a new 
consensus', the ILO correctly emphasize the point that 'gender equality in social 
protection is more than a question of securing equal treatment of men and women in 
the formal sense. It is also a matter of taking account, in an appropriate way, of 
gender roles in society, roles which differ between societies and have in recent years 
undergone immense change' (200 1: 69). This is not to imply that the Malaysian state 
has been idle, as this is clearly not the case. 
A variety of policy reforms have been implemented in order to facilitate female 
participation in the labour market, one such example being the 1998 amendment to 
the 1955 Employment Act which provided for flexible working hours and provided 
for benefits to be paid to part-time workers proportionate to that of full time 
employees. However, this amendment was designed to encourage a greater degree of 
flexible part-time work particularly married women in order to enable them 'to meet 
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their family obligations', not to attain financial independence or guarantee greater 
income security. 
Furthermore, there has been a rise in the number of female headed households in 
poverty with figures from the 8MP which show the number in 1997 as being 585,688 
households or 15.1 per cent in 1997 rising to 16.1 per cent or 588,554 in 1999. It is 
conjecture, but none too fanciful, to infer a relationship between retrenchment in the 
manufacturing sector and the increase in the numbers of female-headed households in 
poverty. Similarly, whilst it is encouraging to note that Malaysia is seeking to 
promote greater female participation in the labour force. Furthermore, there are 
concerns that the government, in amending the 1955 Employment Act, has focussed 
on 'new flexible working arrangements such as teleworking, part -time work and job 
sharing, to enable more women to integrate a career with household duties' (8MP, 
2001: 567). The obvious issue here is that remuneration for such jobs will be low in 
terms of both actual wages and real wages in light of pro rata payment. The impact 
upon saving for retirement income is therefore obvious: 
Part time work= low pay= low EPF balances= increased risk of poverty in old age. 
This points to a concrete failing in institutional arrangements for old age incomes 
which promote individual savings over risk pooling and is an issue of direct 
discrimination. Such discrimination is further exacerbated by indirect discrimination 
which is prejudicial to women 'because of the nature of their occupational activity, 
marital status or family situation. Women workers predominate in the sectors not 
covered by social security, such as domestic, part-time or occasional work in the 
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informal economy'. (ILO, 2001: 69). Data to substantiate this is provided by the 
Ministry of Women and Family Development (2003) which notes the decline in 
unpaid female family workers from a high of 19.7 per cent to stand at 11.5 per cent. 
However, the report notes that this figure still accounts for more than two thirds of all 
unpaid family workers. The key issue here is one which can be identified in relation 
to all EPF members, but is an issue which is particularly pertinent to women, that is 
long qualifying periods, throughout which contributions are required to build up 
enough credit to provide members with a decent level of savings, disproportionately 
penalise women. Therefore, it is the double 'risk' of inequality in the paid labour 
market coupled with continuing domestic/care responsibilities which forges the link 
between gender and increased risk of poverty in old age. 
Retrenchment, in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, carried with it a gender dimension 
which saw a disproportionately high number of female employees leave the 
manufacturing sector 'The official data show that a total of 46,4643 workers were 
retrenched from July 1997 until June 1998, with the manufacturing sector accounting 
for 60.5 per cent of them. Women accounted for 38.4 per cent of workers retrenched 
until May 1998' (8MP, 2001: 20). Here again there are issues of validity with respect 
to the official data published by the Malaysian government. It is difficult to arrive at 
the full figures of those who were made redundant as a result of the 1997 crisis, as the 
state did not require, nor collect data relating to numbers and gender split of those 
retrenched until December 1997 to January 1998, a full six months after the run on the 
Thai Baht sparked off the crisis. Similarly, further data taken from the 8MP (200 1, 
Table 20-3) shows that women's employment grew fastest in the service sector from 
14.5 per cent in 1995, to 17.4 per cent by the year 2000, in contrast the proportion of 
125 
women employed in the Production and Related Workers category fell from 25.4 per 
cent in 1997 to 22.6 per cent in the year 2000. 
Table 3.2: EPF Active members' average savings at age 54 by gender 
Male Female 
Members Total Average Members Total Average 
Year (OOOs) Savings Savings (OOOs) Savings Savings 
(RM) (RM) (RM) (RM) 
2000 21,137 1,827,005849 86,436 7,952 357,182,294 44,917 
2001 25,535 2,289,377,130 89,656 10,146 467,759,686 46,102 
2002 24,823 2,522,229' 7 50 101,608 10,156 570,939,118 56,216 
2003 27,342 2,887,880,4 77 105,620 11,896 737,951,939 62,033 
2004 27,498 3,100,573,810 112,789 12,045 815,279,414 67,686 
2005 29,342 3,583,920,369 122,143 13,539 1,001 ,462, 777 73,969 
Source: Adapted from EPF Annual Report 2004: 83; 2005: 94 
As the above section clearly demonstrates Malaysian women are prone to both direct 
and indirect discrimination in both the labour market and the construction of the EPF, 
the ultimate effect of which will be the prevention of accumulation of savings with 
which to fund a longer period of retirement. Table 3.2 clearly demonstrates that 
women lag well behind men in the average levels of savings they are able to 
accumulate. Women are gaining on their male counterparts and the savings gap is 
reducing, albeit at an uncomfortably slow rate. In the next section this chapter will 
explore the limitations of the EPF and give substance to the claim that it is not 'fit for 
purpose', as for most Malaysians it is too limited a model to rely on the provision of a 
sustainable income throughout old age. 
Limitations of over reliance on the EPF 
As discussed above, Malaysia is to a greater extent reliant on foreign inward 
investment, mainly in the field of electronics and is consequently vulnerable to the 
vagaries of the global economy (UNDP, 2002). Over the past 4 years the 
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manufacturing sector has been engaged in a period of retrenchment as the world 
market in semi-conductors has reached saturation point. This is in an economy in 
which electrical and electronic products accounted for 56 per cent of exported goods 
in the first quarter of 2001 (Dept of Statistics, 2001 ). Of course Malaysia has a 
somewhat idiosyncratic manner in dealing with the issue of unemployment as a 
consequence of the global economic downturn. In short Malaysia expels those 
foreign workers deemed surplus to requirements in periods of rising unemployment, 
thereby exporting (or repatriating) some of its unemployment. Whilst this certainly 
lessens the threat of unemployment to Malaysian citizens, the economic situation still 
infers risk to continuous employment, which is crucial for individuals seeking to 
provide adequate resources to finance life in old age. Secondly there is no provision 
for a minimum wage in Malaysia. There has been a great deal of talk from both the 
Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC), the Employers Federation and the State 
but little has as yet been resolved. There is real inequality of income in Malaysia 
(Hashim, 1998) and this is reflected in figures produced by Yaacob (2000) which state 
that 60 per cent of contributors to the EPF are earning RM 1000 (approximately £200) 
or less per month and, citing Vijaya ( 1997) that the average amount withdrawn at age 
55 was RM19,501. More recent figures from the EPF, cited in the New Straits Times 
(16/03/2003) show that 'a Malaysian worker only has on average savings of 
RM85,000 with the EPF one year before he retires. About 80 per cent of the 10 
million workers have savings of less than RM 100,000 with the EPF. An EPF study 
also revealed that almost 70 per cent of retirees would have spent their money within 
three years'. In reality this translates into an equivalent monthly income of between 
25 and 40 per cent of final salary, which is far below the preferred ILO figure of 60 
percent. 
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These difficulties have clear knock on effects for the EPF. In short, there appear to be 
few 'ideal' members of the EPF in existence, those who pay into the fund on a 
continuous and regular basis for 30 to 35 years. Increased job insecurity directly 
impacts upon the ability of individuals to save towards retirement as does the present 
level of income inequality. Here is a clear example of potential ethno-class conflict, 
as it is the growing Malay middle class who are least exposed to employment 
insecurity, whilst those with few skills, poor education and from ethno-class factions 
which have not benefited from the institutional arrangements legislated for in the 
1970s are most at risk. The one category which straddles both the dominant ethno-
class faction and those at most risk are women. Embedded institutional welfare 
arrangement which view women as providers of unpaid care seriously undermines 
women's ability to accrue savings or credits towards an old age income. Research has 
shown that those who make it to retirement, and this is an increasing number, may 
well find that there are simply insufficient funds to enable full retirement to be an 
option (Y aacob, 2000). Instead, the increasing likelihood is that those aged 56 - 60, 
whether employed in the private or public sectors, will be unable to contemplate the 
possibility of ceasing work, or in the majority of instances, reducing the time spent 
earning an income beyond the official retirement age in order to supplement the 
meagre lump sum accrued through membership of the EPF. 
There are many sections of Malaysian society who find themselves in danger of 
poverty in old age. It is not only those whose occupation has been poorly 
remunerated during their working years. It is true that in both rural and urban 
settings, hawkers, trishaw pullers, labourers and petty traders for example, as well as 
those already suffering the effects of poverty in old age, are at risk from poverty due 
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in the main to non-existent EPF savings. There are, however, real concerns regarding 
the ability of a growing number of professionals from the lower middle classes to 
avoid poverty in old age. Ironically it the ethno-class faction which is better provided 
for in terms of employment, through positive discrimination, which finds itself at risk. 
Though provided for as public employees, they will see their income diminish over 
time as the cost of living rises and so eats into the value of their pension. Part of the 
problem is again the embedded institutional arrangement which requires compulsory 
retirement of public sector employees at the end of their 551h year. Low wages, early 
retirement and a static pension combine to increase the risk of a lack of material well 
being amongst older Malaysians. 
There are a number of fundamental concerns regarding the efficacy of national 
provident funds in meeting their main aim, that being the provision of income for the 
elderly beyond retirement. In the first instance, the ability of provident funds to 
provide an adequate income for the elderly is reliant on regular long-term 
contributions from individual account holders. Individual savings schemes are not 
equal to the task of providing adequate income for those workers forced to leave the 
labour force through ill health/disability, or the provision of social/child care in the 
case of women. The nature of the globalised economy, on which so much is pinned in 
the case of Malaysia, reduces the certainty of life long employment, as evidenced by 
the sharp economic downturn in 1997. 
Clark (2002: 65), commenting on East Asia in general, argues that both political and 
economic upheavals can affect the real income of the elderly and such 'events 
illustrate the importance of retirement policies such as indexed benefits, funded 
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retirement accounts, and diversification in the investment of these accounts to include 
international investments'. However, as has been noted, the recent trend away from 
MGS will introduce greater volatility of returns and so affect the ability of the EPF to 
maintain its regularly high dividends Asher ( 1998). 
Early withdrawals from individual members' accounts will take their toll, not only on 
the final balance but also on the dividend yield. In the case of the EPF early 
withdrawals from Accounts 2 and 3 for housing, education and health care, a possible 
40 per cent of all contributions and dividends, will result in lower returns (Williamson 
and Pampel, 1998). The relatively young age at which lump sum withdrawals can be 
made from the EPF (age 55) casts serious doubt on the ability of the accumulated 
balance lasting the required length of time. The increasing life expectancy combined 
with inexperience in individual private investments could leave the elderly vulnerable 
to an increased risk of poverty. The preference for a lump-sum payment, rather than a 
phased withdrawal scheme is evidenced by data in the EPF annual report (2000). 
Figures relating to the lump-sum withdrawal at age 55 were 72,719 or 27.94 per cent 
of savings withdrawn. In 1999, only 177 individuals opted for a phased withdrawal 
accounting for a mere 0.04 per cent of all cash withdrawn. In the 2003 annual report 
the number of members opting for monthly phased withdrawals at age 55 had dropped 
to 151; however, this accounted for a staggering RM8.96 million, clearly indicating 
that this option is, in reality, available to only a very wealthy few. Those members 
opting for the lump sum have inevitably found that their balances were inadequate to 
providing a life long income. In the majority of instances 'the benefits were 
exhausted within three years of receipt at age 55' (Beattie, 1998: 70). In cases were 
lump sums are managed appropriately to give a longer lasting source of income, 
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inflation will inevitably affect the level of income return. Therefore lump sum 
payments cannot be relied upon as an efficient means for the provision of income 
beyond retirement. 
Conclusion 
Providing adequate income beyond retirement and thereby lessening the socially 
exclusive aspects of poverty is not simply a question of individual versus state 
provision. Improving the current schemes and supplementing individual provision 
with a social insurance based pension would provide a greater guarantee of acceptable 
living standards beyond retirement. To achieve full labour force coverage, the state 
would be required to guarantee contributions for those workers who are unable to 
contribute personally, through to a pensions credit mechanism for women fulfilling 
social care obligations and workers in the shrinking informal sector. Such measures 
would contribute to greater gender equality as well as providing better income 
security. A degree of compulsion would be required to encourage the self employed 
and agricultural workers to sign up to such a scheme, as it is precisely these 
individuals who are currently beyond the scope of the EPF. The intertwining of 
ethnicity and class as a result of industrialisation and increased urbanisation has 
resulted in an expanding middle class and a vulnerable urban working class whose 
precarious position is, in part, a consequence of the degree to which the Malaysian 
economy is open to the demands of the global economy and in part a result of existing 
ethno-class relationships. The former is evidenced by Jomo (2001) who notes the 
increasing income inequality as wages are suppressed to maintain and attract FDI. 
The latter is evidenced by the fact that those employed in the informal sector, the low 
paid, those forced to leave the labour force early through ill health or disability, or 
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women taking a career break to fulfil social care obligations are placed at a 
disadvantage in a scheme which depends upon a high level of long term contributions. 
Women in particular are likely to suffer direct discrimination and the adverse effects 
of poverty in old age due in part to earlier retirement combined with greater life 
expectancy. An increase in the level of contributions paid would go some way 
towards addressing this problem for the low paid. This could be achieved through the 
introduction of a minimum wage, which would in effect guarantee a defined level of 
savmg. 
The EPF operates as an individual savings scheme designed to offer social protection 
beyond retirement through the provision of an adequate income(EPF, 1999). To fulfil 
this criteria greater emphasis needs to be placed on its core activity rather than 
expanding its remit to cover the costs of health and social care. Access to funds with 
regards to retirement ages will need to be addressed. The withdrawal of a lump sum 
at age 55 is no guarantee of income for the remaining lifetime. The need to introduce 
periodical benefits has been acknowledged by Malaysia (Beattie, 1998) although 
given the data presented above, a degree of compulsion with attendant benefits may 
be required. 
An increase in the mandatory retirement age and thus access to Account I would at 
the very least increase the period of contribution. This could be made more 
acceptable if carried out incrementally over an extended period of time. This thesis is 
not assuming that those who reach age 55 retire from work altogether, research proves 
this not to be the case (Chen and Jones, 1989). However, a government led initiative 
towards flexible retirement could facilitate the continued employment of older 
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workers and lessen the incidence of poverty and social exclusion experienced by the 
elderly. The Malaysian government is unwilling at present to countenance the 
continued employment of older workers in the public sector beyond their 561h year, in 
part due to the pressure brought about by Malaysia's expanding cohort of graduates. 
Demographic, social and economic changes in Malaysia will increase the need for a 
more adequate system of income provision for the elderly. Reliance on institutionally 
embedded traditional means of support combined with individual savings may well 
lead to an increase of the incidence of poverty and social exclusion among the elderly. 
To prevent such a scenario, action needs to be taken to ensure that all workers are 
covered by a system that offers at least a minimum guaranteed income through 
periodical payments. The overriding impression is that the EPF as the only 
mechanism for securing an income into old age, has outlived it usefulness, it is simply 
no longer up to the job as developments, both social and economic, have left it 
behind. As an institution the EPF has found it difficult to adapt to a changing labour 
market, and its reactions have been just that reactions. There is recognition of the 
problem, but little concrete evidence available which points to a Fund which is 
capable of meeting the need of current, let alone future, Malaysian. In truth the EPF 
appears to have opted for the status quo rather than meeting the needs of its members. 
Clearly then, the EPF has value as an individual savings scheme, but its scope and 
coverage compromise the ability of the fund to act as an equitable and adequate form 
of pension provision for a majority of Malaysians. There is another factor, recognised 
as both a global and domestic issue, which impinges upon the efficacy of the EPF, 
namely the demographic shift to an aged population. This process which it is argued 
is part and parcel of the effects of economic development and growth was first noted 
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in the World Bank's 1994 publication Averting the Old Age Crisis. In the next 
chapter the processes of economic globalisation are examined as a global, regional 
and domestic pressure and it is argued that individual savings, including those 
invested in equity based investment vehicles, are insufficient to meet the needs of the 
growing numbers of elderly Malaysians. Economic globalisation is not presented as 
an all or nothing package, rather the concept of a local filter is introduced which is 
used to explain how states are able to resist or adapt to the external pressures and 
benefits which engagement with the global economy has undoubtedly brought 
Malaysia, whilst simultaneously introducing new risks which further calls into 
question the 'fit for purpose' nature of the EPF. 
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Chapter Four 
The impact of 'globalisation': challenging the EPF 
In Chapter 1 it was argued that the twin concepts of economic globalisation and 
historical institutionalism were representative of the struggle to adapt to changing 
economic and social developments, both internally and externally, and that this called 
into question the 'fit for purpose' nature of the Malaysian EPF. As both Chapters 2 
and 3 noted, the current EPF is as a result of historical developments which took place 
during the colonial period, as well as more recent administrative reforms, and the 
colonial era continues to have an impact through embedded and path dependent 
social, political and economic institutions. This chapter widens the discussion to take 
account of the exogenous pressures placed upon Malaysia as a result of the degree of 
market openness to global economic forces. Such forces have enabled the process of 
economic and social development over the past 30 - 40 years, but have also 
introduced 'new' risks to both the economy and the Malaysian population, and which 
have consequences for the EPF. 
This chapter will pin down some of the more amorphous terms and concepts which 
often surround the ongoing debate which centres on the ability of nation states to 
operate independently of an increasingly interconnected global economy. It is 
impossible to contemplate social policy reform without some regard to the prevailing 
global economic conditions. This is not the sole factor, rather it is a component part 
of the decision making process albeit one which carries greater weight in certain 
instances than in others. Domestic institutional and political arrangements are likely 
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to have a mediating effect on the influence, or otherwise, of external economic 
conditions (Hobson and Ramesh, 2002). Similarly there is no suggestion that regard 
given to wider economic circumstances by policy makers is anything new, clearly it is 
not. However, it would be wrong to suggest that the importance of external pressures 
and influences has remained constant over the last 60 or so years. As economic and 
trade barriers have tumbled, due in part to the influence of International 
Governmental Organisations (IGOs) such as the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), international institutions such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFT A), World Trade Organisation (WTO), Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU), and the concomitant rise in 
power of the Multi National Corporations (MNCs), there has been a concurrent rise in 
the attention that nation states have had to pay to external, primarily economic, 
factors. That is not to suggest, as it has been by others (R. B. Reich, 1991; Ohmae, 
1995; Strange, 1996; Mishra, 1999), that the nation state has ceased to function 
without reference to the wider economic processes, this is clearly not the case as 
evidenced by Malaysia's response to the 1997 Southeast Asian economic crisis which 
saw controls placed upon both the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and the Ringgit 
pegged to the dollar at a steady RM3.8. Rather, just as the processes of globalisation 
and their end point are subject to disagreement so too is the idea that individual nation 
states are unable to resist the push and pull of the global economy. Instead, this thesis 
is informed by those like Mann (1997) and Dicken (1998, 2003), and as such argues 
that 'the position of the nation-state is being redefined ... The nation-state remains a 
most significant force in shaping the world economy' (Dicken, 1998: 80). 
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Though it is something of truism to contend that the nation-state has had to adapt and 
change to meet wider global economic shifts and increased interconnectedness, in 
certain instances this has involved attempting to predict future economic trends and 
taking difficult local decisions so as to safeguard national economic security and 
stability. This process of events should come as no surprise, as it is nigh on 
impossible to find a point in modem history at which nation states have remained 
constant with regard to their economic and social policies. Reference is often made to 
the so called 'golden era' of post war welfare expansion, however, two points are 
worth noting firstly that this 'epoch' lasted at best 30 years and secondly its effects 
were unevenly spread and the benefits felt by a relatively small number of 
western/northern developed nations and as such is limited in its applicability or 
relevance to this thesis. That is not to ignore the process of policy exchange which 
has taken place and which continues to inform the path of welfare reform. This 
process as identified by Goodman and Peng ( 1996) as 'peripatetic learning' has 
played, and continues to play, a role in the exchange of ideas between different 
nations and geographical areas of the globe. Rather in respect of the 'golden age', 
this thesis argues that the political and economic stability and consensus of this period 
did not greatly affect the developmental path of welfare reform in Southeast Asia. 
Economic development provided the driving force, behind which lagged social 
welfare development. 
There has been, in a sense, a deterministic approach to the development of welfare 
states amongst the newly industrialising countries of Southeast and East Asia. In part 
the argument contends that authoritarianism and economic liberalisation have gone 
hand in hand to produce welfare regimes which have focussed on a strong family and 
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weak state provision. The role of the state, it has been argued, has for the most part 
been limited to providing conditions for year on year economic growth, thereby 
enabling populations to provide for and meet the needs of their members, the 
preferred private rather than public path to meeting social needs. Holliday (2000 cited 
in Gough, 2000a: 15) employs the term developmental-universalist to describe the 
form of welfare reform employed under the productivist welfare capitalism of such 
states as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Gough (2000a: 16) argues that by this it 
should be understood that 'Social expenditures were small but relatively well 
targeted ... as part of a strategy of nation building, legitimation and productive 
investment. The growth in welfare over the last three decades has relied on the 
expansion of formal employment within the orbit of strong families, plus growing 
payment for services.' In general, welfare expenditure has remained relatively low in 
selected areas of Southeast Asia although the benefits of targeted welfare spending 
have produced the desired positive effect for the economy, in particular through 
spending on education and health, and it is for this reason that the use of such a label 
is both accurate and usefully explanatory. The economic development that has taken 
place under the influence of increased economic globalisation has enabled states with 
a common history to advance at differential rates to a form of common future, that 
being a 'developed status'. Some have fared better that others in this regard, although 
it is worth noting that such an account of economic and social reform suffered a 
severe blow in part as a result of the regional economic crisis which began with a run 
on the Thai Baht on the 2nd July 1997. 
The main problem with such a crude model of development is that it glosses over the 
detail in favour of the broad strokes in seeking to categorise and model diversity. It 
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fails to take account of the very different forms of economic and social development 
which have been implemented in a large and diverse geographical area. So just as one 
could not suggest a single welfare model for Western Europe in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, any such claim for Southeast Asia would be fundamentally flawed. 
Instead what is argued for in this chapter is a degree of historical similarity between 
the nations of Southeast Asia, as they face some common contemporary issues, but 
that this does not go far enough to fully explain their approaches to social policy 
reform. This thesis argues that globalisation is an amorphous term which covers more 
than simply increased economic interconnectedness, important though this is, and that 
these globalisations have explanatory power in terms of cultural clashes in the 
aftermath of decolonisation. 
To further this aim, this chapter will chart some of the common historical and 
contemporary similarities between a select group of Asian nations which represent 
differing stages of both economic and welfare state development. The chapter will 
also examine issues facing Malaysia's ongoing process of economic development 
which are shared by it's regional neighbours, specifically the rise of alternative 
destinations for FDI, namely China and India. The obvious comment to make at this 
point is that the chosen states represent both tiers of economic development which, 
have respectively been referred to as tigers or dragons. Such states have also been 
described as newly industrializing countries (NICs) and newly industrializing 
economies (NIEs), or the World Bank's catch all category of high performing Asian 
economies (HP AEs ). Rather than make use of the full range of the first wave of 
nations to advance economically in the region, namely Japan, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, it was decided to employ Korea as their sole representative. In part this is 
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due to common demographic issues affecting Korea at a similar pace to the other 
chosen states and in part because Korea has recently undergone a democratisation 
process, which having largely left behind previous authoritarianism, has exposed a 
new range of social risks which are to be open to insurance based solutions -
unemployment is a good example. It is not intended that Korea should form a 
blueprint of development for other nations in Asia, although there is much to learn 
from the Korean experience, rather the aim is to highlight the fact that the 
development and construction of the Korean welfare regime is active and ongoing and 
leaves behind the constraining notion of economic determinism as the driving force of 
social welfare development. 
It is worth briefly restating the shared historical experiences of the six nations which 
we will examine more closely later. Some of the factors this group have in common 
are, with the exception of Thailand, a relatively recent colonial past, a generally low 
level starting point in terms of development at independence and a common 
developmental path throughout the latter stages of the twentieth century which saw 
economic development as the means by which both the state could survive and its 
peoples benefit from new found independence and homespun prosperity. All of the 
nations under discussion have forged their own path in seeking and achieving 
oftentimes spectacular economic growth. However, one fundamental strategy that all 
have employed is an authoritarian governance coupled with providing the necessary 
conditions with which to entice inward investment by large multinational corporations 
seeking cheaper and more flexible labour. With the exception of Korea, there is a 
continued high level of economic dependence upon foreign direct investment, 
particularly in the area of electronics manufacturing which leaves the remaining states 
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at greater risk of exposure to a global market which has reached saturation point in 
this particular sector. This does not necessarily mean that the development of welfare 
systems in each nation state are at the mercy of foreign capital. There is justifiably 
less currency in the once dominant notion that a successful open economy could not 
afford to expand welfare provision for fear of alienating capital and thereby damaging 
the individual economy. The argument here is not that capital has less power, 
however, clearly there are instances where this is not the case. Rather, nation states 
and their institutions have not been fundamentally or structurally undermined by the 
growth and reach of capital in the form of MNCs or IGOs, and have developed 
welfare regimes which take account of macro-economic conditions as well as the 
needs of their citizens. In effect nation states act as filters through which the 
processes of globalisation must pass and which screen their effects with reference to 
national economies and more importantly social welfare regimes. 
There are global agencies which carry more weight in the arena of economic 
globalisation and these institutions or organisations can be identified as a source of 
hindrance to aspects of progressive welfare reform. Into this category would fall 
international governmental organisations (IGOs) such as the IMF, World Bank and 
the WTO all of which wield immense power over the developmental path of the 
worlds less developed nations. These organisations have for the most part been 
dominated by the 'North' and by the USA in particular. However, there are signs that 
such power to direct the economic and social policies of smaller nations as 
represented by the so-called Washington consensus has lessened, if not waned (Jomo, 
2001; Rigg, 2003). The instance of Malaysia imposing capital controls in the wake of 
the 1997 economic crisis much against the warnings of the IMF, and the subsequent, 
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and somewhat grudging, admission by the same organisation that such a decision did 
not detract from the rapid pace of economic recovery is notable for the shift in tack 
from earlier statements of gloom. However, as with most aspects of economic policy 
time does not allow for initiatives to go unchallenged for long. So although the IMF 
accepted that the short-term implementation of capital controls and the pegging of the 
exchange rate to the dollar initially aided economic recovery, other commentators 
have suggested that this act of market closure caused a degree of nervousness and 
suspicion amongst possible foreign investors unsure as to the stability of the 
Malaysian market (FEER 91h October, 2003: 22). As Garrett (2000: 944) suggests 
'there might be domestic political incentives for governments to maintain restrictions 
on cross-border capital movements ... Such policies send negative signals to the 
financial markets; however, and many governments may be unwilling to take this 
risk'. 
Addressing globalisation 
Globalisation has been making steady progress to the centre of social policy debate 
for the best part of twenty years and it is both used in a prescriptive and descriptive 
manner. At times it can be seen as a catch all concept which can be used to explain 
such diverse developments as the growth in economic and social interconnectedness, 
the development (or not) of a global culture and the end of the rise of the nation state. 
Globalisation has also been employed as an ideological hammer with which to beat 
the previously dominant social democratic model of the post World War Two era and 
as a justification for the view that with the end of economic protectionism of the 
nation state and Soviet style socialism at the close of the 1980s rampant and 
unrestricted neo-liberal capitalism is the only means by which global and local 
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poverty and inequality can be addressed (Beck, 2000; Giddens, 2000; Gough, 2000a; 
Held and McGrew, 2000; Mann, 1997; Mishra, 1999; Sklair, 2002; Yeates, 2001). In 
an attempt therefore to avoid further obfuscation the following section of this chapter 
seeks to operationalise and limit the scope of the broad term globalisation in order 
that a more accurate definition can be employed within the confines of this thesis. 
Whilst the many and varying strands of the globalisation debate offer different views 
or takes on the purpose, direction and extent of the processes which are encompassed, 
it is fair to say that there seems little point in arguing the case that nothing is 
occurring. In Held and McGrew (2000: 341) the United Nations Development Report 
( 1999) claims that globalisation is not new, but that the current global era has 
identifiably new components which set it apart from historical precedents. These the 
report identifies as; 
• New markets- foreign exchange and capital markets linked globally operating 
24 hours a day, with dealings at a distance in real time. 
• New tools - Internet links, cellular phones, media networks 
• New actors- the WTO with authority over national governments, the MNCs 
with more economic power than many states, the global networks of NGOs 
and other groups that transcend national boundaries. 
• New rules- multilateral agreements on trade, services, intellectual property, 
backed by strong enforcement mechanisms and more binding for national 
governments, reducing the scope for national policy. 
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Garrett (2000: 942), in his identification and examination of four perspectives of 
globalisation, which he restricts to the 'international integration of markets in goods, 
services, and capital.', suggests that, with specific regard to the lending practices of 
banks to developing nations, the advent of complex multinational production regimes 
and the two way manufacturing trade between developed and developing states then 
the sensible conclusion to draw is that something new is happening (see Table 4.1 
below). In addition to this there are a number of generally agreed upon dimensions 
which can be employed to give shape to this discussion. So as Held et al (1999: 15) 
contend 'the concept of globalisation implies, first and foremost, a stretching of 
social, political and economic activities across frontiers such that events, decisions 
and activities in one region of the world can come to have significance for individuals 
and communities in distant regions of the globe ... there is a detectable intensification, 
or growing magnitude of interconnectedness.' (original emphasis). However, 
although use can be made of the concept of greater interconnectedness it should be 
noted that this too is open to dispute. Following others such as Giddens (2000), Held 
et al (1999), Mishra (1999), Sklair (2002) and Yeates (200 1) a little time should be 
spent broadly sketching the varying strands in this particular section of the 
globalisation debate. 
In the first instance then the scope of disagreement will be limited to two broadly 
accepted camps, before introducing a more comprehensive and market integrationist 
approach as put forward by Garrett (2000). There are those for whom globalisation is 
viewed as something new, indisputable and unstoppable, variously describe as 
globalists (Sklair, 2002), Hyperglobalizers (in which is included here the briefly 
mentioned transformationalists) (Held et al, 1999) or subscribing to a 'strong' version 
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of globalisation (Yeates, 2001). Subscribers to this view argue that 'globalisation 
defines a new epoch of human history in which 'traditional nation-states have become 
unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy' (Held et al, 1999: 3). 
Rather it is the MNCs who have the upper hand in the new global economy with their 
ability to shift location and maximise profit to geographical areas which offer the 
most advantageous conditions. Nation states are leeching control and power not only 
to these dominant corporations but also to new supranational forms of governance 
which will eventually call into question the legitimacy of national governments (Held 
et al, 1999; Held and McGrew 2002; Yeates, 2001) who are unable to meet the needs 
of their citizens. Furthermore traditional notions of nationality, identity and custom 
are replaced by a new global consumerist ideology which as Yeates (200 1: 1 0), 
somewhat tongue in cheek suggests, enables 'the wonders of Disney, Coke and 
McDonalds are brought to those previously ignorant or deprived of them'. In short 
those advocating such a stance argue for an economic view of the processes of 
globalisation resulting in a fundamental and qualitative shift in power away from the 
state and towards a new global economic order. 
Opposing these advocates are the sceptics for whom globalisation is portrayed as 
something of a myth or political construct serving the increased marketisation 
approaches of various international actors and neo-liberal inclined national 
governments. (Garrett, 2000: 943 citing Rodrik, 1998). Furthermore, the sceptics 
argue that levels of world trade have simply returned to pre-World War One levels 
and that the world economy is becoming regionalized with national governments 
allying their economic interests to regional trading blocs such as the EU, NAFf A or 
ASEAN (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Held et al, 1999). Put simply then, the 
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argument here is that changes are taking place but that these developments are 
commensurate with greater internationalization of the world economy rather than a 
move towards, and certainly not an arrival at, a truly global economy. The sceptics 
also reject the notion of cultural homogenisation put forward by the advocates. 
Rather they suggest that the processes of increased internationalization result in 
winners and losers, roughly equating to the North winning and the South losing out. 
This, the sceptics argue, gives rise to increased nationalism and fundamentalism 
resulting in greater fragmentation based on cultural and ethnic difference. 
A useful, and more comprehensive picture is provided by the summary of four main 
perspectives of market integration in the global economy (or what he terms the 'big 
picture') in Garrett (2000). As Table 4.1 indicates, the sceptic position is represented 
by the first perspective, the hyperglobalizers by the second, the transformationalists 
are contained within perspective three and the fourth takes a more 
political/ideological viewpoint. The position of Malaysia within this framework is at 
best suggested and evidenced by its response to the 1997 crisis. The acceptance of the 
risks and possible costs of market closure, as indicated by perspective three, did not 
prevent the imposition of capital controls or the pegging of the Malaysian Ringgit 
(RM) to the US dollar at a constant rate of RM3.8 which continued until July 2005. 
However, these policies were followed in opposition to the stance taken by the then 
'Washington consensus' and indicates the viability of independent action by nation 
states and their ongoing active involvement in the global market. 
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Table 4.1: Four perspectives on international market integration 
View Selected advocates Critique 
1 A return to economic Rodrik ( 1997) New facets of global 
internationalization as at Hirst and Thompson ( 1996) economy; banks lending 
the beginning of the 20th Krasner ( 1999) to developing states; two-
Century way manufacturing trade 
between North and South; 
complex multinational 
_Qroduction 
2 Technological Ohmae ( 1995) Greater salience for 
determinism; Strange ( 1998) finance rather than trade; 
'unstoppable' processes of negates role of nation 
globalisation; 24 hour states 
trading 
3 Moderate technological "Washington Consensus" Unclear as to benefits of 
determinism; World Bank increased free trade; gains 
Acknowledges continued IMF of openness offset by 
role of the nation state, but WTO uncertainty and volatility 
at a cost to maintaining 
streams of FDI 
4 Globalisation as political Helleiner ( 1994) Easy to endogenise 
construct which does not Rodrik ( 1998) ideological changes in 
benefit society as a whole Rodriguez and Rodrik terms of technological 
( 1999) determinism in 
international finance and 
cost of market closure in 
terms of multinational 
_Qroduction 
Source: Adapted from G. Garrett, 2000: 942-44 
Social policy and globalisation 
The question that should be addressed at this juncture is, what is the role for the study 
of social policy in a globalised world? An area of common ground has emerged in 
certain sections of academia which argues that the growing importance of the global 
economy, the decreased levels of states autonomy with regards to social policy reform 
and the desire from some quarters for a greater degree of global regulation, thereby 
seeking to ameliorate the harshest effect of global capitalism, which appears not too 
dissimilar from concerns regarding the construction of national welfare regimes, has 
lead to call for the study and analysis of social policy to be expanded to include both 
national and transnational perspectives (Deacon et al, 1997; Perez Baltodano, 1999; 
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Yeates, 200 I). Some issues which find a place on the global stage include, but are not 
limited to, economic security, migration, age, urbanisation and greater disparity 
between the nations of the rich North and those of the poor South which questions the 
neo-liberal contention that globalisation is 'good' for all. It is not too great a leap of 
imagination to accept that the increased emphasis on the global requires a greater role 
for comparative analysis which takes account of the different developmental path of 
individual nations and which further accepts that social policy initiatives of the North 
are not wholesale transferable to the South. 
In the first instance the social and cultural arrangements which have developed in 
different nations are relative to, and concerned with, the milieu in which they have 
come about. So for example, the strength of the informal private provision of welfare 
as a result of continuing robustness of family and community bonds in many 
developing nations has given rise to a broader scope of formal welfare arrangements 
which have sought to shore up such arrangements. Such an approach is outlined in 
the 8MP (200 I: 18) which states that 'globalisation will have an impact and may even 
threaten the integrity of the family structure and traditional communities as well as 
influence cultural values and norms in social integration and nation building.' It is 
this reliance on familial provision of welfare which has thus far, enabled national 
governments from the South to exclude or limit the role of the state. The diversity of 
local or national welfare arrangements, many of which are beyond the scope of 
traditional social policy analysis as developed in the North has lead Gough (2000c: 
15) to argue that 'In a majority of DCs .... a wider range of historical and institutional 
variables impinge on the welfare regime. In other words, welfare regimes in DCs are 
not the same game with different actors; usually a different game is being played.' In 
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part, this requires a broadening of the scope of analysis of welfare regimes in 
developing countries, one which takes account of the multitude of initiatives which, 
though not directly identifiable as traditional welfare reforms or initiatives in the 
developed North, nevertheless seek to address issues such as poverty and inequality. 
One such area, which is pertinent to developing countries in general and Malaysia in 
particular, is that of land reform and the support given to those living in rural areas in 
an effort to sustain populations. In his paper on globalisation and poverty and income 
inequality in Southeast Asia, Jomo (200 1: 19) argues that only in case of Korea and 
Taiwan did land reform aim to reduce poverty and inequality 'after the Korean War, 
the Seoul government bought land from landlords and resold it at subsidised prices to 
90,000 tenants. In Taiwan, the Kuomintang government seized land in return for 
shares in public companies and sold it cheaply to peasants ... Only in South Korea and 
Taiwan did land reforms contribute to low initial income inequality, a level that was 
maintained.' The situation was different in Malaysia, due in part to reforms initiated 
by the British colonial administration and also due to land ownership inequalities 
being less acute (Jomo, 2001). Instead the Malaysian state opened up new agricultural 
land through schemes administered by government agencies such as the Federal Land 
Development Authority (FELDA), Federal Land Consolidation Rehabilitation 
Authority (FELCRA) and the Rubber Industry Smallholders' Development Authority 
(RISDA) under the auspices of the NEP (Jomo, 2001). However, research casts doubt 
on the efficacy of such schemes and others such as the Green Revolution in rice 
production in Malaysia. Rigg (2003: 292-3) cites research carried out by Kato (1994), 
which depicts a process of widespread abandonment of rice cultivation in Peninsular 
Malaysia, an increase in the average age of rural inhabitants, a reduction in rural 
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populations and a substantial increase in incomes from pensions or remittances from 
the younger generation working in the urban industrial environment. This is in line 
with Jomo's (2001: 20) suggestion that income inequality in rural areas grew 'in the 
1960s, declined in the 1970s and 80s and has increased again since then.' 
However, there are suggestions (World Bank, 1994) that the processes of economic 
globalisation are in part responsible for what should be a convergence of social policy 
reforms which would seek to address the current and future inequalities which are a 
facet of globalisation per se. Malaysia is faced with issues of income inequality 
across the life course and lacks comprehensive formal arrangements which will result 
in an increased proportion of the current and future elderly being at greater risk of the 
social exclusory aspects of poverty in old age. Furthermore, it is argued that internal 
migration, increased urbanisation and heightened insecurity of employment will affect 
the ability of individuals to save enough to prevent a drop in standard of life once full 
time economic activity is ended. This is not a problem unique to Malaysia, rather it is 
one of a plethora of issues which find a place on the global stage. The development 
of welfare regimes can be seen to be qualitatively different in terms of geo-social and 
cultural arrangements, but by the same token the issue of poverty in old age is not 
restricted to the North or the South, it is a global concern. How this issue is dealt with 
will primarily be concerned with local institutional arrangements and will still pass 
through the national filter, although it could be argued that the scale of the issue 
should reveal a degree of consensus in how to find a solution. Perhaps what mediates 
such a consensus are the individual endogenous pressures brought to bear by specific 
domestic institutions, and here the range is broad, which will necessarily affect the 
future path of welfare reform. The conclusion put forward in this thesis calls for a 
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greater role for the state through social insurance and a diminishing reliance on 
individual provision. 
Welfare regimes in a globalised world 
This section of the chapter is concerned with the notion which implies that the 
processes of globalisation have had a detrimental effect upon the contemporary 
structure and future developments of welfare regimes in the developed and 
developing world. It has been suggested that little has been left untouched by the 
increased interconnectedness of the global economy as nation states seek to become 
ever more flexible and attractive to the requirements on the MNCs who power the 
increasingly connected global economy (Beck, 2000; Held and McGrew, 2000; 
Mishra, 1999; Yeates, 2001). This view, though less strident now than previously, led 
to fears of 'social dumping' which demanded that social spending was cut in order to 
promote investor attractiveness and lower the costs to the state. This was to be 
achieved via cutting or maintaining, though not increasing, social expenditure and 
both an increased role for households and individuals and a greater marketisation of 
welfare provision. 
However, there is a contra position such as that taken by Rodrik ( 1997) which 
highlights the increased need for the state to take a leading role in the reform and 
provision of social welfare. This is particularly the case with regards to social 
insurance, as the majority of individuals remain bound to national locations and yet 
are at greater risk of the negative effects of economic globalisation. The role that 
social insurance plays in terms of fostering social solidarity and, historically in the 
case of the developed economies though less so for the NICs, nation building should 
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not be ignored. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that national economies now 
operate in a more restrictive environment which can limit policy choices and which 
has given rise to the abandonment of redistributive policies in favour of 'privatization' 
and a leaner welfare state. Yeates (2001) argues that this is in essence representative 
of the welfare convergence thesis which infers that nation states will resort to similar 
welfare choices and that those who take a more independent stance will be punished 
by the main actors in the global economy. Yeates (200 1: 23) cites Taylor-Gooby 
(1997: 171) who suggests that 'Since full employment, redistribution and expensive 
universal services are no longer seen as feasible, the new welfare can only justify 
social spending as investment in human capital and the enhancement of individual 
opportunities. Welfare states are all driven in the same direction by the imperatives of 
international competition'. 
The efficacy and accuracy of the convergence thesis, portraying as it does something 
of an overwhelming and overarching determinism in the name of economic 
globalisation is challenged by Hay and Marsh (200 1: 12-13). Rather they argue that 
despite some of the claims made in the name of globalisation, the reality is one of 
heterogeneity not homogeneity. Taking up the theme of convergence, their view is 
summed up as 'in so far as there are convergent tendencies in global political 
economy these are exhibited at the regional and certain! y not the global level ... This 
as we have argued, requires an inversion of the conventional lines of causality which 
run from globalisation to a variety of assumed outcomes and effects'. 
Whilst it is difficult to disagree with the surface validity of the convergence thesis, 
given that there is an awareness of the economic and social consequences of dis-
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investment by one or other of the large MNCs and of the need for the state to maintain 
its attractiveness to international investors, it should be noted that the welfare 
convergence thesis operates from a western model of welfare and seeks to explain the 
challenges facing the social democratic ideology which gave greatest impetus to post 
World War 2 welfare state construction. It is somewhat different when viewed from 
the perspective of the NICs. In this instance there may well be something in the 
convergence thesis, albeit not a downward thrust to meet the expectations of the 
global economy, but a reform agenda which increases the scope of state led provision 
in order to prop up the mainstays of welfare in these states, namely the family and 
community. Just as the 'golden era' fostered social cohesion and social solidarity for 
the West, so too could an increased scope for welfare regimes in the NICs maintain 
cohesion in an era which sees the traditional providers of welfare under increasing 
strain as more and more individuals and families are lain open to the risks posed by 
the greater interconnectedness of the global economy. As Jomo (200 1: 21) argues 
that 'It was often claimed the unemployed could always count on "traditional" social 
safety nets provided by families, communities and informal sector work. The social 
impacts of the 1997 East Asian financial crises underscored the inadequacy of such 
provisions when most needed.' 
It should also be noted that those traditional providers are themselves undergoing a 
period of change which can be best illustrated by the changing nature of the family 
and the loosening of the familial bonds as migration, particularly rural to urban, 
stretches and increasingly breaks the informal network of welfare provision. It is 
worth reiterating the point made earlier that globalisation has to pass through local 
national filters and that national governments are concerned with the needs and 
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requirements of both the economy and the electorate. This duality infers a 
differentiated approach to social protection and at least defers and possibly weakens 
and slows the impact of the processes of economic globalisation on national welfare 
regimes. 
Position of developing countries in globalisation 
Southeast Asian economic development 
The states, which are considered in brief in this section have, during the recent past, 
been playing a game of catch-up with the industrialized nations of the West and 
North. In part this has been a play for survival, as in the case of Singapore, and in 
part a means by which poverty could be tackled without recourse to 'traditional' 
welfare statism as in the case of Malaysia. For many in the international community, 
represented by such institutions as the IMF and the World Bank, the Southeast Asian 
nations were seen as success stories to be marvelled at and wherever possible 
emulated. Rapid, and in general prolonged, economic growth won international 
praise as evidenced by the World Bank's 1993 publication of the East Asian Miracle. 
That the economic 'miracle' masked increased inequality and growing social 
exclusion did nothing to dent the reputation of the region and of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in particular as a powerhouse of economic growth 
and development. Regardless of the over-arching reasons behind the drive for 
industrialisation and economic growth, developing countries, and particularly those in 
Southeast Asia, have fully engaged with the development of the contemporary global 
economy in a bid to achieve local aims, and as such have found themselves with 
greater exposure to the vagaries of global economic activity as a concomitant part of 
the increased interconnectedness of international production and trade. In the first 
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instance this push for foreign-led, export-driven industrialisation and development 
(Rigg, 2003) relied heavily upon the growth of manufacturing production as 
peripheral geographical locations. That is, those economies away from the North and 
West (the USA and Northern Europe), offered a plethora of incentives such as cheap 
labour, preferential fiscal incentives and an entry to a growing market in order to 
attract the all-important foreign direct investment (FDI). This process of enticing 
manufacturing based FDI was successful at the expense of those established 
industrialized economies. 
Table 4.2: Growth and change in manufacturing production 1963-1994 
Share of world Average annual change % 
manufacturin~ % 
Leading Industrialized 1963 1980/87* 1994 1960170 1970/81 1980/87 1990/94+ 
Countries 
Japan 5.5 19.4 21.0 
USA 40.3 24.0 26.9 
UK 6.5 3.3 4.1 
East & Southeast Asia 
Hong Kong 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Indonesia - 0.1 0.5 
South Korea 0.1 0.6 2.7 
Malaysia 
-
0.1 0.3 
Singapore 0.1 0.5 1.2 
Taiwan 0.1 0.5 1.2 
Thailand - 0.3 0.8 
Note: * Figures for LICs are for 1987. Those for ESEA are 1990 
+ 1990/94 rates of change are based upon constant 1990 US$ 
Source: P. Dicken, 1998: 28, 30 Tables 2.2 and 2.3 
13.6 6.5 6.7 0.03 
5.3 2.9 3.9 3.20 
3.3 -0.5 1.3 0.50 
- 10.1 - -0.2 
- - - 10.7 
17.6 15.6 10.6 8.2 
. 11.1 6.3 15.8 
16.3 13.5 7.5 4.7 
16.3 13.5 7.5 4.7 
- - - 13.1 
As Table 4.2 shows, in the first instance Japan led the way through the quadrupling of 
its' share of world manufacturing output, from the mid 1960s to the mid 1990s, at the 
expense of the USA and Northern Europe. This was closely followed by growth in 
the four tiger economies (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), which was in 
turn followed by rapid growth in the Southeast Asian NICs. 
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However, as with all aspects of the processes of globalisation, the shift in 
manufacturing from the geographical and (relatively) high cost core to the cheaper 
periphery did not see the first tier of Asian newly industrialising countries (the NICs 
being Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) remain as the destination for the 
investment targets of MNCs, which soon moved onto the second tier (being 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) and beyond (primarily China). As Rigg (2003: 33) 
notes, the 'garment and footwear industries have continually moved their operations 
to those countries with the lowest wage rates - from Taiwan, South Korea and Hong 
Kong to Malaysia; from Malaysia to Thailand; from Thailand to Indonesia; and from 
Indonesia to Vietnam and China'. This highlights one area of concern for the region, 
that being the vulnerability to capital flight due to increased costs. Another such 
concern is the dependency upon certain key export sectors within national economies, 
particularly the electronics industry in Malaysia as we shall see, and linked to this, the 
increased risk to national economies from a global economic slowdown or a slump in 
demand from export destination markets. In terms of trade in manufactures, Dicken 
(1998: 31) cites some remarkable figures which give an indication of the relatively 
precarious nature of the Southeast Asian NICs prior to the 1997 crisis. He argues that 
a small number of NICs account for rapid growth in the importance of manufactures 
to the economies of the developing world 'for the group of east and southeast Asian 
NIEs as a whole manufactures accounted for 49 per cent of total exports in 1980. By 
1994, this share had increased to 78 per cent.' Furthermore, he adds that 'In some 
cases the transformation has been nothing short of spectacular ... For example, in 
1980, less than 20 per cent of Malaysia's exports were of manufactures; by 1994 the 
figure was 84 per cent. (Dicken, 1998: 36). 
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It is important however, to move away from the notion that the NICs of Southeast 
Asia are simply producers of cheap exports to the developed North. Many are now 
moving toward production of more sophisticated value added products and just as 
importantly the destination of exported goods is diversifying. Citing figures from the 
UNCT AD Trade and Development Report 1996, Dicken (1998: 38) notes that 'In 
1985, less than one fifth of the Asian NIEs' manufactured goods were sold within the 
region itself. In 1994, the share had increased to almost two fifths.' Further it is 
worth mentioning that the region is itself a growing market within global export trade 
and is increasingly important as a market for imported goods and services. So for 
instance in 1984 the East and Southeast Asian region accounted for less than 10 per 
cent of the global import market, by 1994 this figure had increased to 17 per cent 
(Dicken 1998). The importance of regional trade was further enhanced by the 
inauguration of the Asian Free Trade Association (AFT A) in September 2003, which 
saw further reduction in trade barriers between ASEAN member states. 
What has, for the most part, driven the economic development of much of Southeast 
Asia has been the dominant role of foreign direct investment, both in terms of 
employment relocation from high to low cost areas and in terms of technology 
transfer thereby enabling the development of indigenous capabilities in search of 
sustainable long term economic growth. It is the role played by FDI in the economic 
development of Southeast Asia which is examined in the next section. 
The importance of FDI in the 'Southeast Asian miracle' 
With the exception of Korea, the remaining five Southeast Asian NICs have at various 
times and to a varying degrees, relied upon FDI as the driving force behind 
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industrialisation, export based development and sustained economic growth. As 
Table 4.3 indicates, the role played by private investment in the developing 
economies of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia in particular, remains important in the 
aftermath of the regional financial crisis of 1997 and, it has been suggested was 'a 
vital source of foreign capital during the crisis' (Thomsen, 1999: 4 ). Garrett (2000: 
943) has argued that; 'FDI is an important driver of growth. It provides a transmission 
mechanism for the diffusion of technological innovations'. 
Table 4.3: Growth of manufactures exports (%) 
1970 1980 1990 1993 1999 
Indonesia 2 35 53 54 
Malaysia 9 19 54 65 80 
Singapore 37 50 72 80 86 
Thailand 16 28 63 73 74 
Source: Adapted from Rigg (2003: 239, Table 6.1) 
Note: Data for Vietnam and Korea unavailable 
What Table 4.3 does not show is the importance of FDI per se to individual selected 
economies; nor does it tell us the destination of the investment over and above 
manufactures. Two important points to note here are, firstly that one measure which 
will give some indication of the reliance and economy has on FDI is its relationship to 
GDP. This relationship varies both between economies and within sectors in the host 
economy. If we take the first indicator, that of FDI as a per cent of GDP then the 
variation between our selected countries becomes apparent. 
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Table 4.4: Inward FDI as a share of gross domestic product, 1994 (%) 
Singapore 72.8 
Malaysia 46.2 
Indonesia 26.5 
Thailand 10.1 
South Korea 3.3 
Source: Adapted from Die ken ( 1998: 48 Table 2.1 0) 
Note: No data available for Vietnam 
Table 4.4 shows that foreign firms dominate the Singaporean economy and are very 
important to the Malaysian economy and yet in the case of Korea they account for 
only 3.3 per cent of GDP. In part, the low level of FDI as a per cent of GDP in Korea 
can be explained by the dominant position of indigenous industrial giants in the form 
of the Chaebol. This underlines the greater reliance on FDI in Southeast Asia as 
opposed to Northeast Asia as represented by the first tier of NICs. Jomo (200 1: 13) 
argues that this greater reliance 'raises questions about their industrial and 
technological capabilities (especially in the most dynamic and export oriented sectors) 
and concern about the sustainability of their growth and industrialisation, especially if 
other countries are deemed more attractive sites for FDI'. 
Secondly, FDI tends to be concentrated in particular sectors. In the case of Singapore, 
high levels of FDI are concentrated in the financial services sector as Singapore has 
sought to set itself against Hong Kong in an attempt to move away from the primary 
manufacturing sector. Malaysia, placed second in Table 4.4, still attracts a relatively 
high level of FDI to the manufacturing sector and within that the electronics industry 
is both a prominent destination and extremely important in terms of export of 
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manufactures. In third place, FDI to Indonesia's manufacturing sector is mainly 
directed towards resource-based activities such as chemicals and paper, although the 
electronics sector is growing in importance and in deed Indonesia has recently been 
highly successful in attracting FDI in face of stiff competition from the newer low 
cost production centres of China and Vietnam (Rigg, 2003). It should be noted 
however, that the vast bulk of FDI inflows to Indonesia are located in the oil and gas 
sector (Thomsen, 1999). Further down the table, Thailand's manufacturing sector 
only accounts for about one third of FDI the remaining is directed towards 
distribution, finance, construction and real estate. Moreover, in each case there is 
concern over the need for diversification of FDI destination within national 
economies. In the case of Singapore, this has been successfully achieved as labour 
costs rose and labour intensive manufacturing based FDI sought alternative lower cost 
locations. This process of a shift away from primary sector based FDI towards the 
more value added manufactures and the service sector is ongoing in both Thailand 
and Malaysia particularly, whereas Indonesia is concerned with maintaining current 
levels of low cost manufacturing based FDI, despite the threat of increased costs 
leading to FDI relocation further east, principally to China and Vietnam. 
The role of FDI in the export-oriented industrialisation process in Southeast Asia was, 
in the main, the driving force behind the sustained economic development in the 
region in the latter third of the twentieth century. As indicated above, the main issue 
facing Malaysia and other regional states is to maintain and build upon existing levels 
of FDI in the face of stiff competition from low cost destinations, particularly India 
and China, and to shift focus of investment towards higher skilled and more value 
added manufactured products and services. In the case of the former this includes 
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labour suppression (see Rigg 2003, Chapter 6), and in the case of the latter, this 
requires increased levels of skills and education in order to facilitate a flexible labour 
force capable of meeting the needs of private capital. The next section of this chapter 
will focus specifically on Malaysia, and examine more closely not only the 
importance of FDI to the Malaysian economy, but also the extent to which Malaysia 
is subject to global economic pressures and responses to such. 
Malaysia: open to the global economy 
As was indicated in Table 4.4, there is a strong correlation between high levels of FDI 
and strong economic performance in the Malaysian economy. UNPAN (2003: 88) 
clearly states that 'Since Malaysia became independent in 1957, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) has been the largest factor fuelling growth'. The World Investment 
Report (UNCTAD, 2003) indicates that inward FDI was worth US$ 3,203 millions to 
the Malaysian economy in 2002, though this was down from a peak of US$ 3,895 
millions in 1999. In 2001, with respect to foreign firms operating in Malaysia, the 
government had approved 636 Representative Offices, 335 Regional Offices, 52 
Operational Headquarters and 47 International Procurement Centres. In this there is 
evidence that Malaysia has been and can continue to be best described as a small, 
open economy, fully engaged with the globalised economy and at risk from the 
pitfalls therein. 
There remains a good degree of inward investment potential in the Malaysian 
economy, in part due to the reforms instigated both by the Mahathir and the Badawi 
governments. In the case of Dr Mahathir, the Malaysian government sought to fully 
embrace globalisation through increased incentives provided for under the Promotion 
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Investment Act ( 1986) which built upon the earlier Investment Act ( 1968). In the 
case of the latter, incentives for inward investment by foreign capital included fiscal 
incentives in the shape of total or partial relief from both development and income 
tax. Export oriented businesses were located within Free Trade Zones (EPZs) which 
were created along the West coast of Peninsular Malaysia, particularly in Johor, 
Penang and Selangor. As Dicken (2003: 180-1) notes, the local impact of EPZs has 
left certain areas more vulnerable to the ebb and flow of the global economy 'In 
particular cases like Penang, Malaysia, they can be very large indeed. Here the 
number of plants in the Penang EPZ grew from 31 in 1970 to 7 43 in 1997 whilst 
employment in the EPZ plants grew from 3000 to almost 200,000'. In 1986 the 
replacement Act sought to 'extend more attractive incentives to investment in the 
manufacturing, agriculture and service sectors. The incentives, among others, include 
allowances for building, expansion and modernization of hotels, incentives for 
Research and Development as well as the creation of the Investment Guaranteed 
Agreement to avoid the non-business risks, such as nationalization of companies and 
to liberalizes the inflows and outflows of capital' (Yusoff et al, 2000: 15). The 1997 
crisis saw restrictions placed on capital flows as the Mahathir administration sought to 
protect the Malaysian economy from capital flight. In addition Mahathir engaged in 
Keynesian style intervention in the hopes of stimulating recovery and economic 
growth (UNPAN, 2003). This has taken the form of increased government 
expenditure on large scale infrastructure projects such as the new Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport (KLIA), the building of the new administrative capital at Putra 
Jaya and the Multi-media Super Corridor (MSC) which will eventually link KLIA to 
Putra Jaya and beyond to central Kuala Lumpur. Beeson (2000: 347) has argued that 
the development of the MSC is evidence of the 'widespread belief that industrial 
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evolution and innovation is dependant upon (or likely to occur more readily where) 
"clusters" of similar industries exist.' Further measures intended to stimulate 
domestic spending include reductions in income and import duties, implementing 
generous wage increases to the countries 800,000 civil servants and reducing 
employee contributions to the EPF by 1 per cent. The new administration of Prime 
Minister Abdullah Badawi has shelved some of the more expensive and recently 
proposed mega projects such as the North-South Rail link and a bridge connecting 
Malaysia to Singapore. He has also shown willingness to tackle corruption or 
cronyism which was represented by all too close ties between UMNO and the 
business community and was a central feature of the Mahathir regime (Beeson, 2000; 
Jomo, 2001; UNPAN, 2003). 
However, there remain important concerns regarding the ability of the Malaysian 
economy to sustain long-term economic growth and resist global economic pressures. 
This is evidenced by the fall of Malaysia from 16th to 25th in the World Economic 
Forum's ranking of competitiveness (UNPAN, 2003). The reliance on FDI led 
economic growth certainly casts a degree of doubt over the sustainability of 
previously high levels of year on year economic growth. In 2002, FDI was 
responsible for 59.4 per cent of GDP (UNCTAD, 2003) and this was 
disproportionately centred on the electronics industry. In 1995 electronics and 
electricals accounted for 65.7 per cent of gross exports of manufactured goods, by 
2000 this figure had increased to 72.5 per cent (8MP, 2001). However, to 
disaggregate this further, the goods manufactured in this sector has seen a move away 
from semi-conductors, which constituted 76.1 per cent of total electronics exports in 
1990 and by 2000 this had decreased to 42.6 per cent, and towards higher value added 
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goods such as silicon wafers, motherboards and hard drive media (OPP3, 2001). 
External events, such as the terrorist attacks on the USA in September 2001, have 
resulted in a sharp drop in demand for goods produced in the electronics sector as 
American firms delayed reinvestment as the US economy stalled. This has further 
exacerbated the economic slowdown and continues to have a detrimental effect on the 
Malaysian economy. The downturn in manufactured exports resulted in more than 
30,000 people being made redundant between January and September 2001, the 
majority of whom were in the electronics sector (UNP AN, 2003) and government 
projections saw unemployment figures climb from 3.1 per cent from 2000 to 3.9 per 
cent by the year end of 2001. Such figures led to a statement in The Sun newspaper 
(05/05/200 1) by the then Minister for Human Resources Dr Fong Chan Onn, who 
declared that figures of one to two thousand redundancies per week was 'normal'; 
however the effects of such redundancies were felt most keenly in the EPZs, with 
Penang faring worst. The over dependence on external trade flows to the US have 
been highlighted by recent events and this has in turn created a negative effect on 
foreign short term capital investment on the KLSE, which dwindled from a high of 
almost 30 per cent in early 1997 to a mere 3 per cent in 2002. (UNPAN, 2003). This 
reluctance on the part of foreign investment capital is, according to the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Update 2002 (UNPAN, 2003: 88-9), due to concerns regarding government 
involvement in the economy, particularly the close ties between government and 
business in the form of crony capitalism; inconsistent application of the law and the 
independence of the judiciary; concerns regarding Malaysia's banking system and in 
particular the level of non performing loans. 
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There are two final linked issues, one internal and one external, facing Malaysia 
which should be acknowledged in this section. Firstly there has been much talk about 
the shift to a knowledge-based economy. A knowledge-based economy is 'where the 
acquisition, utilization and dissemination of knowledge provide the basis for growth. 
The development of a knowledge-based economy involves enhancing the value-added 
of all productive activities through knowledge utilization, in addition to creating new 
knowledge-intensive industries' (OPP3, 2001: 24). This meets the criteria as outlined 
in the National Vision Policy (NVP) which seeks to establish Malaysia as a developed 
nation by 2020, and which will result in less reliance upon low skilled manufacturing 
production. Jomo (2001), states that the demand for skilled labour in Malaysia has 
spiralled, but that the domestic education system has not been able to meet the need. 
This is underlined by the 8MP (2001: 88) which notes that 'the transformation of 
production methods and processes towards capital-intensity and information and 
communications technology (ICT) applications led to shortages of highly skilled 
manpower in specific areas.' The shortfall in skilled labour is as a result of 
underperformance in education provision, both in secondary and particularly tertiary 
education where Malaysia lags behind its competitors. There are provisions for 
addressing this need in both the 8MP and the OPP3; however, this does not meet 
current need and as such will impinge upon Malaysia's economic competitiveness and 
attractiveness to FDI as a place in which to do business. 
Secondly, an external issue facing Malaysia, and Southeast Asia in general, is the 
emergence of competitors for inward streams of FDI in particular China. There has 
been rapid growth in levels of FDI into the Chinese economy during the last twenty 
years. The World Investment Report 2003 gives a good indication of this, reporting 
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levels of inward FDI between 1985-95 as averaging US$11 ,690 millions or 3.1 per 
cent of GDP compared to US$52,700 millions or 36.2 per cent for the year 2002 
(UNCTAD, 2003). This rapid growth in FDI is not solely at the expense of the 
Southeast Asian region as the originators for the FDI differ. In the case of China, 
Hong Kong, China is responsible for over 50 per cent of inward investment with 
Japan, the USA and Taiwan contributing another 25 per cent (Thomsen, 1999). 
However, it is the potential growth in the Chinese economy which can be viewed as 
the threat, with a realignment of investment from OECD nations shifting away from 
the increasingly costly Southeast Asia and towards the relatively low cost China. In 
2001, the then Malaysian Second Finance Minister Mustapa Mohamad acknowledged 
that China was likely to be a competitor for FDI and that the answer lay in the 
willingness and the ability of smaller economies, such as Malaysia, to 'respond 
quickly to the new challenges in the global environment' (National Economic Action 
Council, 2001). 
Conclusion 
Malaysia has undoubtedly benefited from the processes of globalisation thus far, 
particularly in terms of sustained export-oriented economic growth. However, not all 
of the population has benefited and there has been an increase in the levels of income 
inequality during the export-oriented phase of economic development since the late 
1980's (Fields and Soares, 2002; Jomo, 2001). The pace of globalisation is unlikely 
to reduce, if anything technological developments will speed up the processes of 
change and increase economic competition. It has been argued that growth will 
depend upon increased investment in human resources, primarily through education, 
and maintaining open economies, but that such openness will increase exposure to 
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external pressures and may lead to greater economic volatility (Osteria, 1999; Jomo, 
2001; Pangestu, 2001 ). It may well be that across the Southeast Asian region 
demographic shifts, increased urbanisation and a greater prevalence of 'new' risks, 
such as unemployment, may require greater formal intervention from the state. 
The spectacular rise of the Asian economies throughout the 1980s and 1990s was to a 
greater extent built upon the increased level of inward investment which was actively 
sought as the means by which developing nations could achieve their wider economic 
and more domestic political and social goals. The increased levels of cost for 
manufacturing production in the North coupled with the unshackling of capital 
facilitated the rush to greater industrialisation and its attendant urbanisation 
throughout the region. So at first viewing we could conclude that the processes of 
globalisation have the upper hand in terms of explanatory power when analysing the 
socio-economic changes which have undoubtedly taken place in states such as 
Malaysia. However, this does not give us the whole picture, what we do not get is 
any sense of decision making at a national level. Globalisation is not a take-all 
package there are aspects of the globalisation debate which can fare less well under 
scrutiny and to argue that a global culture is seeking to obscure national and regional 
differences as major brands dominate the global consumer market is simply cultural 
reductivism. 
Institutional arguments noting culture and cultural difference have often been cited as 
a reason why, for example, social policy reforms have taken second place to 
economic objectives. It is not that Southeast Asia is jam packed with ardent neo-
liberals shunning the needs of the poor in the search for more US dollars. Rather, it is 
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the institutionalised social and cultural mores of the region which place self-reliance 
and the family at the centre of welfarism both large scale and small. In Malaysia the 
recently departed Dr Mahathir periodically castigated industrial nations of the North 
for attempting to impose its own values and moral standards on developing nations 
whilst arguing that Asian values placed 'greater stress on economic and social rights 
and ... they took less account of individuals, and gave more regard to the interests of 
the community' (Milne and Mauzy, 1999: 137). It is this notion of a 'local' 
institutional filter, through which the varying strands of globalisation must pass, 
which informs subsequent discussion in this thesis. Economic globalisation is 
affecting social policy choices in both the North and the South, but its effects may 
remain muted as national governments set their own agendas. 
As this chapter has shown, the Malaysian economy has benefited greatly from 
substantial levels of FDI whilst simultaneously experiencing newer risks, such as 
increased and persistent unemployment and shortfalls in retirement funding, which 
will require state led initiatives to ameliorate such risks. It is those who are least 
skilled and are employed in the more volatile and less secure sectors of the labour 
market who are more likely to experience periods of unemployment. This will 
increase the likelihood of a failure to contribute consistently to the EPF. Furthermore 
the increasing income inequality will further affect many EPF members' ability to 
accrue sufficient savings save to avoid problems in old age. The following chapter 
examines the effects of a phenomenon, ageing, which is both global and local in scope 
and which has been couched in terms as a 'crisis' by key global institutions. A key 
issue here is both the growth of the elderly population and the increasing number of 
years that individuals can expect to spend in 'retirement' which calls into question the 
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institutionalised 'ways of doing welfare' in Malaysia in general and pensions 
provision in particular. As was shown earlier current arrangements provided for under 
the EPF do not meet the stated aims of the institution and this will be exacerbated by 
an increasing elderly and longer lived population. 
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Chapter Five 
Ageing: a global issue and a challenge for the EPF 
This chapter is concerned with the 'popular' notion that as the developing world 
catches up with the advanced capitalist industrial nations they are sure to experience 
similar issues which at present tax governments of the developed world. However, 
this is something of a tmism. In part there is a degree of accuracy in this approach in 
so far as the developing world will experience some of the concerns which are 
currently affecting the North as it undergoes the processes of capitalist 
industrialisation and accompanying urbanisation. Nevertheless, this is too simplistic 
and deterministic a position to be tmly useful. What such an approach fails to take 
account of is the diversity of institutionalised social, economic and cultural 
arrangements, which will have a direct bearing on the developmental paths of the 
industrialising nations. 
One major cause for concern has been and continues to be the rate at which 
populations are ageing and the costs, both social and economic, this is likely to incur. 
For the past decade at least the question of how to cope with increasingly elderly 
populations has been a major issue in both national and international contexts. 
Accordingly, HelpAge International (2002: 2) claims that 'Ageing has become one of 
the defining global issues that will shape the future of the world's societies.' 
Furthermore it is not simply an issue of numbers. There are real concerns regarding 
the cost implications, both in terms of increased health costs and ineffective income 
levels, for those reaching old age in increasing numbers and for many of whom old 
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age is equated with an extending period of economic inactivity. It is somewhat ironic 
that the successes of sustained economic growth, advances in health care and the 
resultant increased longevity are now translated into a 'crisis' of global proportions. 
It is these cost implications which, as the World Bank (1994) has argued, could have 
severe detrimental effects on economic growth both nationally and globally. 
Furthermore, the embedded institutionalised 'ways of doing' welfare can act as a 
barrier or brake to necessary reforms. Here it is both the mechanism as institutions 
and the political/ideological approach which emphasises individualism which requires 
change, as the shortcomings of old age income mechanisms are often exacerbated by 
cultural and ideological institutions. 
Jackson (1998: 198-9) offers a usefully concise summary of the bi-polar nature of the 
imagined 'ageing crisis', arguing that in most publications dealing with population 
ageing evidence such as a rise in dependency ratios, a drop in workers to non-workers 
and increasing dependency burdens will harm economic growth and necessitate 
welfare retrenchment. The young produce and the old consume from an increasingly 
shrinking pot. However, as he argues this is a somewhat skewed picture as not all the 
young are economically active and by no means all the elderly are economically 
inactive. Old age is in itself a social construction which varies in relation to cultural 
context, and as Wilson (2000) argues assumed uniformity of old age does little to 
accurately describe either the current situation or help foster workable future policies. 
Even supposedly simple definitions such as the chronological age at which the term 
elderly becomes operationalised is open to dispute. It is common practise to employ a 
retirement age as a marker of old age, yet this too is culturally and socially 
constructed and open to change dependant upon a variety of factors such as level of 
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economic development, contemporary economic conditions, life expectancy and 
fertility rates. The pensionable/retirement age in the UK is, for example, currently set 
at age 65, whereas in Malaysia the same qualifying age can be anywhere from 5 to 10 
years before that, ranging from age 55 in the public sector to age 60 in the private 
sector. Even this does not accurately describe the situation as many older Malaysians 
continue to be economically active well into old age, in part due to a lack of 
alternative income streams. Thus to view old age representing a 'crisis' is both 
ideological in origin and deriving from a western perspective (Jackson, 1998). 
Ideologically the World Bank (1994) represented the neo-liberal 'Washington 
consensus' which stressed private market based solutions over public state mandated 
initiatives and focussed attention on an assumption that all older people are eligible 
and receive pensions leading to misplaced concerns about the cost of pensions 
(Wilson, 2000). 
What the remainder of this chapter seeks to explore is the nature of this 'crisis' and 
the extent to which the demographic transition to an ageing population can be 
regarded as a crisis. In doing so it will discuss what it is that constitutes an ageing 
population, the rapidity and extent of this phenomenon and, with reference to 
Southeast Asia in general and Malaysia in particular, whether this demographic shift 
should be labelled as a 'crisis'. In part then the themes explored here are concerned 
with issues of demography which incorporates ageing, changing family structures, 
increasing female participation in the formal labour market linked to adequacy of 
income in old age, retirement, culturally specific responses to old age and the way 
forward for developing societies increasingly enmeshed in the global economy. The 
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aim here is to give at least a general indication of how individual states are responding 
to the demographic shift to an ageing population. 
Governments around the world are facing a series of difficult choices, brought about, 
in part, by previously relatively minor and manageable pressures. Hitherto, issues 
such as population ageing could be dealt with through either national pension 
systems, sustained economic growth, individual or private arrangements, or most 
likely a combination of all three. However, with the growth in the global economy, 
the increased level of economic interconnectedness and the volatility that that entails 
has meant that governments are now engaged in the process of reassessing their social 
security systems and old age incomes policies. This reassessment is taking place in 
an era in which people are living longer and spending increased periods of time reliant 
on income streams other than wages. In an effort to facilitate equitable and adequate 
incomes in old age, governments all around the world are seeking an answer to the 
issues of the demographic shift to an older population. It is worth remembering that 
demographic changes are evident not only in the form of the headline grabbing shift 
towards an elderly population, but also in terms of changes in the labour force, 
particularly the increase of female participation in the formal labour force, changing 
family structure and size and an increase in single person households. 
Furthermore, the manner in which societal change and globalisation interact will 
inform the subsequent discussion both explicitly and implicitly. One aspect of this 
discussion which is beyond debate is that ageing can be viewed as a near-global 
phenomenon. As such, inaction by national governments is not an option; reforms are 
needed around the globe and this is certainly the case in Southeast Asia in general and 
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Malaysia in particular. Moreover, it has been suggested that, 'caring for the elderly, 
encompassing intergenerational transfers, the financing of pensions, family 
demographics, and health care finance, may be regarded as Asia's major challenge in 
the next several decades' (Shantakumar, 2002: 81 - original emphasis). In the 
Malaysian case there are a number of factors which intersect or crosscut one another, 
and as such, complicate an already difficult issue. These factors include the plural 
nature of Malaysian society, increased inequality both in terms of income and location 
and finally there are ethno-class issues which are increasingly informing the debate 
regarding social change and the nature of contemporary Malaysian society. 
The demographic shift to an ageing society 
It would be unusual to engage in any discussion on the global nature of the 
demographic shift to an ageing population without reference to the World Bank 
Policy Research Report, Averting the Old Age Crisis ( 1994 ). It is this publication, 
more than any other, which has sought to portray the success of increasing life 
expectancies for the vast majority of developed and developing nations as a crisis of 
global proportions. This in turn has been echoed by publications from other 
institutions such as Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD: 1996; 1998; 1999; 2000), the Asian Development Bank (ADB: 2000), 
HelpAge International (2002), the International Labour Organisation (ILO: 1997), to 
list but a few. As both Christopher Pierson (2001) and Ellison (2006) note, the World 
Bank has sought to heighten the levels of expectation that societies around the world 
will find themselves challenged by increasingly ageing and aged populations. The 
precise nature of the 'crisis' is to be found in the costs incurred by the demographic 
shift which sees the growth of older cohorts outstrip the replacement rates of younger 
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generations. One main feature of this concern is that the 'intergenerational contract', 
which has funded welfare in developed nations in the post-war period, will be 
unsustainable as the shift to an older population takes hold. Whilst this may well be 
one of the central concerns in OECD nations, a similar issue is of concern for 
developing nations in general and Malaysia in particular. In this instance it is not so 
much the direct funding of formal welfare which is in doubt, but the informal intra-
family and intergenerational transfers which take the form of both care and cash 
which are increasingly placed under strain as internal migration increases and the 
cultural shifts associated with modernisation, such as smaller families and greater 
geographical mobility, take hold. As Christopher Pierson (200 1: 91) suggests, 'the 
key argument in relation to ageing societies is that at some point in the next fifty years 
in all developed and developing countries the cost of supporting a growing elderly 
population out of the current production of a much smaller active workforce will 
place on the latter a burden which is either unsustainable or, at the very least, 
politically unacceptable.' For the World Bank, the economic costs and impact this 
would have on the economic competitiveness of individual nations in particular and 
the global economy in general meant that urgent reform was necessary. Added to this 
was the central concern held by the World Bank that current arrangements, based as 
they were on a mandatory pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis and funded out of payroll 
taxes levied on the working population, did not meet their aims of protecting the old. 
Such arrangements held firm during periods in which the economically inactive older 
populations were relatively small. However, if the elderly population grew 
substantially this would place a greater burden either on the working population, 
through the imposition of higher payroll taxes, or on the state through increases in 
public debt. Either way, the Bank argued the result would be lower economic growth. 
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These claims forced the issue to the forefront of international and governmental 
concerns for the greater part of the last decade. 
To prevent such a situation of depressed economic growth and increased pensioner 
poverty, the 1994 World Bank Report suggested that public provision should be 
reduced and supplemented by the implementation of a multi-pillared approach to old 
age incomes. Briefly, the Bank (1994: 16) argued that a scaled down mandatory 
publicly managed and tax-financed pillar should remain, but that this 'would have the 
limited object of alleviating old age poverty and coinsuring against a multitude of 
risks'. This would still be financed through payroll taxes and could either take the 
form of a severely means tested benefit effectively limiting coverage, a minimum 
pension guarantee, or alternatively a lower value universal flat rate benefit to a 
broader group of the elderly. The second pillar would comprise a mandatory fully 
funded though privately managed scheme which would take the form of either 
personal saving plans or occupational plans. This, the World Bank (1994: 16) argued, 
should 'avoid some of the economic and political distortions to which the public pillar 
is prone'. The final and third pillar, according to the Bank would be entirely 
voluntary and would simply be for those who wished to access increased old age 
income security. As Christopher Pierson (2001: 96) notes however, 'the trickiest 
issue of all in the World Bank's proposed reform is the transition from what we have 
to what they recommend ... even on their most optimistic projections it is, in the end, 
an issue of sharing out the disappointment -delaying retirement, paying out lower 
replacement rates, while increasing taxes and social security charges.' 
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It should be remembered, however, that such recommendations are made on the basis 
of an identifiable 'crisis' existing. This is by no means the case in all instances and 
the findings of the World Bank are but one, albeit substantial, aspect of the ongoing 
debate regarding the causes, nature and solutions to the demographic shift to an 
increasing elderly population for the majority of the world states. Indeed Jackson 
(1998) has suggested that in addition to the World Banks three pillars, a fourth pillar 
could be added which would represent part-time work undertaken after retirement in 
order to supplement income. Citing Kessler ( 1998), Giarini ( 1990) and Reday-
Mulvey (1990) J ackson (1998: 122) argues that such a fourth pillar 'will become 
increasingly important as work and retirement become more flexible'. Retirement 
trends, which for the developed world in the latter quarter of the twentieth century 
saw earlier exits from the formal labour market as a direct response to the move 
towards a diversified post-Fordist, more technology based and globalised economy 
(Jackson 1998), may well have been a short-lived phase designed to reduce labour 
forces in the search for greater flexibility. 
Indeed, given the concerns amongst many governments of the developed nations the 
current trend is one that encourages later retirement and offers incentives for workers 
to defer drawing pensions. Taylor (2004) cites a number of examples of this. In the 
first instance Australia now offers incentives for individuals to defer drawing 
pensions until age 70 and in both Japan and the USA retirement/pensionable age is 
being raised from 60 to 65 in the case of the former and from to 67 years in the case 
of the latter. However, the relatively early statutory retirement ages in Asia for 
instance, has thus far, and will in all likelihood continue to require a part time 
approach to retirement and work into older age. This will enable individuals to 
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supplement low pension levels and may go some way to avoid the material poverty 
experienced by many older people in the developing world, resulting in increased 
social exclusion and isolation from mainstream society. 
Population ageing 
According to Jackson (1998) population growth and ageing is a feature of 
industrialisation, although the exact nature of the relationship between population 
growth and economic development is open to debate. What is agreed upon; however, 
is the manner in which populations grow and undergo the demographic shift to an 
ageing profile. Jackson (1998: 11-12) cites Notestein's model from the 1940's which 
divides the demographic transition model into four stages: 
1. Fertility and mortality rates roughly equally high 
2. Fertility remains high but mortality falls leading to increased population 
growth 
3. Fertility rates fall in accordance with mortality rates, population grows less 
quickly resulting in an increasingly ageing population 
4. Fall in fertility rates slows down until fertility and mortality are again roughly 
equal. Fertility rates now linked to economic conditions and the new steady 
state results in a larger older population with a higher average age. An aged 
steady-state population 
Furthermore, Jackson (1998: 12) argues that 'Most developed countries are in the 
third or fourth stage of the transition and well on the way to a new, more aged steady 
state population'. Given the general trend of the figures presented here and in the 
publications of many international organisations, many developing nations, such as 
those from East and Southeast Asia, are following similar demographic trajectories. 
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According to World Bank figures ( 1994: 25) in 1990 about 9 per cent of the global 
population were aged 60 or over, the numbers are expected to almost triple by 2030 to 
16 per cent or 1.4 billion aged 60 and above. The Bank ( 1994: 28-30) estimates that 
most of the growth in the world's old population will take place in Asia and that the 
region will have older populations at much lower levels of per capita incomes. Added 
to that, approximately a quarter of the old will be aged over 75 and of this, almost two 
thirds will be women. Similarly, Wilson (2000: 34) agrees that current projections 
indicate that there will be three times as many older people living in current 
developing nations by 2035. Christopher Pierson (200 1: 93) notes that developing 
societies are experiencing far more rapidly ageing populations than advanced 
industrial nations, citing as he does the example of the doubling of the elderly 
population in France as taking 140 years, as opposed to a similar process taking just 
22 years in Venezuela. Rober1 Clark (2002) adopts a similar approach, albeit one 
with a different focus. He argues that Asia is undergoing spectacular rates of ageing. 
The data in Table 5.1 illustrates the rapid increase in the rates of elderly population 
growth and the period of time during which the proportion of the elderly increases 
from 10 to 20 per cent of the total population in selected Asian states. In some 
instances, the number of years it takes for the proportion of those populations aged 60 
or above to increase from 10 to 20 per cent is as little as 18 years in the case of 
Singapore and at most 28 years in the case of Japan. 
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Table 5.1: Pace of Population Ageing in selected Asian States: Years Required 
for Population aged 60+ to Increase from 10 to 20 per cent of National 
Population 
Ageing Period Years Required 
China 1999-2026 27 
Indonesia 2017-2043 26 
Japan 1967- 1995 28 
Korea 1998-2021 23 
Singapore 1999-2017 18 
Taiwan 1992-2019 27 
Thailand 2001-2025 24 
Source: Adapted from Clark, R.L. (2002: 64) Table 4.3 
Similarly the data in Table 5.2 clearly demonstrates that, at the very least, the 
proportion of those aged 65 years and over will double between 1998 and 2025, in 
some cases such as Singapore the increase is projected to see the size of the elderly 
population almost triple from 6.8 per cent to 20.0 per cent. 
Table 5.2: Ageing in East Asia 
1998 2025 
Country Total Percent Total Percent 
Population 65 and over Population 65 and over 
(Millions) (Millions) 
China 1,236.9 6.6 1,407.7 13.3 
Indonesia 212.9 4.0 288.0 8.6 
Japan 125.9 16.0 119.9 26.8 
Korea 46.4 6.4 54.3 16.5 
Malaysia 20.9 3.9 34.2 7.8 
Singapore 3.5 6.8 4.2 20.0 
Taiwan 21.9 8.2 25.9 17.9 
Thailand 60.0 6.0 70.3 14.1 
Source: Adapted from Clark, R. L. (2002: 62) Table 4.1 
Dependency ratios, Fertility rates and Life expectancy 
What the data from Tables 5.1 and 5.2 indicate is that the numbers of older 
economically inactive populations is set to rise and at the most fundamental level, the 
implication is one of cost. The question arises, how should governments seek to fund 
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old age or indeed should they refer the issue to markets, eschewing public solutions? 
The World Bank report (1994) is subtitled as Policies to protect the old and promote 
growth, the implication here is clear, action should not inhibit economic growth. One 
of the issues raised by ageing populations is the impact that an increase in old-age 
dependency ratios (OADRs) will have on economic growth, the implication being that 
the impact will be negative. Jackson (1998: 6) argues that 'An ageing population 
means that the proportion of the population over the statutory retirement age, and with 
it the old-age dependency ratio, will almost certainly be rising .... Dependency ratios 
aim to show the average number of dependent people supported by each economically 
active person.' The data in Table 5.3 indicates that in the specific case of Malaysia, 
there is a projected shift away from youth dependency to old-age dependency, 
although the overall dependency ratio is seen to fall from a high of 75.4 per cent in 
1980 to 54.9 per cent in 2050. The shift from youth to age is nevertheless quite 
dramatic with an increase in the OADR from 6.4 per cent in 1980 to 24.7 per cent in 
2050 or a higher than fourfold increase. 
Table 5.3: Malaysian dependency ratios (%) 1980 to 2050 
1980 2000 2010 2030 2050 
Youth 69.0 55.0 42.7 34.8 30.3 
Old age 6.4 6.7 8.0 16.2 24.7 
Total 75.4 61.7 50.7 51.0 54.9 
Source: Adapted from ILO World Labour Report (2000: 257) Table 2 
Linked to this is a decline in fertility rates which results in a smaller (younger) active 
labour market, thereby increasing the cost per capita incurred by an increase in the 
elderly (inactive) population. As Wilson (2000: 32) argues 'different patterns of 
demographic transition show clearly that population ageing is dependant on the birth-
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rate. Death rates are falling in virtually all countries but the stage and speed of 
demographic transition varies with the collapse in the birth-rate.' 
Table 5.4 Total Fertility Rates (TFRs) for selected ASEAN states 
1960 1970 1980 1990 1998 2005 
Indonesia 5.4 5.1 4.3 3.0 2.7 2.3 
Malaysia 6.7 5.2 4.2 3.8 3.1 2.8 
Singapore 4.9 2.6 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.4 
Thailand 6.4 5.0 3.5 3.2 1.9 1.9 
Vietnam - - 5.0 3.6 2.3 2.2 
Source: Adapted from R1gg (2003: 179); www.umcef.org/mfobycountry/index.html 
As Table 5.4 shows there has been a dramatic decline in fertility rates across 
Southeast Asia with Singapore particularly noteworthy as the rate is below that which 
is required to maintain a stable population. As ever in this region there is an ethnic 
dimension to this issue, and in the case of Singapore, it is the dominant Chinese 
community which is experiencing falling fertility rates, and the ethnic Malay 
community which is experiencing fertility rates above replacement level. This process 
is somewhat different in Malaysia, as here it is the dominant Malay community which 
maintains a higher fertility rate, albeit declining overall in line with the national trend. 
As Tey (2002: 6) notes the total fertility rates vary by ethnicity in Malaysia with 
figures for Malays standing at 3.8 per cent, declining to 2.6 per cent for Indians and 
2.5 per cent for Chinese. 
In addition to this sharp decrease in fertility rates is a concomitant rise in life 
expectancy which will see people live longer and, in theory at least, become 
economically inactive for longer periods of time. As Table 5.5 indicates, there have 
been substantial rises in life expectancy at birth in these selected states. Given that 
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the official retirement age across this region is between 55 and 60, the majority will, 
at first glance, see increased periods of economic inactivity as retirement periods 
grow. 
'fable 5.5: Life expectancy at birth in ASEAN 5 
1960-5 1970-5 1980 1990 1998 
Indonesia 43 48 55 62 66 
Malaysia 56 63 67 71 73 
Singapore 66 70 72 74 78 
Thailand 54 60 64 68 72 
Vietnam 63 67 68 
Source; Adapted from Rigg (2003: 179) 
However, there are two main issues to draw from such data. The first is that 
projections of fertility rates are just that, projections. There is no rule which dictates 
that fertility rates follow a linear pattern from high to low over extended periods of 
time. It is accurate to suggest that as industrialisation takes hold and modernisation 
gathers pace developing nations will experience falls in fertility rates, but as Bonoli 
(2000: 17) argues, 'there seems to be a relatively high degree of uncertainty with 
regard to long term population age structure projections. Since fertility rate is the 
most relevant factor and yet the most difficult to predict, projections are reliable only 
if they look at the generations who have already been born ... Current projections of 
the population ... should be considered as relatively reliable until around 2015. 
Beyond this time horizon it is extremely difficult to produce useful projections'. 
Secondly, there is little evidence to suggest that older people become economically 
inactive at the prescribed time of retirement. Wilson (2000: 38) argues that 'In 
worldwide terms, people may be defined as 'old' and 'dependant' by demographers, 
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but the vast majority of them are working', indeed part of the problem with this form 
of measurement is that it counts only paid work, not productivity. If productivity 
were the measure used then a wider spectrum of activities could be included which 
would in turn reflect more accurately the activities in which older people engage in 
which though unpaid is economically productive. 
Accepting that factors such as data projections and the categories productive and 
unproductive are problematic, insofar as they are open to question there is, however, a 
need to disaggregate figures further in order to attempt to get a more accurate picture 
of the nature of the demographic shift. The picture so far is one of less younger 
people, more older people living longer resulting in an increase in dependency ratios 
which in short requires greater levels of economic productivity from a shrinking 
labour force. What this doesn't reveal is who are the older people and how old are the 
elderly. Schultz (1997: 10) argues that by employing a cut off age, beyond which 
people are classified as elderly or old, does not reveal gender or age distribution. If 
increased life expectancy indicates individuals living longer, then figures for the 'very 
old' or 'old-old' defined as those who aged 80 or above illustrates the age distribution 
of the elderly. He supplies data which details that in 1950 the very old constituted 13 
million, or 7 per cent of the total elderly population. By 1985 this had increased more 
than threefold to 45 million or 10 per cent of the total elderly population, and was 
projected to reach 137 million or 11 per cent or the total elderly population by 2025. 
This increase in the very old will similarly affect both developed and developing 
nations and in both cases the very old age group will grow twice as fast as those aged 
60 or above. 
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Similarly, in order to find out who are the elderly and the very old it is necessary to 
examine the sex ratios of those aged over 60. Women generally have a longer life 
expectancy than men and are therefore more likely to live to very old age. One 
indicator of this is the sex ratio, which is defined as the number of males to l 00 
females. 
Table 5.6: Sex ratios (male:female) for selected age groups in 5 ASEAN states, 
1990 and 2025 
1990 2025 
25-49 65-69 80+ 25-49 65-69 80+ 
Indonesia 100 84 67 101 87 57 
Korea 105 71 34 101 86 50 
Malaysia 97 85 72 102 80 54 
Singapore 104 97 61 106 95 63 
Thailand 103 88 54 102 95 66 
Source: Adapted from Schultz ( 1997: 12) Table 2 
As Table 5.6 indicates there is a disparity between the number of males who reach 
very old age (80+) compared to the number of females who reach a similar age. 
Given the increased poverty levels experienced by elderly women compared to 
elderly men, due in part to lower wages and breaks in employment to fulfil care 
responsibilities resulting in lower incomes in old age, such a measure indicates that 
there is an uneven gender dimension to the issue of old age. 
Retirement trends 
As noted above, the notion of retirement is socially and culturally constmcted and is a 
feature of industrialisation and a move away from agricultural based economies. 
Particularly relevant to developing countries is the move away from an agricultural 
based to an industrialised economy. On the whole this raises two specific issues. In 
the first instance as the agricultural sector declines in size and importance in relation 
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to the growth in the industrial sector, labour follows the employment opportunities 
and internal migration from rural to urban locations gathers pace. It is predominately 
the young who migrate and this can result in fewer and older workers remaining in 
rural communities. Secondly, this affects the dynamics of the traditional family as the 
younger generations take on the role of wage earners for the extended and dispersed 
family in the form of remittances. There is a specific issue in economies in which the 
qualifying bar for statutory retirement is fixed at a low level, namely that the form of 
retirement income must stretch further as longevity increases. Robert Clark (2002) 
argues that statutory retirement policies combined with early access to retirement 
benefits can encourage older people to leave the labour force at relatively young ages. 
Added to this are the effects that the processes of industrialisation, and the 
accompanying urbanisation, have on traditional forms of support upon which former 
and current generations of older people rely. 
It is important to note that such informal arrangements consisted of both cash and care 
and both aspects are under threat from the processes of economic development 
(Robert Clark, 2002). Rigg (2003: 180) argues that the 'erosion of the family as a 
support unit and safety net is partially associated with social changes linked to 
modernization'. This implies a greater reliance on more formal support, both benefits 
and care. However, the ages at which individuals retire will have a profound impact 
on the quality of life which can be 'bought' with the old age benefits they have built 
up during their working life. As noted in Chapter 3, lump sum payouts from the 
Malaysian EPF are unequal to the task of providing income throughout old age, 
lasting an average of just three years beyond the statutory retirement age of 55. 
However, retirement is not necessarily an individual choice. As Schultz ( 1997: 23) 
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points out, retirement 'is virtually mandatory, determined by a variety of factors 
largely or entirely outside their control. Factors such as government policies and 
laws, traditional work practices, employment opportunities, employer policies, and 
the state of worker health often dominate the retirement decision'. 
In its report State of the World's Older People (2002: 3) HelpAge International cites 
the draft text for the United Nations (200 1) International Strategy for Action on 
Ageing, as calling for policies to be adopted which would aim 'to ensure that people 
everywhere are able to age with security and dignity and continue to participate in 
their societies as citizens with full rights'. Key to fmthering this aim is the need for 
international agencies to press national governments to act to limit the social 
exclusionary effects of poverty in old age which currently compromises the pursuit of 
the UN strategy. There are some common misconceptions regarding older people 
which have in part been given credence by publications such as the World Bank's 
(1994) Averting the Old Age Crisis, focussing as it does on the need for pension 
reform as a cost curbing exercise. The 'popular' image is of older people both 
dependent and economically inactive. However, there is data to suggest that many of 
the world's older people continue to work beyond official retirement ages and into 
very old age. According to HelpAge International (2002: 30) at least half of the 
world's older people are economically active in their 60's compared to a third of those 
aged between 70 and 74 and a fifth of those aged 75 and above. 
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Table 5.7: Labour force participation rates for the elderly (aged 65+) in 6 
ASEAN states 
Labour force participation rates (%) 
Males Females 
Indonesia 48.5 24.1 
Korea 32.4 16.0 
Malaysia 38.6 17.0 
Singapore 16.3 4.3 
Thailand 37.5 17.3 
Vietnam 43.7 26.1 
Source: Adapted from Ogawa (2003: 108) Table 10 
As Table 5.7 indicates there is a gender disparity between the number of males aged 
65 and above who are participating in the labour force as opposed to females. In part, 
this disparity can be explained by generally lower levels of female participation across 
all age ranges and the culturally specific reasons which see far lower female labour in 
Asian and Islamic countries. What should be noted, however, is that such figures do 
not take account of informal labour, both in terms of employment which is either not 
counted in census data or, the unpaid work mainly performed by women. It is safe to 
assume that if the latter were included the figures for female labour participation 
would increase dramatically. 
However, what the data in table 5.7 does not indicate is the gradual downward trend 
in the labour force participation for older male workers. Schultz ( 1997) argues that as 
industrialisation continues to expand in developing countries, the trend is towards 
fewer older males working beyond the statutory retirement age. Furthermore, this 
does not provide the full picture if, as indicated above, many workers simply move 
into the informal (or part time) sector in order to supplement meagre retirement 
mcomes. 
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A further dimension to both the processes of modernization, and the spectre of an 
alleged ageing 'crisis', is the increased levels of migration and the effect this has on 
the material well being and access to care for the worlds increasingly elderly 
population. Crouch ( 1996) and Hashim ( 1998) both claim that the most important 
means of escaping rural poverty has been internal migration to urban areas. However, 
this does not tackle poverty for those left behind who are often elderly and rural 
bound, nor does it take account of possible holes in the traditional family based 
provision of care. Such a situation is not gender neutral, as increased longevity results 
in more older women and an increasing number of elderly widows. The World Bank 
( 1994: 29) notes that in 'Africa and Asia, more than half of the women over the age of 
65 are widows, compared with only 10 to 20 percent of men'. There are two issues to 
be noted here, firstly women generally earn less than men, take more breaks in 
employment due to domestic care responsibilities and, in developing countries, are 
more likely to work either part time or in the informal sector. This necessarily has a 
detrimental effect on the ability of women to save for old age. Secondly the social 
changes which accompany industrialisation, such as the trend towards smaller 
families, reduce the pool of support available to older women. 
This issue is important both generally in Asia, and in the Malaysian context in 
particular. As Da Vanzo and Chan (1994: 95) note, according to data from the 
Second Malaysian Family Life Survey (MLFS-2) 'More than two-thirds of 
Malaysians age 60 or older co reside with an adult child.' and that 'eo residence is 
influenced by the benefits, costs, opportunities and preferences for co residence 
versus separate living'. Just as there is no single explanation for the levels of eo 
residence, so there are differences in the levels of co residence amongst the three main 
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ethnic groups in Malaysia. Da Vanzo and Chan ( 1994) argue that just as the cultural 
norms for the three groups vary, so too do levels of eo residence. Accordingly it is 
the Chinese community which experiences the highest levels of eo residence and the 
Malays the lowest, this being contrary to percentage share of population. However, 
there may be some dispute in the current levels as Da Vanzo and Chan ( 1994) employ 
data from the 1980s and therefore fail to take account of the increased rates of Malay 
urbanisation over the last 25 to 30 years. The effect this may have on levels of eo 
residence is that the relatively high costs of housing in the urban areas could lead to 
increased levels of eo residence as families pool resources to make ends meet. This 
point is picked up by a later publication (Chan and Da Vanzo, 1996: 47) in which the 
authors postulate that 'For both the married and unmarried, seniors living in 
metropolitan or large urban areas are significantly more likely to eo reside than those 
in small urban areas'. What this increased level of eo residence fails to address is the 
poverty levels which may force parents and children into eo residence. For the 
majority, the level of benefits accrued under the EPF are insufficient to last the 
increasing period of old age and therefore there inevitably will come a time when eo 
residence is not a an economy measure, rather more of a necessity due to low or non 
existent old age income. It is the increase in poverty amongst older people which cast 
doubt on the efficacy not only of the EPF, but also of current pension arrangements 
around the globe. In order to maximise returns to investors and pension companies 
alike, increased exposure to the global financial markets is accepted as the norm. 
However, the downside is the increased level of risk this exposes investors to. There 
is always an appropriate health warning accompanying any market based investment 
that consistent high returns are not guaranteed and that past performance should not 
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be taken as an indication of future performance. There is something illusory in seeing 
pension arrangements as a national or domestic issue in an era in which the global 
market place is the destination for increased levels of private investment and an 
increasingly deciding factor in overall economic performance of domestic economies. 
It is this interconnectivity which forms the focus of the next section of this chapter. 
Pensions investment: local or global? 
In the contemporary economic era, it is somewhat myopic to continue to view the 
pension systems of individual nation states as domestic in both their construction and 
reform, and the manner in which benefits are accrued. There is little scope for 
Keynesian style macro-economic intervention which took precedence in much of the 
industrialised North in the post-war welfare state building period. The growth in 
'other' markets as a source of cheaper labour and as destinations for both capital and 
manufactured products has, by necessity, lead to greater labour market flexibility 
combined with an increase in capital flows. Deaton ( 1989: 186 cited in Mann, 2001: 
69) suggested that the size of pension funds could be viewed as a source of conflict 
and crisis in part because 'The pension system under advanced capitalism has 
assumed a structurally strategic and pivotal macroeconomic function'. This has 
meant that, in effect, national governments can no longer pursue economic policies 
without reference to the external economic conditions both regionally and globally. 
To give a degree of substance to the claim that pensions systems, and those 
institutions which administer private pension funds, are beyond the scope of domestic 
issues one need look no further than the staggering size and economic clout of 
retirement funds. Mann (200 1: 68-9) offers some truly incredible figures which are 
worth quoting at length 'In the mid 1990s Diana Olsberg ( 1997) estimated that 
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pension funds worldwide held over Aus$12,000 billion (equivalent to roughly £5,000 
billion) ... Just a few years later Richard Minns (2001: 26-7) estimated that pension 
fund assets amounted to 43 per cent of the planet's GDP! .. .The Myners Review, 
undertaken on behalf of the Labour government, stated that: "UK institutional 
investors own more than £1,500 billion of assets - over half the quoted equity 
markets" (Myners, 2001, p 4). A figure that is more than double the size of the US's 
GDPfor 1998'. 
It is, therefore, undeniable that pension funds are a major source of capital in the 
global equities markets and as such are able to wield considerable power on both the 
economic and political level. However, it should be noted that despite the size of 
funds and the complex nature of 24 hour a day dealing which is now possible due to 
the advances in ICTs in the financial services industry, pension funds are accountable 
to both national governments, through regulatory frameworks, and to their members 
whose interest may or may not be maximising returns on investments. On both these 
points it is worth considering the extent to which the pensions industry operates on 
two distinct levels, as both an autonomous or free reigning set of institutions and 
simultaneously as a (seemingly) highly accountable industry which is required to 
provide answers to those who provide its capital investment. Reisen (2000) suggests 
that diversification of portfolio assets by pension funds into developing countries 
through foreign capital investment can be regarded as one way in which the 
developed world can reduce the costs of current and future pension costs to employers 
and the state as well as indicating increased returns for individual investors. 
However, this scenario of a seemingly win-win situation is tempered by the approach 
of pension fund managers who Reisen (2000: 37) argues 'take a conservative 
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approach to international investment, which is motivated more by risk reducing 
portfolio diversification than by expectations of superior long-term returns'. This 
approach has to be weighed against technological advances which have increased the 
speed at which investment, and more importantly dis-investment, can take place. The 
Asian financial crisis is one such case to bear in mind. The speed at which currency 
speculation led to a full-blown regional financial crisis was a result of the 
development and implementation of ICTs in the international financial markets. 
Reisen (2000: 242-3) suggests that increased use of hedge funds which invest 
borrowed capital worth more than actually held funds, or to use the financial sector 
jargon leverage, the increased availability of financial derivatives which can 
'facilitate the evasion of emerging-market prudential regulation as well as of taxes 
and capital controls', as well as modern risk management systems which in effect 
reacts to increased market volatility through a tightening of credit, all played a part in 
the contagion aspect of the Asian crisis. However, despite the big picture element of 
such suggestions, it is worth remembering that individual investors bear the cost of 
investment failure and that regardless of the mechanisms by which investments are 
thought to perform or under perform, or which can lead to speculative inspired 
economic shocks or crises, the result can be a shortage of funds which individuals had 
hoped to have built up through increased exposure to market based investments. 
Regardless of the form which old age incomes provision takes, there has been a 
marked increase in the level of risk at both an institutional and individual level. In 
Chapter 3 the Malaysian EPF was examined in some detail, and it is clear from data 
supplied by the EPF itself that the level of investments in securities has risen to 
previously unprecedented levels. In short, this nominally increases the level of 
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individual risk as the dividend is derived from investment performance. It should be 
noted however, that there is a guaranteed minimum dividend which ameliorates a 
degree of risk but which would not enable savings to grow to sufficient levels to fund 
the lengthening period of old age. When individual risk is increased with regards to 
the EPF and other savings mechanisms, it is achieved by freeing a proportion of 
individual member's savings for investment in market based equity products. Such 
products however carry no minimum guaranteed return and as such are prone to the 
vagaries of the global market. In addition to this obvious risk is one other, that being 
the relative lack of experience of individual investors who are being encouraged to 
take greater personal responsibility for the accumulation of funds for old age through 
equities based products. As Christopher Pierson (200 1: 1 03) clearly argues 'The 
responsibility for making very complex and highly consequential decisions are thus 
devolved to individuals who, with even the most expert (and perhaps costly) advice, 
will find it extraordinarily difficult to make rational choices ... pensioners with 
identical contribution records may find themselves with widely differing pension 
entitlements and standards of living (depending on the performance with which they 
have invested).' 
However, the situation in Malaysia is not unique. There has been an increased level 
of interconnectivity between domestic pension arrangements and the global economy. 
Gordon Clark (2003: 210-12), whose focus is on European pension futures, argues 
that 'pension futures are also global economic futures ... managing global finance is 
not just a matter of managing the possible contagious effects of country specific 
crises. It is also a matter of managing administrative and regulatory reform in large 
developing countries with a significant demographic and economic growth 
194 
potential ... the nature and path of reform may be more than a matter of adapting to the 
outside world. To the extent that national social security and retirement income are 
affected by global capital markets, these institutions may become the object of 
systematic reform not just accommodation.' Similarly, Reisen (2000: 246) argues 
that any approach to staving off future economic crises must be undertaken at both a 
domestic and international level. He is clear that despite earlier trends which saw 
international financial institutions as 'lenders of last resort' this can no longer be 
possible in a world in which capital mobility is both rapid and intense. It is the sheer 
scale of private liquid assets which put them beyond the scope of international 
institutions abilities to cover losses. Such private assets are, as Reisen (2000: 246) 
states 'worth trillions of dollars and are virtually free to move across borders'. 
It is somewhat paradoxical then, that as nation states are required to engage more 
fully with the global economy, in order to promote domestic economic growth and 
stability, they are more open to external economic shocks which would have a 
detrimental effect on their abilities to fund increased public spending, particularly in 
the areas of education and training which is necessary to continue to attract the all 
important FD I. As the above figures cited from Mann (200 I) show, the level of 
capital investment through the actions of private investors in the form of pension fund 
managers can have both positive and negative macroeconomic consequences for 
national economies. But it is worth reiterating the point that, above and beyond this 
macro-level impact and reform process, it is individuals who gain or lose from 
decisions which are more and more being taken with the global market as the focus. 
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Conclusion 
If only one lesson was to be taken from the 1997 regional economic crisis, then it 
could just as well be that state lead public pension provision which operates on an 
insurance basis is more equitable than a mechanism which emphasises private 
individual provision in which reform centres on investment in equities. Such 
increased individual exposure to markets enhances levels of volatility though in no 
way guaranteeing returns on a lifetime investment given both market volatility and the 
herd-like practices of fund managers (Reisen, 2000). The Malaysian state has shown 
itself capable of acting to limit further damage to economic growth in the aftermath of 
the crisis. The state could also show itself capable of initiating reforms which would 
address the predicted demographic shift and prevent an increased risk of social 
exclusion in old age. 
There are two further issues which arise from this chapter and which are worth 
discussing, albeit briefly. In the first instance there are the choices which are 
available to national governments and which only they can take with respect to 
domestic pensions policy. In essence this can be summed up as a choice between 
greater openness to the global market or, a mix between individual state-determined 
fully funded income guarantees and a market element which individuals can employ 
as a mechanism by which they can 'top-up' their savings for (possibly) an enhanced 
income in old age. 
However, as has been noted, domestic pensions policy is inexorably linked to the ebb 
and flow of economic globalisation. On a most basic level, this has increased the 
level of risk at which national economies operate. The effect of this could be to limit 
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the policy options available to national governments, but this does not mean that there 
are no policy options. Pensions policy is, at best, described as incremental (C. 
Pierson, 2001) and as such is unlikely to place an immediate burden on national 
economies. This is not to ignore issues of affordability (nor the pressing nature of 
democratic elective processes) rather it raises the possibility of a greater variety of 
policy choices. Christopher Pierson (200 1: 107) succinctly sums this up when he 
argues that 'in the end, affordability will strongly reflect economic performance and, 
in practice, all pension regimes will involve a mix of private and public provision. 
There may well be a feedback between social policy and economic performance but 
levels of growth will also be affected by contingencies outside the scope of social 
policy'. 
One area which is well beyond the scope of domestic social policy is the way in 
which the stmcture and form of the globalised economy is managed. Reisen (2000: 
258) highlights some of the issues which need addressing if the most severe effects of 
economic crises are to be ameliorated. He suggests that there is a general agreement 
between the governments of the developed and developing world for a 'new global 
financial architecture'. The basis for this new financial management style appears to 
be based on clearer, more immediate and more reliable data. However, in its 1998 
Annual Report, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) noted in relation to the 
1997 Asian crisis that 'in spite of readily available BIS data showing the increasing 
vulnerability of some of these countries to a sudden withdrawal of short -term bank 
loans, the volume of these loans just kept on rising' (cited in Reisen, 2000: 259). 
Reisen (2000) concludes that bad news which gets in the way of profits is never 
popular with investors. This may be so, but if the end result is financial crises, 
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regardless of size, leading to a devaluing of individual pensions, this again transfers 
the bulk of the risk to those who are most reliant on projected growth figures and who 
can least afford unexpected shortfalls. 
The demographic challenge is not restricted to the issues of age and 'domestic' 
pensions policies. Other issues such as healthcare, social care, the gender dimension 
of elder poverty, ethno-class relations and inflexible retirement ages all contribute to 
the debate, as do doubts regarding the accuracy of some of the data such as that 
detailing fertility rates (Bonoli, 2000). One key issue which this chapter has sought to 
highlight is the veracity of the alleged 'ageing crisis' and the perceived effects of 
demographic change. One such effect, which is of greater relevance to Malaysia is 
the decline of traditional forms of support in terms of both cash and care 
(Shantakumar, 2002; Rigg, 2003). The effects of increased levels of rural to urban 
migration combined with inflexible retirement ages are deemed to be contributory 
factors to increased elderly poverty and social exclusion. In conclusion then it is 
worth reiterating two points. Firstly demographic change will occur at different rates 
in different settings (Wilson, 2000) and secondly, that regardless of the pace of 
change, inaction, either by international financial institutions or by national 
governments is no longer an option. If the issue is left unattended then the result can 
only be increased poverty and poverty for the increasing numbers reaching a 
lengthening old age. Furthermore, it is clear that the three main ethnic communities 
which make up the majority of the Malaysian population will 'benefit' differently 
from the effects of previous social policies which have impacted upon the abilities of 
the different ethno class factions to save for old age. In the next chapter the 
intertwining of ethnicity and class is examined and it is argued that the positive 
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discrimination of policies such as the NEP and NVP have privileged a certain ethno-
class faction, namely the new Malay middle class. 
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Chapter Six 
Ethnicity, Class and Gender: social change chanlenging the EPF 
The thesis thus far has examined the efficacy of the EPF and its ability to respond to 
exogenous and endogenous pressures of economic globalisation, institutionalised 
welfare arrangements and a demographic shift to an ageing population. This chapter 
builds upon this discussion and examines the development process which has seen 
Malaysia move from a primarily ethnic based society to one in which ethnicity, class 
and gender combine to give greater insight into the growing inequality in Malaysian 
society which calls into question the efficacy of the EPF and its claim to ensure that 
members have financial security in old age (EPF, 2004). Employing a Weberian 
model of class, that which is defined by occupation linked to status and power, this 
chapter aims to analyse the class structure that has developed and is presently current 
in Malaysia. It is worth reiterating at the outset of this chapter that there are twin 
pressures brought to bear in Malaysia which can act as instigators or prohibitors of 
welfare reform. These pressures were examined in part in previous chapters where it 
was argued that Malaysia's increased exposure to the global economy has impeded 
the expansion of welfare as costs are kept to a minimum, whilst simultaneously 
generating economic growth which the state could use to develop social welfare 
arrangements for the increasing constituency of the industrialised labour force. 
Acting as an institutional brake to demands for increased state welfare was the notion 
of ethnic and cultural traditions which placed individual and family provision at the 
forefront of social welfare, both in terms of cash and care. 
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This chapter will take the thesis forward by examining the link between class 
ethnicity and gender and implicit in this treatment will be an examination of the 
process of rapid urbanisation that has taken place over the last twenty five years, 
culminating in a far reaching reappraisal of the occupational class structure for many 
of Malaysia's citizens. To facilitate this it will be necessary to examine the 
relationship between ethnicity and occupation, as an early indicator of class, and to re-
examine this notion within the confines of the current structure of society. In short, to 
what extent can or does ethnicity determine an individual's place within the 
occupational structure and thence the class model employed in this text? A parallel 
question will be in evidence - that being is class combining with ethnicity to become 
the primary focus of inequality in contemporary Malaysia? 
Fundamental to the examination of class linked to ethnicity is the central theme of this 
thesis, namely the scope, efficiency and equitable approach of the EPF based 
provision of income for the elderly beyond retirement. Is ethnicity a factor in the 
adequacy of income provision for the elderly, or in this instance does class transcend 
ethnicity as the major determinant for the quality of life beyond retirement? As noted 
in Chapter 2, the former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir extolled the virtues of a future 
focussed Asia, which has sought to maintain firm links with traditional social and 
cultural values. It was suggested that the use of the rhetoric Asian values was 
employed to deflect possible criticism away from an old age incomes policy that is 
failing to deliver on its key objective, to ensure the accumulation of adequate savings 
to fund a lengthening old age and retirement (EPF, 2004). 
201 
It would be impossible to embark upon any analysis of contemporary Malaysia, 
without first turning one's attention to the complex and all pervasive concepts of 
ethnicity and ethnic affiliations. Whilst whole swathes of social science literature 
have focussed solely on this single conundrum, namely what it means to be 
Malaysian, it is not the intention of here to engage solely in a critical appraisal of 
others work. Rather, explicitly throughout this chapter and implicitly in others, this 
thesis would seek to apply an ethno-class based analysis of the performance and 
functioning of the EPF and its stated aim of financial security in old age (EPF, 1999, 
2005). 
To engage in such an analysis of contemporary Malaysian society, it could be argued 
that one is imposing a 'westernised' perspective onto a situation in which the concept 
of class is at best understood in a piecemeal fashion. A situation in which ethnicity 
and ethnic affiliation are of far greater relevance to the individual citizens one may 
have shoe-horned into relevant, though convenient, socio-economic groupings. 
However, to ignore the relationship between individuals, their place in the socio-
economic hierarchy that undoubtedly exists in Malaysia and access to power would be 
to abandon any notion of critical analysis. A more accurate portrayal can be 
presented if one were to take both ethnicity and class as part of the same material 
process (Boulanger, 1992) and of greater relevance here is the intertwining of 
ethnicity and class and the institutional implications of such on the ability of the 
elderly to access adequate income beyond retirement. Malaysia is a highly developed 
capitalist nation, which incorporates difference based on both ethnicity and economic 
power, between and across social groupings. The foundations of the modern 
Malaysian state, which were effectively put in place through the implementation of 
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the NEP in the early 1970s, inextricably bound together these two notions. That is, 
that ethnicity should not be a defining label which limits an individual's access to 
economic and political power. Thereby ending the closed class system, which saw 
the Malays as agrarian rural based, the Chinese as entrepreneurial urban based and the 
Indians as plantation based labour within the immediate post colonial economy. 
Contemporary Malaysian society is cross cut by socio-economic and cultural 
fractions. In part what this chapter will seek to examine is the extent to which 
institutionalised ethnic identities can be viewed as a response to the economic and 
political inequalities experienced by Malaysia's main ethnic groups. Brown (1994: 
206) presents a useful discussion on the possibility of ethnicity and ethnic affiliation 
offering 'an ideological channel which is employed for antithetical purposes by 
various contending class and class-fraction groups'. This can be taken both in the 
context of the NEP, through the promotion of Malay culture as the basis for a national 
identity, and more contemporary socio-economic plans such as Vision 2020. 
Within the terms of this thesis then, ethnicity should be understood as a concept best 
explained as an institutionalised shared or perceived identity of a social group (March 
and Olsen 1998). In the context of contemporary Malaysia, ethnic identity is 
incontrovertibly bound up with notions of culture. It is the stated aim of the political 
establishment to achieve the representation of a common Malaysian culture, which 
draws heavily upon that of the Malay constituency (Kahn, 1992). It is this notion of a 
collective identity incorporating specific cultural codes, which forms the basis of the 
concept ethnicity. To each ethnic community, identity and belonging is to be found in 
language, dress, religious belief and custom. Each is an expression or manifestation 
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of difference, which in the case of Malaysia affects all aspects of social, political and 
economic life (Nagata, 1979; Ahmad, 1993; Neher and Marlay, 1995). 
Communalism, in the Malaysian context, can best be understood as a representation 
of Malaysian social and political life along ethnic lines. That is, it is a description of 
the ethnic division of contemporary social life, which is seen to affect the overlapping 
areas of Malaysian society. This can, at times, be seen to be to the exclusion of all 
else, indeed Ahmad (1993: 145) comments that 'Every political issue tends to be 
transformed into a communal one'. It is this institutionalised notion of ethnic division 
and discord that can be in part presented as a contributing factor to the portrayal of 
Malaysian society as riven by ethnicity to the exclusion (or seemingly so) of all else. 
The contention here then is that class and class analysis, in conjunction with ethnicity, 
has much to contribute to furthering our understanding of Malaysian society and more 
specifically to the continued existence of poverty in old age. 
To aid clarity and understanding it would serve a purpose to reiterate the point first 
raised at the beginning of this chapter, namely that Weber's model of class will be 
employed, thus enabling an accommodation of the distinction between economic, 
political and status difference current in the socio-economic division of contemporary 
Malaysia. To enable this form of analysis to be useful, it would pay dividends to take 
a small amount of time to lay some foundations of Weber's approach to the concept 
of the relationship between class and collective action which will enable this thesis to 
operationalise such an approach with respect to contemporary Malaysian society. 
What this section is interested in is establishing a meaningful way in which to view 
Malaysian society thus enabling something of substance to be said with relation to the 
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potential growth of inequality and social exclusion specifically amongst the 
increasingly elderly section of the population. 
Nagata (1979), Brown ( 1994) Crouch (1996) and Kahn (1997), to varying degrees, 
take note of the western bias of much class based analysis, but all are equally quick to 
establish the notion of a clear understanding of social inequality in Malaysian society. 
These authors differ in their preferred approach, for instance Nagata ( 1979) bases her 
system of stratification on the universality of vertical rank based upon wealth, 
education and piety whilst insisting on an awareness of this understanding as being 
culture-specific. Kahn ( 1997) too, argues for a cultural specific understanding of 
class arguing that in the case of Malaysia one can discern 'a process of accelerated 
social and cultural differentiation of the population of Malaysia, a process moreover 
that cannot be explained by or reduced to some underlying process of class formation, 
but which instead can only be conceptualised within a broader, multidimensional 
understanding of the project of modernity Malaysia-style' (Kahn, 1997: 86). This 
thesis is, on the whole, in agreement with Kahn that a multi-dimensional 
understanding of contemporary Malaysia should be sought. However, clearly such a 
broad based task is beyond the scope of this thesis. What is within the bounds of 
achievability, however, is to try to make sense of how Malaysian society is now 
organised in the way that it is, and which differs markedly from that which preceded 
it. And to ask the question, how does this translate into the way in which individuals 
are able to prepare economically for old age or not? 
Weber ( 1968: 302) provides a usefully concise definition of his view of both what a 
class is and of what he terms class situation. In the case of the latter Weber states that 
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'Class situation means the typical probability of (1) procuring goods (2) gaining a 
position in life and (3) finding inner satisfactions, a probability which derives from 
the relative control over goods and skills and from their income-producing uses within 
a given economic order'. In the case of offering a definition of a class Weber (ibid) is 
equally direct, 'Class means all persons in the same class situation. 
a) A "property class" is primarily determined by property differences, 
b) A "commercial class" by the marketability of goods and services, 
c) A "social class" makes up the totality of those whose class situations within 
which individual and generational mobility is easy and typical'. 
Anthony Giddens argues that in Economy and Society1 Weber (1968) offers an 
explicit discussion of the concept of class and in doing so provides a 'dichotomous 
model ... his viewpoint strong! y emphasizes a pluralistic conception of classes. Thus 
Weber's distinction between 'ownership classes' (Besitzklassen) and 'acquisition 
classes' (Erwerbsklassen) is based upon a fusion of two criteria 'on the one hand ... the 
kind of property that is usable for returns; and on the other hand ... the kind of 
services that can be offered on the market' (Giddens, 1992: 79, original emphasis). 
Giddens is clear that there are distinctions between and within classes which are 
based, in the case of those who are 'propertyless', on the 'degree of 'monopolization' 
of 'marketable skills' which they possess' ( 1992: 79). 
Weber viewed the market as both a social phenomenon and as a community which 
required interaction/co-operation, though not necessarily leading to collective action, 
1 Giddens cites Max Weber Economy and Society ( 1968) vol. 2, pp.926AO and vol. I, pp. 302-7 as his 
source. 
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rather leading to self-interested co-operation of individuals for their own ends. 
Albrow (1990: 263) makes it clear that Weber's interest in the market was 'because it 
represented the polar opposite to bonding on the basis of love, fraternity or purely 
personal attraction'. Here could also be added bonding on the basis of shared 
ethnic/cultural identity which in this instance could be seen to inhabit the same space 
as Weber's fraternity. In the market social relations were built upon the economic 
principle, which views each individual as seeking to maximise their advantages 
through exchange with others. 
By arguing that Malaysia has shifted from an ethnic based society to an ethno-class 
based society, this thesis is not simply stating the obvious. It may perhaps, appear 
simplistic to take note of the processes of industrialisation which have occurred in 
Malaysia in the last 30 or so years, but this has fundamentally undermined the notion 
of ethnicity determining occupation and thus to a greater extent individual and, most 
importantly, prior group socio-economic position. It is the advent and current 
domination of the global capitalist economic market, as Malaysian society has 
undergone social and economic change, which chimes with Weber's view of the 
concept of economic action which Albrow (1990: 265) states 'carried with it always 
the potential for the disruption of established social relationships'. Furthermore, 
Albrow ( 1990: 265) seeks to clarify Weber's description of the market as being the 
'antithesis of solidarity, of collective action for a common cause or of altruistic self-
sacrifice .. .importantly, it was also the source of another perspective on social 
structure ... It drew attention to the fact that individuals were placed in situations of 
control over resources, of chances to take advantage of that control. In capitalist 
society it was the basis of class position'. Thus this thesis argues that the ongoing 
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shift from a purely ethnically based model of stratification, to one in which ethnicity 
becomes a characteristic of a wider relationship to power and status within the class 
based capitalist economic system, as is the case in contemporary Malaysia, can be 
best employed to describe the unequal and disadvantageous position which 
individuals are increasingly finding themselves in, in old age. As Giddens (1992: 79) 
clearly states 'Class is thus an 'objective' characteristic influencing the life-chances of 
men'. 
It would be useful, however, to present at least a rough outline of the constituent 
members of the socio-economic classes as employed in this thesis. The analysis of 
the class structure employed in this thesis uses occupational categories as signifiers of 
class. Drawing upon the work of Higgott and Robinson ( 1985), Jomo (1990) and 
Crouch ( 1996) it is intended that the constituent members of each class, or class 
fraction, will be defined following the model used by the Ministry of Labour, that is 
employing seven main occupational classifications. Taking both (i) professional and 
technical and (ii) administrative and managerial as fractions combining to form the 
upper middle class, then (iii) clerical and (iv) sales are representative of the lower 
middle class. Although Crouch ( 1996) chooses to omit the group represented as (v) 
service, due to the wide-ranging nature of this category, it will be included here, 
whilst acknowledging its problematic nature due to the variance in its composition 
(Jomo, 1990). The working class will be subdivided into those who could be said to 
broadly represent the rural and urban working class, that is (vi) agricultural and (vii) 
production. See Table 6.1 below. 
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Table 6.1 OccupationaVclass structure 1957, 1970 and 1990 (%) 
1957 1970 1990 
Middle Class 15.5 20.0 32.6 
Working Class 18.9 27.3 27.6 
Agriculture 56.4 44.9 28.3 
Source: Jomo K. S. (1990: 82); Crouch (1996: 181) 
Occupying the top of the hierarchy are those who have greatest access to power, both 
political and economic. It should be stressed, however, that the three main ethnic 
groups are to be found in all classes and class fractions, the differential populations 
are represented below in Table 6.4 (p 215). Therefore, though it may be regarded as 
simplistic or crude, this chapter will present the relationship between class and 
ethnicity employing the image of vertical pillars (ethnicity) cross cut by horizontal 
bars (class) representing the different socio-economic strata relating to occupation, 
income and status (Brown, 1994 ). 
Class and ethnicity: a developing relationship. 
To set this discussion in context it is necessary to briefly revisit some well-worn 
routes, which trace the development of the contemporary Malaysian socio-economic 
categories as deriving from the influence of the colonial administration. As noted in 
Chapter 2, it was the expansion of British rule into Peninsular Malaysia for economic 
reasons which brought about the first census based distinctions between the three 
main ethnic groups into their quite distinctive areas of employment. Malays remained 
for the most part wedded to the land as farmers and main providers of labour in rice 
production. Their ownership of land made the prospect of paid employment in the 
dangerous developing tin industry all the less likely and it was the demand from the 
international market in the 1850s which lead to a large influx of Chinese labour and 
capital under the British colonial administration. At this juncture, it should be noted 
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that there already existed a sizeable and economically vibrant Chinese population 
mainly centred on the Straits Settlements. Similarly, as the growing plantation 
industry took hold in the Federated Malay States and as plantation owners diversified 
from coffee to rubber so the need for labour increased. The colonial administration 
controlled immigration and was well placed to meet the labour shortage, encouraging 
the immigration of Tamillabourers from India. Not until the Great Depression were 
immigration controls put in place, although by this point in time the demographic 
structure of the society had altered beyond recognition (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2: Population by ethnic group in Peninsular Malaysia (millions) 
Date Malays Chinese Indian Total 
1911 1.22 0.69 0.24 2.34 
1921 1.38 0.85 0.44 2.91 
1931 1.57 1.29 0.58 3.79 
1947 2.16 1.89 0.54 4.92 
1957 2.8 2.33 0.68 6.28 
Source: Adapted from Snodgrass ( 1980: 24) in Jesudason ( 1989: 29). 
In percentage terms, Jesudason ( 1989) notes that in 1921 there existed a balance 
between the indigenous Malay population (48 per cent) and the immigrant Chinese 
(29.4 per cent) and Indian (15.1 per cent) populations (Jesudason, 1989: 29). 
However, a decade later the Malays (44.7 per cent) were reduced to a numerical 
minority in relation to the Chinese (39 per cent) and Indian (14.2 per cent) aggregate 
population (Nagata, 1979: 11 ). Although as Jesudason ( 1989) and others (Nagata, 
1979; Keyes et al, 1994) note little intermarriage occurred between the three main 
ethnic groups, with religion, language and strict community ties acting as powerful 
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barriers. So here we have the notion of class by ethnic labour, clearly delineated and 
with little sense of exchange or crossover between distinct cultures. Rather the point 
can be made that the open door immigration policy, which saw labour directed and 
controlled, firmly established cultural diversity and identity, based on ethnic 
affiliation. 
As noted in Table 6.1 above, the extent to which, at the time of independence, Malay 
concentration in agriculture not only represented a mainly rural based population, but 
also indicated the poor socio-economic position in relation to the commercial urban-
based Chinese population. By 1970 little had changed. The state had failed to 
address foreign domination of the economy and had, by and large, adhered to the 
informal agreement between the MCA and UMNO which left the Chinese position in 
the economy undisturbed and the Malay domination of the political sphere 
unchallenged (Crouch, 1996). 
It is against this economic background that the twin pronged NEP ( 1970-1990) was 
announced in the Second Malaysia Plan (2MP) 1971-197 5 and elaborated upon in the 
Outline Perspective Plan ( 1971-1990). Dressed up as an attack on poverty 
experienced by all sections of Malaysian society (Prong 1), it was in actual fact a 
programme of positive discrimination in favour of the Malay population through the 
reduction of ethnic economic imbalances (Prong 2). As was noted in Chapter 2, 
although this programme was aimed at the advancement of Malays, in terms of 
economic power, it would be wrong to suggest that the main target was the Chinese 
commercial sector. In effect the NEP targeted foreign owned companies, abandoning 
the previously laissez-faire approach and employing re-distributive measures through 
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the establishment of state corporations and trust agencies to ensure that the profile of 
Malays in the commercial sector was raised. The NEP set a target of 30 per cent of 
share capital to be Malay owned by 1990. As Table 6.3 below indicates, the task was 
indeed sizeable, given the size of the overwhelmingly Malay agricultural sector (56.4 
per cent) at the time of independence and this despite prior limited efforts to 
encourage Malay entry into modern economic activities (Crouch, 1996). 
Although the claim of the NEP was to eradicate poverty, specific objectives were not 
set until the publication of the Third Malaysia Plan (3MP) 1976-1980. Up to 1970 
there is evidence of class by ethnic labour and reflected in this to a greater extent 
access to economic power. What is striking is the differential of political power that 
existed between the three main ethnic groups. As explained in Chapter 2, the Bargain 
institutionalised the Malaysian political economy and confirmed the pole position of 
the Malays as the holders of political power, following on from the position the Malay 
ruling elite occupied under the colonial administration. The crisis point for the Malay 
establishment came with the threat to this political power as a result of the elections in 
May 1969. The threat of political power following that of economic power, that is 
drifting to the Chinese or non-Malay community, resulted in state interference in the 
economy in order to achieve a greater share of the economic power, as well as 
meeting pressures from the emerging of Malay middle class. The NEP can therefore 
be seen as state restructuring of the socio-economic structures in order to benefit 
Malays, but not to the detriment of the Chinese and Indian communities. This fell 
under the second prong of the NEP which aimed to narrow the differences between 
Malay and non-Malay incomes by reducing disparities in the ownership and control in 
modern sectors of the economy and reducing reliance on employment based in the 
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agricultural, or traditional economic sector. In short, the state sought to urbanise a 
defined section of society through a process of fast track industrialisation, greater 
access to employment opportunities and higher educational achievement. The net 
result of this would be the breaking of the relationship between ethnic identity and 
occupation, thereby abandoning the notion of class by ethnic labour. Ethnic 
affiliation was to be replaced by a Malaysian national identity accessible and 
attractive to all sections of society. In effect, the promotion of Malay culture as the 
basis for the new national identity, specifically in the spheres of language and 
education, coupled with the Islamic revival of the 1970s, ensured the continuation and 
reinvigoration of communalism. What is clear is that the implementation of the NEP 
by the Malay UMNO dominated Barisan Nasional transformed Malaysia's class 
structure. This saw a decline in traditional agricultural occupations and a rapid 
growth of the Malay presence in urban-based working and middle class occupations. 
As Crouch ( 1996) notes, industrialisation and rapid economic growth would still have 
occurred, resulting in the expansion of both middle and working classes. However, 
the makeup of these enlarged classes would have remained, in the majority, non-
Malay. The primary benefactors of the NEP therefore were deemed to be the Mal ay 
community, in terms of both objectives of the policy. The anti-poverty drive also 
disproportionately benefited the Malay community as poverty was, and is to a greater 
extent, defined as rural based, a point which will be addressed below. 
The rapid urbanisation of mainly young Malays saw an equally rapid decline in 
agricultural based labour which is clearly demonstrated in Table 6.3 below. At the 
time of independence the agricultural sector represented 56.4 per cent of the total 
workforce. By 1990, the end of the NEP, this had declined to 28.3 per cent, although 
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the composition of this much-reduced sector is still predominantly Malay, 76.4 per 
cent (Crouch, 1996: 183-4 ). As was noted elsewhere, internal migration from rural to 
urban settings is likely to increase levels of rural based elder poverty, and indeed may 
increase levels of elderly Malays facing poverty and exclusion due to the higher 
proportion of Malays living in rural areas 
Table 6.3 Occupational structure, 1957, 1970 and 1990 (%) 
1957 1970 1990 
Middle Class 15.5 20.0 32.6 
Upper middle class (4.0) (5.9) (11.3) 
Lower middle class ( 11.5) (14.1) (21.3) 
Working Class 18.9 27.3 27.6 
Agriculture 56.4 44.9 28.3 
Source: Crouch, 1996:183, Table 2- Note 1990 figures mclude Sabah and Sarawak. 
However, careful attention must be paid with regards to these statistics. On closer 
examination tables 6.3 and 6.4 clearly demonstrate that although the agricultural 
sector declined sharply, the destination of the majority was not, as may have been 
expected, the production sector or urban working class. Rather the main destination 
was the rapidly expanding white-collar employment sectors constituting the urban 
middle-classes where Malays now constituted 48.1 per cent as opposed to 33.6 per 
cent in 1970. Malay employment in the service sector similarly displayed an 
appreciable increase, nearly doubling from 6.8 per cent to 12.4 per cent over the same 
period. 
Two important points should be noted. With regards to the figures for the agricultural 
sector of the working class, the data for 1990 refers to all of Malaysia including Sabah 
and Sarawak (East Malaysia) where agricultural employment is higher. Similarly the 
production sector of the working class is smaller, as are the middle class sectors, 
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thereby displaying a tendency to understate the major trends in the occupational 
structure. Secondly, the occupational destinations for the majority of Malays within 
the middle class is skewed in favour of those which fall under the general heading of 
government employees, teachers, nurses being especially prominent occupations 
(J omo, 1990). This is confirmed by the figures which show an under representation in 
other middle class sectors and reflects the recruitment policies enshrined in Article 
153 of the constitution, and reaffirmed under auspices of the NEP (Nagata, 1979; 
Higgott and Robinson, 1985; Milne and Mauzy, 1986). 
Table 6.4: Class composition of ethnic communities, 1970 and 1990 (%) 
Bumiputera Chinese Indian 
1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 
Middle class 12.9 27.0 28.6 43.2 23.4 27.3 
Working class 18.0 23.2 41.6 33.8 24.7 34.8 
Agriculture 62.3 37.4 21.2 13.5 41.0 23.4 
Services 6.8 12.4 8.6 9.5 10.9 14.5 
Source: Crouch, 1996: 185, Table 4 
As the data in Table 6.4 confirms, the NEP has, over its twenty-year life span, 
wrought substantial and far-reaching changes upon the socio-economic and 
communal structure of the labour force. 
Middle class occupations, as a percentage of the Chinese labour force, rose rapidly 
during the tenure of the NEP. Over the twenty-year period the number of Chinese in 
middle class occupations rose by 14.6 per cent to 43.2 per cent in 1990. Conversely 
the percentage of Chinese employed in both the rural and urban sectors of the working 
class declined from an aggregate figure of 62.8 per cent to 47.3 per cent by the year 
1990. The service sector saw only a minimal rise of 0.9 per cent. 
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The Indian community saw a far less meteoric rise in those employed in middle class 
occupations. As the figures in Table 6.4 show, numbers rose from 23.4 per cent in 
1970 to 27.3 per cent by 1990. The same period saw a sharp decline in the numbers 
employed in the rural working class, down from 41 per cent to 23.4 per cent. Whilst 
those in the urban working class rose by just over 10 per cent, and those employed in 
the service sector rose by just over 3.5 per cent; 24.7 per cent to 34.8 per cent and 
10.9 per cent to 14.5 per cent respectively. 
No longer can the stereotypes of the Malay peasant, the entrepreneurial Chinese, or 
the Indian plantation worker be employed to describe the communal nature of the 
Malaysian labour force. That is not to say that communalism any longer affects 
allegiance within the new occupational structure. Rather, the communal division of 
the modem socio-economic structure remains a viable and divisory concept, one 
which has played and continues to play an important role in the continuation of Malay 
cultural and political hegemony. 
Reasons for the explosion in the percentage of the labour force employed in middle 
class occupations can be attributed in part to state intervention and also partly to the 
rapid expansion in both secondary and tertiary education (Crouch, 1996), a situation 
which again predominantly favoured the Malay community. This not only drew rural 
populations to urban centres, but also provided the necessary recruits to the middle 
class professions. Drawing upon data from the Fourth Malaysia Plan ( 4MP) and the 
Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2, 1991-2000), Crouch (1996: 188) 
demonstrates how the increased Mal ay participation in tertiary education, ( 1970 to 
1990), was reflected in increasing Malay presence among doctors ( 4 to 28 per cent), 
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dentists ( 4 to 24 per cent), architects ( 4 to 24 per cent), engineers (7 to 35 per cent) 
and accountants (7 to 11 per cent). 
The eradication of poverty? 
The eradication of poverty irrespective of race was one of the two main objectives of 
the NEP. It is the intention here to examine the ways in which definitions of poverty 
have been employed by the state. Acknowledge any discrepancies that may cast 
doubt over the official data available. Note the disparity between rural and urban 
incidences of poverty and analyse the success, or otherwise, of the NEP in its avowed 
aim. This will go some way to highlighting the need to address present arrangements 
for the provision of income into old age, which are reliant on the individual 
maintaining long periods of employment, but which do not take account of low 
wages. 
The first point on which our attention should be focussed, is that concerning the 
definitions of poverty employed by the Malaysian government in its estimation of the 
scale of the task it set itself and the success of its strategies. The combating of 
poverty requires in the first instance for a poverty line, or some agreed upon defined 
criteria, to be established. The target of anti poverty strategies being, understandably, 
to raise the income of those families and individuals who are judged to be below this 
line and therefore in poverty. If one were to take at face value the figures relating to 
the reduction of poverty over the time-span of the NEP, then progress can be said to 
have been impressive at the very least. However, as Anand (1983), Jomo (1990) and 
Crouch ( 1996) indicate, the trick is in the interpretation. In the first instance the 
government initially declined to set a poverty line, or indicate an acceptable level of 
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income towards which those individuals said to be in poverty would be moved. 
Secondly the methods that were employed to calculate levels of poverty have altered 
over time and between government agencies. This raises two particular issues 
concerning the veracity of the official data 'the possibility of poverty eradication by 
statistical manipulation or even by redefinition of the poverty line' (Jomo, 1990: 145), 
that is, is the official data measuring incidence of the same phenomena over the given 
time period. This issue of validity is worthy of note, but lacking alternative sources of 
data this chapter shall warily employ the data sets produced by the BN led 
government. 
Table 6.5: Peninsular Malaysia: Incidence of Poverty, 1970-1999 (%) 
Table 6.5 indicates that the overall level of poverty for Peninsular Malaysia, which in 
1970 stood at 49.3 per cent, had decreased substantially to stand at 17.3 per cent in 
1987. By the end of the NEP in 1990 the levels of poverty recorded had dropped 
below the target figure of 16.7 per cent to stand at 15.0 per cent. In absolute terms, in 
1970 792,000 households fell below the poverty line (Jomo, 1990; Crouch, 1996). 
However, as stated above, one should be wary of taking at face value the official data 
sets. Jomo (1990: 149) highlights some of the more noticeable discrepancies that 
occur between data published periodically by the government. For instance he cites 
the widely held belief that two poverty lines, set at 1970 figures, existed and were 
employed by two different governmental departments. The lower being a monthly 
figure of RM25 per capita, which he estimates as representing an average family 
monthly income of RM 140. The higher figure, set at RM33 gave an average family 
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monthly income of RM 185, 32 per cent higher. This he claims can in part explain the 
tremendous reduction in poverty, as detailed in the 5MP (1986), that occurred 
between 1983 and 1984. This data saw a staggering reduction in the number of poor 
households in Peninsular Malaysia of 32.7 per cent, from 717,600 to 483,000 in 
absolute terms. 
With the publishing of the Fifth Malaysia Plan (5MP, 1986) a new and more 
expanded concept of income was created. The new wider scope of income, which 
included such public services as health, education, transport as well as owner 
occupied housing, places doubt over the validity of the scale of poverty reduction 
failing as it does to compare like with like (Jomo, 1990). In a similar vein the Mid 
Term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan ( 1989) (MTR5MP) included the first 
publication of a Poverty Line Income (PLI). This was defined 'on a basis of a 
minimum expenditure level to secure a certain standard of living and updated 
annually using the Consumer Price Index to reflect changes in price levels'. The PLI 
'is about $350 per month for a household of 5.14 persons in Peninsular Malaysia' 
(MTR5MP, 1989: 45 cited in Jomo, 1990: 151- for a fuller discussion see also 
Hashim, 1998: 149-153). Jomo (1990) raises two further points of interest, the first 
being the absence of separate PLis for urban and rural areas which could be taken as 
an indication of an underestimation of urban poverty. This point is taken up by 
Hashim (1998) who notes that most other Asian states, including Malaysia's near 
neighbours, set different urban/rural PLis with the urban being the higher of the two. 
Hashim ( 1998: 162) argues that not only do prices vary by location, but that the 
employment of a single PLI across urban and rural areas assumes that patterns of 
219 
consumption for both household types are similar, without taking any account of 
household size. 
The second point of interest highlights the fact that the government employs an 
absolute, rather than a relative, definition of poverty, claiming to monitor the 
incidence of poverty in relation to a poverty line. Hashim ( 1998) notes that in 
contradiction to this, the government claims to define poverty relative to the standard 
of living prevalent in Malaysia. However, Hashim (1998: 161) argues that 'a poverty 
line which is updated only for inflation over a long period of time ceases to reflect 
relative deprivation. It would only do so if the Malaysian standard of living had 
remained constant over the past two decades. Given that real economic growth rates 
averaging 7.8 percent per annum were achieved during the 1970s and 6.8 percent per 
annum during the 1980s, general living standards in Malaysia have greatly improved.' 
This, Jomo ( 1990) argues, can result in the growth of income inequality whilst the 
poverty rate declines. As income inequality grows, those earning relatively less will 
find it increasingly difficult to generate sufficient savings through the EPF to fund life 
in old age. 
As Table 6.6 clearly demonstrates the period of rapid economic growth during the 
1970s and 1980s resulted in the reduction of families existing below the poverty line. 
Of the 792,000 households deemed to be in poverty in 1970, 706,000 or 89 per cent 
were to be found in largely Malay rural areas. This again returns to the primary 
objective of the NEP, which though stating the eradication of poverty regardless of 
race, was in effect of greater benefit to the rural Malay population. However, the 
success of the NEP in its declared aim must be placed in context. There still remain 
significant numbers in poverty both in rural and (in percentage terms) urban locations. 
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In fact the decline of poverty in urban areas has been sluggish, falling by only 10 per 
cent from a level of 85,900 in 1970, to 77,500 in 1990. Rural poverty, which we have 
noted is mainly Malay, has on the other hand declined by approximately 52 per cent 
from 706,000 in 1970 to 371,400 in 1990 (Crouch, 1996: 190). Why the disparity in 
rates of decline? In the first instance Crouch ( 1996) argues that the single most 
important means of escaping rural poverty has been migration to urban areas. In 
times of strong economic growth this can lead to reduced rates of unemployment and 
greater prosperity. This was addressed by the Barisan Nasional (BN) through 
sanctioned illegal labour, mainly Indonesian migrants, taking jobs in the plantation 
and construction industries, thereby depressing wage increases for unskilled labour. 
However, in periods of economic decline, as experienced by Malaysia in the mid-
1980s and again during the regional slump in 1997-98, urban unemployment rises and 
downward pressure on wages particularly in the lower skilled sectors is increased. 
Rural wages remain depressed during both economic cycles, thereby maintaining a 
greater degree of resistance to the downward trend in official poverty figures. 
Table 6.6 Peninsular Malaysia: Number of Poor Households, 1980- 1999. 
Non-
Year Total Agriculture Agriculture Rural Urban 
(OOOs) (OOOs) (OOOs) (OOOs) (OOOs) 
1970 791.8 582.4 209.4 705.9 85.9 
1975 835.1 576.5 258.6 729.9 105.2 
1980 666.1 443.7 222.4 568.5 97.6 
1983 717.6 497.6 220.0 619.7 97.9 
1984 483.3 na na 402.0 81.3 
1985 601.9 379.4 222.5 501.5 100.4 
1987 485.8 na na 403.2 82.6 
1990 448.9 na na 371.4 77.5 
1995 418.3 na na 319.0 99.3 
1997 332.4 na na 267.5 64.9 
1999 409.3 na na 306.6 102.7 
Source: Hash1m, S. 1998, p. 49 Citing Malaysia ( 1981: 34-35, 1983: 80, 1989: 52, 1993: 58); 
8MP (200 I: 57, Table 3.1 -figures for 1995-99 incorporate Sabah and Sarawak) 
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The decline in poverty rates for the three main ethnic groups have reflected the 
general trend over the given time period (Table 6.7), with the greatest decline noted in 
the rural, and predominantly Malay areas, although this still accounts for more than 
80 per cent of all poor households (Hashim, 1998). By 1990 poverty rates amongst 
Malays had fallen to 20.8 per cent, with the Chinese and Indian rates standing at 5.7 
per cent and 8.0 per cent respectively. Crouch (1996) acknowledges the questionable 
veracity of the official data on poverty reduction. However, he argues that other 
social indicators such as lower infant mortality rates, greater life expectancy, higher 
primary school enrolment rates, greater access to healthcare and the development of 
supply routes for the basic utility services lends credence to the significance of the 
overall downward trend. 
Table 6.7: Incidence of poverty by ethnic group (1970 -1990). 
1970 1976 1984 1990 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Mal ay 65.0 46.4 25.8 20.8 
Chinese 26.0 17.4 7.8 5.7 
Indian 39.0 27.3 10.1 8.0 
Source: Adapted from Crouch, 1996: 189-90 and Haslum, 1998: 53. Table 2.8 
In concluding this section of the chapter, it would serve a purpose to recall the central 
theme, which is that although ethnicity is a substantial and forceful concept of (dis) 
unity in contemporary Malaysia, it is class which determines an individual's ability to 
access adequate income during retirement. It has been demonstrated that ethnicity 
permeates all classes and class fractions, but that socio-economic status no longer 
relies to the extent it once did on an individual's ethnicity. That is to say, class by 
ethnic labour can, to a greater extent, be consigned to an historical perspective. This 
is not to dismiss the role or relevance that ethnicity and cultural identity plays in 
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everyday life in contemporary Malaysia. Indeed, such factors have been identified as 
one of the endogenous institutional pressures working across or against the need and 
desire for social policy reform. 
It is clear from the figures displayed above that the NEP may well have achieved its 
aim of a reduction of poverty to 16.8 per cent. Indeed official figures indicate that 
this level was undercut by the end date 1990. What the official data sets also 
highlight are discrepancies in the methods of measurement. This in turn leads to an 
underestimation of urban poverty due to the employment of a single PLI. The data 
also reveals the extent of restructuring of the socio-economic framework, which has 
seen a rapidly expanding middle class become the immediate destination for up an 
urban migratory Malay workforce, by-passing the traditional route of the urban 
working class occupations. 
It is of interest to note, however, that disproportionate though it may have been in 
favour of the Malay community, the restructuring of the socio-economic framework 
included and benefited both the Chinese and Indian communities. This clearly 
indicates the rise in prominence of class as the primary indicator of the ability of the 
elderly to accumulate adequate funds to provide income into retirement under the 
Employees Provident Fund which, as a contributions based retirement plan, is reliant 
on long periods of employment. Furthermore, this does not take adequate account of 
low wages, which, as highlighted, have remained depressed for those in semiskilled 
and unskilled employment. Poverty may well have been reduced in accordance with 
the official data, but as Jomo (1990) and Hashim (1998) note, this does not 
acknowledge the importance of growing income inequalities. However, the point is 
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that class, and its attendant inequalities have come to form an increasingly significant 
part of the common consciousness of all Malaysians (Goh, 2002). 
Adding gender to the mix 
What this section aims for is not a detailed analysis of the role of gender in Malaysia, 
rather a more general approach has been adopted, which seeks only to highlight ways 
in which gender and gender inequality give rise to increased risk of poverty in old age 
for current and future cohorts of Malaysian women, calling into question the ability of 
the EPF to meet its core objective (EPF, 1999; 2005). 
Table 6.8: Labour Force Participation Rates by Gender and Age - Peninsular 
Malaysia 1957-1990 
Age Participation Rates (0AI) 
Group 
1957 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
M F l\1 F M F l\1 F M F M r 
15-19 60.0 27.9 52.3 33.0 54.3 39.4 47.9 33.5 43.7 28.2 44.1 31.4 
20-24 92.7 31.2 87.1 41.9 94.0 56.4 9Ll 54.0 90.7 58.3 89.1 63.9 
25-29 93.5 38.4 98.1 46.3 92.4 44.6 98.1 49.2 97.4 53.9 
30-34 94.4 39.0 98.9 47.5 98.0 40.5 98.8 47.3 98.5 50.2 
35-39 94.0 40.0 98.8 52.4 98.2 42.7 98.9 48.5 98.8 47.8 
40-44 93.2 40.0 98.7 52.1 97.7 43.8 98.4 50.4 98.5 48.8 
45-49 91.5 40.7 97.2 53.2 96.6 41.4 97.9 48.7 97.2 48.5 
50-54 86.7 36.6 93.2 49.4 92.7 36.5 93.5 40.0 93.3 40.9 
55-59 75.6 29.2 83.3 37.5 77.4 30.8 76.6 32.6 71.3 29.4 
60-64 87.6 22.3 65.2 23.7 72.0 28.5 68.6 25.0 67.1 23.9 59.9 24.0 
15-64 90.0 30.8 83.4 36.3 86.0 37.3 86.6 39.3 84.6 44.6 84.4 46.8 
M=Male F =Female 
Source: Department of Statistics, 1960 and Siti Rohani Yahya, (1993), ''Patterm and Trends ofLabor Force Participation 
of Women", Paper submitted to Women and Development Project (HAW A). 
Source: Adapted from Ahmad, A. 1998: 20, Table 5 
As Table 6.8 suggests, there is evidence to substantiate the claim that there has been a 
change in the labour force participation rates of women, as well as the role occupied 
within and outside of the paid labour market. Furthermore, as Table 6.9 
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demonstrates, there has been a significant decline in both self employed women and 
those categorised as unpaid family workers, from a high in 1957 of 24.6 per cent and 
19.1 per cent to 11.9 per cent and 11.5 per cent respectively. Indeed in the report The 
Progress of Women Since Independence (KPWK: 2003), from which this data was 
sourced, states that 'a decrease in the number of unpaid family-helper workers and 
own account workers indicates an improvement in women's status' (KPWK, 2003: 
55). This is somewhat of an over statement given that there is common place 
evidence to suggest that women now carry out the 'double-shift' of paid work as 
employee and unpaid domestic labour. Indeed a little later in the same chapter, the 
report offers analysis of the distribution of employed women by age groups and 
employing data from the Department of Statistics (2000) declares that the percentage 
of dual-income families has increased with the percentage increase of married 
working women rising from 55.3 per cent in 1990 to 58.4 per cent in 2000. 
Table 6.9: Distribution of Employed Persons by Employment Status and 
Gender, 1957-2000 
Male Female 
Employment Status % % 
1957 1970 1980 1991 2000 1957 1970 1980 1991 
Employer - 4.2 4.0 3.6 3.9 - 2.3 3.0 2.0 
Employee 56.8 49.3 59.6 64.1 73.8 56.3 36.9 53.5 70.8 
Own Account 38.4 31.9 28.3 28.3 19.6 24.6 18.0 23.8 16.7 
Worker 
Unpaid Family 4.8 14.6 8.1 4.0 2.7 19.1 42.8 19.7 10.5 
Worker 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: Data for 1957 are for Peninsular Malaysia only and excludes 'employer' category 
Source: Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development (KPWK), 2003:55, Table 3.2 
2000 
0.8 
75.8 
11.9 
11.5 
100 
There is data in the OPP3 (200 1: 151) which looks at the expected increases in female 
labour force participation rates from 1990 to 2010. Such data expects there to be only 
a modest 4.5 per cent increase in the numbers of women engaged in the formal sector 
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over the 20 year period which equates to less than one in two women employed in the 
formal labour market by the year 2010. 
That there has been an increase in female participation in the paid labour market is not 
unusual, given the economic growth and investment in manufacturing, particularly in 
the electronics industry where women comprised 75 per cent of the labour force. 
What is perhaps worth highlighting here is the relatively low paid and insecure 
employment destinations of many women workers. To prelude this, it should be 
stated that in the year 2000, women were predominantly located in two sectors of the 
labour market, these being manufacturing at 27.1 per cent and services at 27.4 per 
cent (KPWK, 2003: 58). These figures; however, differ from those presented in the 
81h Malaysian Plan (8MP, 2001). As shown in Table 6.10 below, those women 
employed in the corresponding category of Production and Related Workers was 
lower at 22.6 per cent, whilst those women employed as Service Workers was 
reported as 12.1 per cent. Such discrepancies can be easily explained by noting the 
different categories used, so for instance a similar though higher figure for female 
service sector employment can be produced if the categories Sales and Related 
Workers and Service Workers are collapsed together, producing a figure of29.5 per 
cent. Similarly if Agricultural Workers and Production and related Workers are 
collapsed together then a figure of 27.4 per cent is produced, which is again slightly 
higher than those produced by the Ministry of Women and Family Development 
(KPWK, 2003). Whilst such discrepancies may have intrinsic interest, it does not 
alter the fact that women are, in general, over represented in lower paid and insecure 
employment. Evidence to support the effects of such insecure and low paid 
employment can be found in a United Nations pamphlet entitled Social Policies in 
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Malaysia (2003). The pamphlet cites the 8MP (2001), and notes that 'In 1999, the 
incidence of poverty in female headed households was approximately 16 per cent, 
more than double the national incidence of 7.5 per cent' (UN, 2003: 44). 
Table 6.10: Employment Distribution by Occupation and Gender 
1995 and 2000 (%) 
1995 2000 
Occupation Category Male Female Male Female 
Professional, Technical& Related Workers 8.4 12.7 8.9 13.5 
Administrative & Managerial Workers 3.9 1.8 4.7 2.2 
Clerical and Related Workers 7.5 17.5 7.1 17.5 
Sales and Related Workers 10.5 11.6 11.1 12.1 
Service Workers 9.4 14.4 9.5 17.4 
Agricultural Workers 21.9 16.6 20.4 14.8 
Production and Related Workers 38.3 25.4 38.4 22.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Adapted from 8MP, 2001: 560- Table 20.3 
A contributing factor the increased female participation in the formal labour market 
has been the increased female access to education at all levels. Figures released in the 
8MP demonstrate that equal access to education combined with increased investment 
in educational facilities has resulted in educational enrolment reflecting the gender 
split across the whole population. In short, this is evidenced by figures which show 
that 'At the primary and secondary levels, enrolment of female students was about 
half of the total enrolment, while at the upper secondary level, female students 
accounted for about 66 per cent of total enrolment in 2000. Intake of female students 
into public universities expanded significantly from 50 per cent in 1995 to 55 per cent 
in 2000' (8MP, 2001: 560-1 ). However, there are noticeable differences between the 
course choices of males and females, with females dominating enrolment onto Arts 
and Humanities courses at a rate of 65 per cent of all enrolment. This may give some 
indication of the occupational destinations for such students. Furthermore, the 
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extension of educational opportunities for women has, in part at least, contributed to 
the declining fertility rate as more women opt for a career and so choose to marry 
later and have children at a later age. This may have short term economic benefits for 
both the economy and the individual; however, it does infer that women are leaving 
the labour market at a stage at which they could properly expect to gain career 
advancement leading to higher wages. This results in opportunities for younger 
employment entrants, but also spells disaster for individuals seeking to save monies 
through the EPF to see them through old age. It is precisely this dual effect of exiting 
the labour market, though not always permanently, combined with the increase in 
domestic labour and increases in life expectancy for women particularly which was 
noted in Chapter 3. 
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, there has been an emphasis on the changing structure and 
basis of Malaysian society, changes which have been brought about as a result of 
direct government intervention in both the economic and social spheres, and which 
impact upon the efficacy of the EPF to enable individuals to accrue sufficient savings 
to fund life beyond retirement. It is fair to say that ethnicity no longer relates as 
directly to socio-economic status as it once did. However, one should not go too far 
and dismiss communalism as an historical concept. The contemporary world appears 
to have re-discovered a form of communalism, and ethnic identity and tradition 
remains an important aspect of Malaysian social and cultural life. Where the current 
situation differs from previous eras, is that there is no longer as strong a relationship 
between ethnicity and occupational status. As shown above, Malays may not now be 
literally sons and daughters of the soil, but there persists a degree of advantage 
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dependent on ethnic group. Many more Malays have progressed up the socio-
economic hierarchy as a result of preferential treatment under the NEP which saw 
large scale recruitment, and positive discrimination in favour of Malays into the 
public services. It is the continuing intertwining of class and ethnicity which this 
chapter has sought to highlight and which carries with it implications regarding 
individuals' ability to save enough money to stave off poverty in old age. 
If one adds gender to the mix, then the picture becomes more complex. Again 
ethnicity is a contributory factor, if only with regards to the increased levels of rural to 
urban migration which took many young women to the Export Processing Zones and 
employment in manufacturing industries. The increase in labour force participation 
rates for women since independence, whilst not matching those of men, nevertheless 
should indicate that more women are able to accrue enough contributions to their EPF 
accounts for their retirement income. However, as intimated above, women are still 
expected to provide unpaid domestic labour, and are likely to take career breaks as a 
result of child birth and child rearing at the time at which promotion and wage 
increase would be most beneficial to the levels of savings. Women predominantly 
work in the low paid, more insecure sectors of manufacturing and services. The 
exception to this is the point at which the combination of ethnicity and socio-
economic status comes into play. State policies have institutionally embedded the 
relationship between ethnicity and employment. Due to the NEP more Malays, both 
male and female, have found employment in the public sector which in itself is 
perhaps unremarkable. However, in terms of social provision, including pensions, the 
public sector provision is both extensive and generous (Asher, 2000; Gough, 2004), 
thereby disproportionately benefiting a certain class faction of the Malay community. 
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In this instance the institutionalised social welfare arrangements which emphasise 
individual provision better serves those in more stable and better paid public sector 
employment. This has clear benefits for an increasing Malay middle class who have 
benefited from the positive discrimination legislation originating in the NEP. 
As is demonstrated in both Chapters 3 and 6, those in the private sector, regardless of 
ethnicity, are reliant on an individual savings scheme which is neither universal nor 
suitable to the current and future economic realities of the twenty first century. 
However, the socio-economic changes which have taken place over the last 30 or so 
years call into question whether the EPF remains 'fit for purpose'. It is the increasing 
growth in income inequality, benefiting the few and disadvantaging the many, which 
cuts across the vertical pillars of ethnicity (Brown, 1994) bringing to the fore the 
growth of class as the locus of disadvantage. To put it simply, those who earn less 
and are in less secure employment are least well placed to save enough money for 
retirement when, as Chapter 3 states, the EPF requires long term contributions. Even 
those able to satisfy lengthy contributions are likely to find that their savings will be 
insufficient as the average life expectancy increases. It is those in the lower socio-
economic classes in general, and women in particular, who are at greatest risk of 
poverty in old age and for whom the EPF will fail to provide the financial security in 
old age which the organisation states to be its primary responsibility(EPF, 2004). 
Thus far the thesis has argued that a combination of exogenous and endogenous 
pressures have combined to call into question the continued 'fit for purpose' nature of 
the EPF. These pressures have produced four key challenges namely institutional 
stasis, engagement with the global economy, population ageing and the intertwining 
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of class and ethnicity. In the next chapter Singapore is employed as a comparator 
case to highlight possible pitfalls for Malaysia should the EPF continue to be the only 
vehicle for the provision of income in old age for the majority of the Malaysian 
population. 
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Chapter Seven 
Risks and pitfalls for the EPF: Singapore as comparator 
This thesis has argued that, due to exogenous and endogenous pressures, the 
Malaysian EPF can no longer be considered 'fit for purpose' in response the social 
and economic changes which have taken place over the last 30 years. In Chapter 3 it 
was argued that the Malaysian EPF was attempting to spread itself too thinly over too 
many areas of need, and in the process was moving away from its central aim. The 
main focus of this chapter is to highlight the political/ideological institutionalised 
arrangements common to Malaysia and Singapore both in terms of the socio-cultural 
institutions which promotes individual provision, and the embedded institutional 
mechanisms of the EPF and Central Provident Fund (CPF), whose respective aims are 
to provide incomes for old age. In many respects, despite being 'younger', the 
Singaporean CPF has provided examples to Malaysia both of what can be achieved by 
employing the provident fund model as the keystone of an approach to social welfare, 
but also importantly the pitfalls of such expansion. 
It would be useful at this point to remember that not only do both states have key 
similarities, but that Singapore, whether by design or default, has implemented 
reforms to the CPF which have been mirrored by later reforms to the EPF. Indeed, as 
Ramesh (2003: 3) notes 'Policy makers in Malaysia and Singapore have recognised 
provident fund's potentials for promoting both economic and social development long 
before World Bank began to promote the idea in the mid-1990s. The two governments 
have indeed gone further and employed it for financing health care and housing and, 
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to a lesser extent, tertiary education'. Further key similarities can be easily summed 
up as a shared colonial past, a brief post independence union and similar ethnic mix -
albeit with the important difference that Malays are the main ethnic group in Malaysia 
whereas the Chinese are the main ethnic group in Singapore. That they are 
geographical neighbours is obvious, but ties such as Singapore's dependence on 
Malaysia for fresh water supply requires both states to rub along together despite the 
regularly fractious nature of their relations. Both states have followed similar 
development paths, early reliance on manufactures based FDI before moving into 
'value added' production, albeit with Singapore in advance of Malaysia. Both are 
under the authoritarian rule of a dominant political party and both retain so called 
'emergency' powers such as detention without trial as a weapon against those who do 
not tow the party line. 
The CPF and the EPF are both fully funded defined contribution schemes which are 
based upon contributions from employers and employees paid into dedicated accounts 
whose primary objective is the provision of individual savings for income in old age 
(Asher 1994, 1999). Ramesh (2003: 2) notes that during early economic development 
the governments of the two states made use of the accrued savings 'for investment in 
development projects without inflationary consequences'. Both the Singaporean CPF 
and its' Malaysian counterpart have played a huge part in the increase in home 
ownership levels. In fact 92% of households in Singapore are owner-occupier which 
ranks Singapore as one of the highest home ownership nations (CPF Annual Report 
2000). Similarly, the 1999 EPF annual report notes that the highest number of 
withdrawals in 1999 was for housing, up by 25.59% on the previous year and totalling 
RM2.54 billion. Similarly, both funds require a certain proportion of savings to be 
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ring fenced for withdrawal after members retire. In the case of Singapore this was 
instigated in 1986, a full 14 years before Malaysia adopted a similar approach with 
the introduction of the Account 4 in 2002 as was detailed in Chapter 3. 
In short there is much to compare, although the contention here is not so much that 
Singapore does not provide a good example for Malaysia to follow but that the CPF 
provides a close comparison for analysis. In particular, an analysis of the CPF 
facilitates an assessment of the EPF which takes account of the difficulties which 
Singapore still needs to address, such as coverage, adequacy and ethnic based 
inequalities, and which Malaysia could well do with avoiding. As noted above, 
Malaysia has in the recent past followed the Singaporean lead with regards to a 
minimum sum scheme in an attempt to ring-fence a substantial proportion of savings 
for the purpose of funding life into old age. However, neither state has formulated a 
means by which all members of the labour force can derive long term benefit from 
private savings or, in the case of the low paid, reach the required levels of savings to 
satisfy the requirements of such schemes. By examining the approach of Singapore, it 
will be shown that Malaysia will not solve the issues highlighted in this thesis by 
following the Singaporean approach to old age incomes provision. 
This chapter, then, has two key aims. In the first instance it will examine the dominant 
provident fund mechanism through which individuals seek to fund life in old age in 
Singapore. This will entail a discussion of the embedded institutional mechanism, the 
CPF, to Singapore's perhaps idiosyncratic approach to welfare provision. It will be 
shown that overwhelming reliance on provident funds, poorly supported by a mean 
and restricted public assistance programme, to finance lengthening life old age is a 
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misguided approach. Secondly it will be shown that poverty in old age has an ethno-
class dimension and the explicit and implicit conclusion that will be drawn is that, 
given the available evidence from Singapore, Malaysia should refrain from emulating 
the CPF and instead approach the problem of incomes for old age from a different 
angle and employ a more solidaristic funding mechanism. The chapter supplies 
further evidence to support the central theme of the thesis, namely that an old age 
incomes policy which reflects the socially embedded ethno-class relations, privileging 
one ethno-class faction over others, and which is founded on an individual savings 
scheme, without a minimum guaranteed periodic payment, is unequal to the task. 
In order to achieve the set aims, the chapter will give a degree of context to the later 
discussion. To this end it will examine selected political and social aspects of 
Singapore, namely the manner in which the, broadly one party, system governs the 
state and the pluralistic nature of Singaporean society, which nevertheless draws upon 
a broader notion of' Asian values' (Hill, 2000). There will be a brief discussion of the 
economic strategy employed by Singapore since the formation of the fully 
independent Republic in 1965. The chapter will then draw upon data to illustrate the 
pre-eminence of the CPF as the de facto social security mechanism in operation in 
Singapore, highlighting the expanded role of the CPF beyond old age income and into 
housing and healthcare financing. The chapter will then address a key issue facing 
both Malaysia and Singapore, the rapid demographic shift to an ageing population, 
ethnic pluralism and gender, before concluding with a comparative discussion 
commenting upon the shortcomings of a social welfare system which over relies on 
individual savings accounts and fails to offer any meaningful guarantee of an old age 
free from the risk of poverty. 
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It is necessary to advance a disclaimer at this point. Obtaining contemporary public 
data sets from the various arms of the Singaporean state has proved somewhat 
problematic, and as such there is a degree of historicity to the data presented in this 
chapter. This does not in any way seriously detract from the claims made herein as, in 
the main, such conclusions as are presented can be arrived at from both the use of 
other more contemporary sources such as international NGOs, as well as authoritative 
secondary sources. It is; however, appropriate to note such difficulties in advance. 
Singapore Inc 
Singapore is a multi-ethnic society divided in general between the Chinese (77.7 per 
cent), Malay (14.1 per cent) and Indian (7.1 per cent) communities. The annual 
population growth rate for the period 2000 - 20 15 has been estimated at 1.1 per cent, 
well below the accepted rate of replacement of 2.1 per cent (UNDP, 2002). It has 
been well documented that Singapore has enjoyed rapid and, so far, long lasting 
success as a state incorporated. Since separation from Malaysia the Peoples Action 
Party (PAP) has manufactured an economic climate which has, for extended periods, 
brought about year on year growth in the economy. The paternalistic state has 
enabled Singapore to switch from a precarious future, to one which not only has 
surpassed casual expectations, but which continues to perform well within the global 
economy. This has all been achieved against a backdrop of few natural resources, 
ethnic diversity and ongoing regional tensions. 
It is a measure of Singapore's success that by the mid 1990s per capita income in the 
city-state was second only to that of Japan in the Asian region. However, it would be 
wrong to assume that the future will mirror the past. That efforts have been directed, 
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in the main, to economic stability and the viability of the state as a self sufficient 
independent entity has been achieved at a cost of institutionalised opposition to state 
led social welfare policy. In a long line of similar, and continuing, pronouncements 
emanating from senior officials in the Singaporean government, former Prime 
Minister Goh stated that Singapore needed to ensure that 'the disadvantaged do not 
expect and cannot demand that they be looked after by the State as a matter of right' 
(cited in Williams, 1996: 164). More recently it has been suggested that the continued 
avoidance of the welfare state should be viewed as an integral aspect of the 
'Singapore model' of development (Quah, 1998). What the rhetoric cannot mask; 
however, is that such a single-minded approach has resulted in a potentially serious 
and far reaching problem, namely how Singapore's rapidly ageing and ethically 
diverse population will be able to afford the lengthening period of retirement. 
The Central Provident Fund (CPF) has long been held in high esteem by such global 
institutions as the World Bank, which has in the past proclaimed that individualism 
and the market are the required approaches to issues of income security and economic 
development. This is in itself a misguided belief, as the evidence from Singapore 
appears to suggest that not only are individual accounts under funded and therefore 
unable to meet with members' expectations, but that few other forms of saving are 
employed on a voluntary basis. Chee ( 1994) has argued that the provision of income 
for the elderly will fall far short of public expectations. Further it was claimed that by 
the year 2000, 19 per cent of men and 34 per cent of women would reach age 60 with 
minimal or zero balances accrued under the CPF. In addition to this it has been 
estimated that approximately 23 per cent of those who are members of the CPF will 
have a final balance of less than S$1 0,000 when they reach retirement age in 2015 
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(Lee, 1998). This figure falls far short of that required to fund an extended period of 
old age, which, on current figures published by the Singaporean government, will last 
on average twenty years. Unsurprisingly, it is those who earn the least who are most 
at risk from poverty in old age. However, it is worth noting that research indicates 
that even for those who are able to take advantage of alternative schemes, mandatory 
contributions to the CPF have had a detrimental effect on other forms of individual 
savings. Aspalter (2002: 182) cites figures which suggest that 'three in ten 
Singaporeans do not save anything beyond what goes into their CPF, and for those 
who earn less than S$1000 a month, almost half do not save because they are barely 
able to cope with daily living expenses'. It is therefore accurate to suggest that 
although the CPF acts as an efficient low cost savings scheme which accounts for 
little or no state spending, it reduces the level of private savings and fails to offer 
social protection to those who are most in need. In short the development of the CPF 
into a full-blown alternative to tax based forms of central state provision has left the 
fund in something of a quandary, how will the growing numbers of elderly 
Singaporeans fund life beyond retirement? This is a recognised issue both for 
Singapore and to a lesser (though increasing) extent Malaysia, and as such has led the 
World Bank to review its promotion of the individual and the market as the natural 
and best providers of income for life beyond retirement. 
According to Ramesh (2000: 243), Singapore 'presides over one of the highest 
standards of living and budget surpluses in the world'. However, public expenditure 
on health and social security are well below public spending on education, and this 
reflects the ethos of the ruling elite for whom western style welfarism is an anathema. 
As shown in Table 7.1, there has been a slight increase in the level of social security 
238 
spending as a percentage of GDP, but this is due not to increased generosity per se, 
but rather to increased numbers of pensions paid to retired civil servants and military 
personnel. Figures for public expenditure on education reflect the construction of a 
meritocratic society in Singapore. It has been this continued (in relative terms) high 
social spending in the education sector which has enabled the Singaporean labour 
force to react to the demands of an increasingly connected global market. 
Table 7.1 Selected social spending indicators as a percent of GDP 
1972-79 1980- 89 1990-95 1998a 
Income maintenance 0.28 0.37 0.53 na 
Health 1.45 1.42 1.12 1.1 
Education 3.00 4.73 4.08 na 
Source: Adapted from Ramesh (2000) and UNDP (2002) 
(a) figures only available for health 
The CPF led approach to welfare Singapore-style 
The CPF was established under the British colonial administration in 1953 and the 
legislation came into force in 1955. As in the Malaysian case the primary reason for 
initiating the CPF was for the sole purpose of providing retirement funds for 
expatriate workers. In the intervening years the CPF has developed into the main 
source of income protection for elderly Singaporeans. The provident fund mechanism 
operates as a compulsory savings scheme which draws contributions from both 
employers and employees. The CPF is compulsory for all private sector employees, 
excepting casual, part time workers and foreign nationals. Those who are self-
employed are encouraged to join the scheme on a voluntary basis, but as in the case of 
Malaysia only a small percentage opt to do so. Interestingly Lee ( 1998), citing Asher 
( 1991 ), calculates that there has been a significant decline in the number of 
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Singaporeans contributing to the CPF. Asher's figures show a decline of 
approximately 6 per cent between 1981 and 1989, down from 81.4 per cent of the 
total labour force to 75.7 per cent respectively. Ramesh (2000: 245) using figures 
from the 1997 CPF Annual Report states that active members accounted for only 43.6 
per cent of the membership 'who formed approximately two thirds of the labour 
force'. Taking figures from the 2000 CPF Annual Report, then one can see that there 
is a slight increase in terms of active membership which accounts for 1,272,856 of the 
total membership ( 44.19 per cent), but this forms a negligible increase in terms of the 
labour force covered. The most obvious conclusion drawn from these figures is that 
approximately one third of the total labour force is not able to receive the benefits of 
membership of the CPF. It comes as no surprise to discover that it is those most in 
need of CPF protection in retirement who form the majority of this 30 per cent. As is 
the case Malaysia, hawkers, petty traders, part-time workers and those engaged in 
low paid and insecure casual labour or unpaid domestic labour in Singapore are, in 
effect, left to their own devices to secure some form of income beyond retirement. 
As the main stay of 'welfare' in Singapore, the CPF has undergone periods of reform 
throughout its forty odd years of existence. During these reforms the issue of nation 
building has in part superseded that of retirement protection. For instance during the 
mid to late 1960s when the state of Singapore was in its infancy, home ownership 
Singapore style was linked to a sense of belonging and a sense of place in an effort to 
instil feelings of nationalism across the multi-ethnic population. The Singaporean 
state has been fundamentally pragmatic in its approach to economic sustainability and 
has not shrunk from using the CPF as a tool to shore up economic policies. It is 
possibly only in Singapore that such a paternalistic and authoritarian approach has 
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yielded such dividends at the cost of a sense of reduced personal freedom. There are 
signs that such an approach is, to a small degree, softening but it would be wrong to 
suggest that Singapore is approaching anything like a liberal parliamentary 
democracy. 
Public Assistance Scheme (PAS) 
Where Singapore differs from the Malaysian approach is with regards to wholly 
public funded cash assistance. The Singaporean PAS reflects the government's view 
that assistance should not be available to all those in poverty, and suggests images of 
the deserving and undeserving poor. As such it operates under stringent means testing 
and is available only to the destitute, chronically ill and the aged (Lee, 1998; Aspalter, 
2002). Benefits, which are set at S$200 per month for single adults, S$295 for 
married couples and S$530 for a family of two adults and two children, are 
recognised by the state as below that which is necessary for subsistence (Ramesh, 
2000). The figures for those applying for public assistance is expected to rise in 
future years as an increased numbers of Singaporeans face life beyond retirement with 
insufficient funds accrued under the CPF, in particular it is women and the Malay 
population who are most at risk (Lee, 1998; 2001 ). 
In addition to the above schemes, the Singaporean government has dispensed cash 
and tax benefits on an ad hoc basis (Ramesh and Asher, 2000; Ramesh, 2000; 
Aspalter, 2002). A short and selective summary includes housing grants for low-
income families from a minimum of S$800 to a maximum of S$16,000 per year. 
Increased tax relief for those who cohabitated with their elderly parents, periodic 
payments towards utility bills where elderly relatives live with their careers, as well as 
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one off payments to CPF Medisave accounts of all Singaporeans age 21 and over, 
amounting to S$100 million in 1997. In March 2000, the government announced a 
S$250 CPF top-up payment which was given to 1.5 million Singaporeans, amounting 
to S$381 million. Further to this the government announced another S$2 billion CPF 
top-up in August 2000 (CPF Annual Report, 2000). 
There is however, a question mark over the efficiency and equitability of such ad hoc 
payments. Ramesh and Asher (2000) argue that individuals are unable to plan their 
savings effectively as one off payments and tax rebates can be in response to external 
economic factors. Furthermore such rebates as are announced do not specifically 
target those most in need, since 'the rebate is set as a percentage of total tax payable, 
the benefit flows disproportionately to high income earners. Indeed, it is not available 
to the vast majority of Singaporeans, as roughly 70 per cent of the adult population do 
not pay any income tax' (Ramesh with Asher, 2000: 77). As Ramesh (2000) notes, 
such benefits do not impose any structured long-term commitments on the state. 
The chapter will now move on to look at the structure of the CPF in more detail. 
Central Provident Fund 
The CPF is a fully funded defined contributions scheme and has developed from its 
initial aim of providing income in retirement into a 'comprehensive social security 
plan which has provided many working Singaporeans with a sense of security and 
confidence in their old age' (CPF, 2002). Today it is a compulsory scheme for all 
employees excepting foreign workers, the civil service, those who are self employed 
and casual workers in low paid, part time employment. Contributions are divided 
between both the employer and the employee, and each member's contributions are 
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subdivided into 3 separate accounts which are broadly concerned with old age, 
housing and health. However, concerns persist that contributions to the CPF will 
prove inadequate in providing an old age income for Singapore's growing elderly 
population. 
Structure 
As with the Malaysian EPF, the CPF is arranged into separate accounts. In 
Singapore, each member's contributions are divided into three dedicated accounts, 
which each receive 75, 15 and 10 per cent of contributions respectively, as follows: 
• Ordinary Account (75 per cent)- from which savings can be used to purchase 
housing, pay for insurance (e.g. DPS) and for investment and education. 
• Medisave Account (15 per cent)- which can be used for hospitalisation 
expenses and approved medical insurance 
• Special Account ( 10 per cent) - which is for old age, contingency purposes 
and investment in retirement related financial products. 
When a member reaches age 55 a Retirement Account is set up to hold the required 
amount under the Minimum Sum Scheme, which was instigated in 1986 in order to 
ring-fence an amount judged necessary to meet an individual's basic welfare needs in 
old age. Under this scheme minimum balances in the Retirement Account are set to 
reach S$96,000 by July 2007 rising to S$120,000 by July 2013 and split equally 
between cash and property. The balance in this account can be used to purchase a life 
annuity, deposit with an approved bank or remain in their retirement account to earn 
interest. 
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The rates of contributions to the CPF have varied since its inception. In part, 
variations have been as a result of reduced contributions to facilitate economic 
recovery as was the case in the mid 1980s and again in response to the recent and 
ongoing recession brought about in part by the 1997 regional financial crisis. Prior to 
this event, contribution rates for those aged 55 and below were set at 40 per cent of 
earnings split equally between employer and employee. As a result of the economic 
downturn employers contribution rates were reduced by 10 percentage points as of 
January 1999, as part of a S$10 billion cost reduction package to help business 
weather the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis (CPF Annual Report, 1999). It was 
expected that rates would be restored to 40 per cent of wages, split equally. However, 
as at January 2001 the contribution rates were set at 36 per cent of earnings, 
incorporating a higher employers contribution of 16 per cent (Table 7.2). In response 
to the economic downturn experienced in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Centre on 91h September 2001 rates were again reduced in an effort to 
lessen the burden on, and therefore cost to, employers. 
Table 7.2: Allocation of CPF contributions as of 1 January 2001 
Age Group Ordinary Special Medisave Total 
Account Account Account % 
% % % 
35 years and below 26 4 6 36 
Above 35-45 years 23 6 7 36 
Above 45 - 55 years 22 6 8 36 
Above 55-60 years 10.5 0 8 18.5 
Above 60 - 65 years 2.5 0 8.5 11 
Above 65 years 0 0 8.5 8.5 
Source: Adapted from Tan (200 I) Table 15-4, p. 328 
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As Table 7.3 demonstrates the total contribution rates for those aged 50 and below is 
now set at 33 per cent of wages, 7 per cent lower than before the 1997 crisis. 
However, the allocation of contributions to the varying accounts will change as a 
result of the findings of the Inter-ministerial Committee on the Ageing Population, 
formed in 1998, which recommended that greater emphasis should be placed on 
accumulating funds in members' Special and Medisave accounts to age 60 and 
maintaining the increase to the Medisave account after age 60 (Tables 7.2 and 7.3 ). In 
effect contributions to the Ordinary account will be reduced to facilitate this shift in 
policy. 
Table 7.3: CPF contribution rates and allocations(%) as of 1st October 2003 
Aged Employer Employee Total(%) Per cent credited to 
Group of wage Ordinary Special Medisave 
to age 35 13 20 33 22 5 6 
35-45 13 20 33 20 6 7 
45-50 13 20 33 18 7 8 
50-55 11 19 30 15 7 8 
55-60 6 12.5 18.5 10.5 0 8 
60-65 3.5 7.5 11 2.5 0 8.5 
Above 65 3.5 5 8.5 0 0 8.5 
Source: /www.cpf.gov .sg/cpf_mfo/goto.asp?page=Onhne/ContnRa.asp (accessed 09/09/05) 
Coverage and Investments 
As at the end year 2004, the CPF had a membership of 3 million. Of this total figure, 
only 1.3 million (44.5 per cent) were active contributors which is equal to 
approximately two thirds of the labour force (CPF Annual Report, 2004). Lee (2001) 
estimates that 25 per cent of the working population have no CPF coverage, including 
unpaid family workers as well as temporary and part-workers. Asher (1994) notes 
that under the provisions of the CPF Act the Board of the CPF must invest members 
accumulated funds in government bonds, from which interest is derived. Citing 
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figures for 1990, Tan (2001) notes that according to the CPF Act interest is based on 
the average of savings and fixed deposit rates of four local banks, subject to a 
minimum of 2.5 per cent. In addition to this, funds in the Special and Retirement 
Accounts earn an additional 1.5 per cent (minimum 4 per cent) interest. 
The way in which interest earned on members' contributions is calculated was 
amended in July 1999 to better reflect prevailing market conditions and to enhance 
the rate of return on CPF savings. Interest rates are now adjusted quarterly and the 
new calculation gives an 80 per cent weighting to 12 month fixed deposits and 20 per 
cent weighting to month end savings deposit rates (CPF Annual Report, 2000). 
However, Ruyter (1998: 2) notes that 'Real rates of return have averaged a negative 
0.33 per cent per annum from 1987 to 1996'. In effect then members were losing 
money over this specified period. What is important to note here is that the reliance 
on market conditions which in turn reflect the prevailing conditions in the global 
market, coupled with a system of tracking local deposit rates has left the individual 
CPF member vulnerable to the vagaries of the global economy. 
Events far beyond Singapore could, and do, impact upon the projected levels of 
savings held by the CPF. There is little to shield ordinary Singaporeans from global 
economic events, such as the downturn in the global economy in 2000, many of which 
can't be predicted. Setting a headline minimum rate of return of 2.5 per cent does not 
take into account the effects of inflation which as Ruyter ( 1998) demonstrates can eat 
away at any notion of profit over an extended period. This is further compounded by 
the encouragement by the state for individuals to invest part of their CPF savings in 
246 
equities in order to enhance the rate of returns, but also increasing exposure to the risk 
of market failure. 
Singapore's preference for privately funded individual schemes to provide for an 
individual's old age is further emphasised by the introduction of the wholly voluntary 
Supplementary Retirement Scheme (SRS) on 1st April 2001. The SRS is operated by 
the private sector including the Development Bank of Singapore, the Overseas Union 
Bank, United Overseas Bank and the Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation, and as 
with the CPF tax benefits are part of the deal. Contributions are eligible for tax relief, 
investment returns are tax-free and 50 per cent of withdrawals from the SRS upon 
retirement are also tax-free. Singaporeans can contribute up to 15 per cent of annual 
income whilst for non-Singaporean citizens or Permanent Residents the contribution 
rate is 35 per cent both of which are subject to an income cap of S$72,000. As noted 
above, there is data which shows that additional saving, over and above that 
accounted for by the CPF, is rare. Certainly the Singaporean government has 
attempted to target the self-employed, albeit at a reduced rate, but only those with 
already sufficient CPF balances will benefit from the introduction of the SRS. 
Singapore's political landscape 
Following the failed union with Malaysia between 1963 and 1965, Singapore came 
fully under the rule of the People's Action Party (PAP) which had been and continued 
to be dominated by the towering figure of Lee Kuan Yew for the next 30 or so years. 
The rule of the PAP had quickly become and remains authoritarian in its approach to 
internal politics. The extent of this authoritarianism has seen the state intervene in the 
minutiae of the private sphere, from a total ban on chewing gum to state policy on 
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family size which saw the inauguration of the 'two is enough' campaign which was 
later superseded by a similar initiative exhorting (particularly educated Chinese) 
Singaporeans to go for 'three or more if you can afford it'. This modernist eugenics 
approach to nation building will be investigated further below with reference to the 
role of Singaporean women and the ascription to 'Asian' values by the state. 
In the immediate post-colonial period 'nation building' was the objective. Singapore 
had to start from virtually zero and in some way structure a society that was capable 
of surviving the hostile regional climate of the time. Quah (1998: 106) argues that the 
PAP had to manufacture a Singaporean nationality in order to combat 'the twin 
threats of communism and communalism'. In a similar manner to Malaysia, 
Singapore has sought to stifle political and ethnically pluralist opposition. Such 
action has been possible in both states due in part to the continued existence of 
colonial legislation designed to combat the threat of a post World War Two 
communist insurgency such as the Internal Security Act. 
Economic development 
Singapore has developed from a declining colonial entrepot to the leading immediate 
regional economic power despite its size and inauspicious beginnings. From the 
period of self-rule to its expulsion from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, Singapore 
relied upon its larger neighbour Malaysia as both a source of raw materials and a 
market for the goods it produced. Tremewan ( 1994: 31) has argued that 'The PAP 
leadership initially saw Singapore's expulsion in 1965 as a severe blow because 
without a sizeable internal market and a hinterland the ISI (Import-Substitution 
Industrialisation) policy could not work for Singapore. Its economy appeared to be 
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back where it was prior to the merger: declining entrepot trade and rising 
unemployment'. However, it is worth remembering that the PAP had, as its central 
aim, the emergence of a fully independent and viable Singapore. It was to these ends 
that Lee K wan Yew focussed both the political clout of the PAP and the efforts of the 
public in achieving levels of economic growth which would, in effect, facilitate the 
construction of Singapore Inc. In the immediate post independence era, economic 
growth was staked upon export-oriented industrialisation through low wage labour 
intensive manufacturing (Tremewan, 1994; Ramesh, 1995). 
In order to achieve early economic growth both Malaysia and Singapore courted 
foreign capital with the aim of establishing home based foreign owned export oriented 
manufacturing plants. The man point of difference is that of timing. Singapore began 
its economic and industrialisation development approximately a decade ahead of 
Malaysia and this also held true for the shift to value added production which took 
place in the 1980s in Singapore and the late 1990s in Malaysia. In pursuance of its 
economic strategy, the PAP leadership neutered industrial opposition through 
draconian labour relations legislation and maintained low labour costs through the 
establishment of a National Wages Council in 1972. The PAP also invested heavily 
in improving Singapore's infrastructure as well as providing a substantially reduced 
rate of taxation applicable to profits from manufactured exports (Ramesh, 1995). 
During the 1960s and 1970s this economic strategy was successful as Singapore 
enjoyed average annual growth rates of above 8 per cent, but by the end of the decade 
other NICs were catching up and providing alternative and more cost effective 
manufacturing bases. Spurred on by the deep recession in the mid 1980's, Singapore 
decided to abandon its low wage labour intensive model in favour of value added 
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capital intensive manufacturing, still utilising foreign capital, but also supporting 
home grown enterprises in a bid to expand production away from Singapore in order 
to cut dependency on developed western nations (Yeung, 1998). Ramesh (1995: 
248), in an article examining economic globalisation and policy choices, states that 'A 
deliberate policy to promote local firms to relocate production abroad is unparalleled 
in the world, and exhibits a unique level of the state's commitment to globalisation.' 
What remains unclear is the extent to which Singapore, through state aided industry, 
can maintain its current and enviable position in a region still feeling the aftershocks 
of the 1997 economic crisis. 
Ageing in Singapore 
Average life expectancy (at birth) has grown from 69 years in 1970 to stand at 77 
years by 1996 (Cheung, 1999). The annual population growth rate has fallen from 2.3 
per cent for the years 1975 to 2000, and is expected to average 1.1 per cent for the 
years 2000 to 2015 (UNDP, 2002). This is reflected in a drop in fertility rates from 
2.6 for the period 1970 to 1975, to 1.6 for 1995 to 2000. Singapore's population is set 
to age rapidly over the next 30 years. In the year 2000 the proportion of the 
population aged under 15 stood at 21.49 per cent (of total population), this is forecast 
to fall to 14 per cent by 2015. According to estimates by the CPF approximately 7 per 
cent of the population were 65 or above in 2000 and this is set to increase to 19 per 
cent by the year 2030. The old age dependency ratio, that is those above 65 to those 
aged 15-64, will rise from 10 per hundred to 35 per hundred in the same time period 
(CPF Annual Report, 2000). This however, does not tell the whole story as it is 
expected that the 'old old', that is those 75 years old and above, will experience the 
fastest growth over the next 30 years. Lee ( 1998) citing figures form Chen and 
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Cheung ( 1988) indicates that in 1980 the number of elderly over 75 was 
approximately 30,000; this figure is expected to increase to 243,000 by 2030. It 
should also be noted that amongst the elderly population, it is women who are most 
likely to be at risk of poverty due in part to greater longevity, late entry in the labour 
force, lower pay and so lower CPF balances. Lee ( 1998: 296), citing figures from the 
1986 Survey of the Aged Living Community, argues that 'over 90 per cent of elderly 
women depended on their children and/or grandchildren for financial support. This 
problem is likely to increase in the next two decades as more of the older generation 
of women, who have little education and therefore earn less and save less, retire'. 
Table 7.4 Labour force participation rates of older persons, 1970-1990 (%) 
Men Women 
Aged 
55--59 60--64 65+ 55--59 60--64 65+ 
Year 
1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 
Singapore 75.9 68.7 57.7 47.6 32.7 20.3 16.2 20.7 13.4 I 1.7 6.5 4.6 
Malaysia 87.4 72.0 76.2 61.7 49.1 42.0 31.9 33.9 24.2 27.3 13.7 18.4 
Source: Adapted from Clark, 2002:67 m Asher et a/2002 
If this proves to be the case then it would seem unlikely that the rate of decline, as 
illustrated in Table 7.4, for those beyond retirement age to cease activity in the labour 
market will continue unabated. It would be reasonable to assume that economic 
activity of the elderly, albeit in the informal sector, will remain at present levels and 
may even increase if data from the 1986 Survey of the Aged Living Community is 
proved accurate. However, these fairly general figures do not tell the whole story. As 
we have noted the ethnically plural nature of Singaporean society presents the state 
with a variety of issues and problems, which are unevenly spread across the three 
main ethnic populations. 
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Ethnic pluralism in Singapore 
Ethnicity as a national concept, one in which the promotion of society over rules the 
needs and desires and wishes of its constituent parts, is institutionally embedded in the 
fabric of Singaporean society. The very reason for Singapore's independence is 
linked to the political institutional arrangements which were agreed at the end of the 
colonial period. Such arrangements resulted in an ethnic balancing act in which, the 
then, Malaysia envisaged a Chinese Singapore as a threat to the political primacy of 
Malays in the post colonial era. Subsequently the Chinese threat was expelled 
through separation and left to fall or prosper with little to go on. 
In spite of the portrayal of Singapore as a Chinese city-state, it is multi ethnic in 
composition, both helped and hindered by the large ex-patriot community which 
accounts for a sizeable proportion of the labour force. Indeed the model which is 
often cited is a society comprising of CMIO (Chinese-Malay-Indian-Other). It is 
interesting to note that under the category 'Other' there is foreign nationals and 
Singaporean Eurasians (Brown, 1998). Ethnicity has always been a live topic, both in 
terms of unifying the disparate factions into a unified Singaporean society capable of 
achieving the economic development targets set by the state, and more latterly coming 
to terms with a shrinking Chinese majority and an emboldened relationship with East 
Asia, and China in particular, which would not have been possible in the 1960's and 
1970's. In the case of the former, Wee (2002: 152-3) cites the 1966 National Pledge 
which sought to inculcate a meritocratic (Brown, 1994) approach to economic 
prosperity based on hard work and the primacy of community or nation, stating as it 
does, that 'We, the citizens of Singapore, pledge ourselves as one united people, 
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regardless of race, language or religion to build a democratic society, based on justice 
and equality, so as to achieve happiness, prosperity and equality for our nation'. 
However, as both Wee (2002) and Brown (1998) argue, the ethnic mix that makes up 
Singaporean society has been used as a tool to promulgate the legitimacy of the PAP, 
both as a unifying political and economic entity and as a focus of internal threat 
against which only the PAP can safeguard the interests of the disparate groups in 
Singaporean society. It is this notion of serving the needs of different ethnic 
communities which is of concern here, the larger picture of the use of identity as a 
nation building tool is documented in greater depth elsewhere (see for instance Hill 
and Lian, 1995; Chua,1997; Brown, 1998; Wee, 2002). One way in which the PAP 
government sought to enhance party legitimacy as a by product, or dual aim, of 
creating a sense of national solidarity was through the extensive and comprehensive 
public housing scheme under the aegis of the Housing Development Board (HDB) 
which is regarded as the most comprehensive and successful scheme in existence. It 
has been suggested that an unwelcome consequence of providing public housing, has 
been the rapid nuclearisation of the family (Chua, 1995). This is both as a 
consequence of economic prosperity, which sees individuals and elderly couples 
buying privacy (Chan, 1997), and in direct opposition to the wishes of the government 
which promotes individual and family provision over the meagre offerings of the 
state. Tme to its hands on approach to social change, the government, once aware of 
the numbers of young singles (those under 35) attempting to purchase their own 
homes, prevented such attempts by stopping individuals from applying for public 
housing flats, returned the deposits of those who had already applied, forcing such 
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individuals to seek alternative, though more costly, private developments (Chua, 1982 
cited in Chua, 1995: 117). 
The promotion of a peculiarly Singaporean Asian identity which originates not from 
some innate cultural tradition, but rather from the state which seeks to reinterpret 
disparate cultures into a unifying concept which, it is hoped will equip the citizenry 
with a value system which most closely resembles the preferred future profile of the 
city state as envisaged by its PAP leaders. This, it should be noted in passing, is open 
to reinterpretation dependant upon the prevailing regional and global conditions of the 
time. Thus the creation of a Singaporean identity which takes account of the pluralist 
nature of society does so in strictly pragmatic terms, based upon the notion of what 
best suits the needs of the nation, society or community as a whole (see Rodan, 1996; 
Chua, 1997; Jayasuriya, 1998 and George, 2000 for a fuller discussion of the 
changeability of preferred values Singapore style). There remains, however, the 
rather precarious and somewhat disadvantaged position of the Malay community and 
in particular the future elderly Malays. Governments' efforts to protect the ethnic 
balance in Singapore have led the state to effect policies that are more attractive to the 
majority Chinese community. It should be noted that, as detailed below, some of 
these policies particularly those concerned with the family have been brought into 
legislation as a result of past economic success. 
Rather it is the economic position of the Malays in Singapore and in particular their 
prospects in the ageing society, which sees the Malays as a poorly provided for 
community under the current arrangements for income in old age. Lee (200 1) notes 
that due to prior educational attainment and discrimination in the labour market, 
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Malays are over represented in the lower paid sectors which generally give little or no 
retirement benefits. Added to this is data which Lee (200 1: 173-4) suggests indicates 
the predicament of elderly Malays, that being a lack of CPF saving which inevitably 
increases both the burden on their children and indicates a higher than expected 
application to the Public Assistance Scheme (PAS) 'However, given the strict criteria 
and the inadequacy of the PAS to meet even the minimum household expenditure, a 
certain proportion of those with small or no CPF balance will face financial 
difficulties upon their retirement. In short, Malays who have moderate and no 
exposure to the CPF will have problems maintaining their incomes when they retire at 
55 and may likely slip into poverty'. 
It would appear there is little to be gained for a sizeable proportion of the Malay 
community from the PAP policy of initiating ad hoc payments to individual's CPF 
accounts. An increased reliance on the PAS will only further burden poor Malay 
families who are expected to provide for elderly relatives. It is true that the state has 
made available educational bursaries for children from low income families (less than 
S$750 a month) as well as providing housing grants of S$30,000 for couples who 
purchase HDB apartments on the same estates as their elderly parents. However, 
these are discretionary payments and do not constitute an added long term 
responsibility for the state to secure adequate income for either those in poverty or 
those at risk from poverty in old age. The consequences of insecure or non existent 
income streams into old age is certainly problematic for the Singaporean Malay 
population; however, as a reflection of the communal nature of Singaporean society, 
the real challenge to current arrangements will come if and when increasing numbers 
of the Chinese community fail to save enough through the CPF. It is the case in 
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Singapore as in Malaysia, that women are at greatest risk of poverty in old age, and it 
is this constituency to which is attended to in the next section. 
Women and the family 
One area in which traditional values have been placed at the fore of both 
governmental rhetoric and policy has been that of the dual role of women in terms of 
labour force participation and provider of domestic labour and the next generation of 
Singaporeans. Pyle ( 1997) argues that Singapore has never really enjoyed the 
'traditional' Asian family form in terms of multi-generational cohabitation, due in part 
to its history as a destination for migrant labour. Even in the last thirty years, the state 
has swung from anti to pro-natalist policies as the economic success demanded 
greater female participation in the labour force which in turn had a detrimental effect 
on the fertility rate resulting in the current below replacement rate level. 
However, true to its type as a state which legislates for the minutiae of everyday life, 
the PAP led government has attempted, somewhat crudely to engineer the future 
population both in terms of ability and, perhaps more controversially in a multi-ethnic 
society, in terms of ethnicity. The problem as the PAP saw it was that too few 
educated, higher income middle class women were having children in their early 
twenties and too many lower income, lower class and less educated women were 
producing more children. As Chua ( 1995), Pyle ( 1997) and Ramesh ( 1992; 2000) all 
note it was the Chinese majority who were producing too few children and the Malays 
who were producing too many. In an attempt to rectify this issue the state in a rather 
heavy-handed initiative introduced allowances which it was hoped would have the 
desired effect on both Chinese and Malay fertility rates. As Ramesh (2000: 246) 
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details, in order to achieve desired objectives, tax incentives were provided for 
women bearing more children and for those bearing children at an earlier age (below 
28 years). The total tax allowance for women having two children before age 28 and 
then going on to have two more children would amount to a tax holiday of S$60,000 
over 21 years. As both Ramesh (2000) and Pyle ( 1997) note these tax allowances 
were accompanied by childcare subsidies, a more flexible approach to balancing 
homework commitments and priority in housing applications. Conversely the 
incentive for lower income and less educated women to have fewer children took the 
form of a S$10,000 credit to the women's CPF account if she was both under 30 and 
underwent sterilization after the birth of her first or second child (Pyle, 1997). 
A pursuit of 'Asian values' or pragmatism writ large? 
Both Malaysia and Singapore have made some use of the notion of 'Asian values' to 
defend their individual approach to welfare, relying as it does in both case on 
individual provision and traditional support from the family. The Singaporean state 
has periodically undergone a shift in approach to both the business of maintaining its 
electoral advantage which in part has oscillated between attempts to create a more 
open form of political discourse and the more sure-footed approach of 
authoritarianism which has served the PAP well since independence. Part of this 
scene shifting has been the, albeit brief, espousal of 'Asian values' as a mechanism by 
which Singapore could be said to be at the forefront of economic prosperity and social 
stability. Rodan (1996) has argued that the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
demise of a discernible communist opposition, which had served both Singapore and 
Malaysia well as a source of external threat with which to maintain draconian laws, 
led to the adoption of the Asian values discourse as a mechanism with which to 
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promote difference from others, notably the more democratic West, and thus shore up 
domestic authoritarianism. The espousal of characteristics such as family and 
community first an emphasis on education and personal savings (Rodan, 1996: 330) 
gave focus to the claim that it was these cultural difference that had enabled, in this 
case, Singapore to achieve high levels of economic growth and societal prosperity. 
This claim to legitimation through the espousal of Asian values was earlier presented 
by Jones and Brown (1994: 83) who have argued that the Singaporean state was 'quite 
explicit in stating that its deployment of 'Asian values' as a political rhetoric is 
necessary to counteract the allegedly fissiparous implications of the rapid social 
changes experienced by Singaporeans'. 
However, despite the repressive nature of the Singaporean state, it would be wrong to 
suggest that many of the policies of the PAP have not found favour with the public. 
Certainly the extension of home ownership, low crime rates and continued economic 
prosperity has created a worthy pool of support for the PAP. The transference of 
power from the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong in November 1990 
was carried out without incident, especially with the former PM becoming Senior 
Minister in the Prime Minister's office. The economy continued to grow and the 
wealth of the nation increased with the per capita income rising from S$22,000 in 
1990 to S$37 ,000 in 2000 (George, 2000). In effect little had changed in terms of 
leadership as the PAP machine carried on regardless. Indeed, the same process of 
power transference was carried out in August 2004 when Lee Hsien Loong, the son of 
Lee Kwan Yew took over as Prime Minister from Goh Chok Tong, who in turn 
became Senior Minister. It is worth noting that a form of liberalisation has occurred 
in Singapore, in the form of a more participatory style of politics (Hill and Lian, 
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1995). For instance the instigation of a Speaker's Corner in September 2000 enabled 
public gatherings to take place without seeking a license. However, it would be 
wrong to attach too much credibility to such moves, the continuing dominance of the 
PAP as the party of power is assured for the foreseeable future, and it is the long 
standing and predicted future path of social policy reform, in particular the entrenched 
and strident anti-welfarist stance of Singapore reliant as it is on the CPF, which is 
dealt with in the next section. 
Issues facing Singapore (and Malaysia) 
Singapore is not immune to the turbulence in the contemporary global economy, and 
despite its immense success in turning itself into a more than viable city state with 
few natural resources to call upon, Singapore has not been able to simply ride out the 
storm brought about by events on a both a global and regional scale. The onset of the 
global economy has provided Singapore with new challenges as it has attempted to 
move away from reliance on a weakening manufacturing sector and develop a more 
service s based economy. It is true to say that Singapore presents itself, and is 
recognised as a regional economic hub and the rush to service industries, such as the 
financial services sector, was given greater impetus by the exit of manufacturing 
related foreign direct investment. In this instance Singapore both planned an exit 
from a manufacturing based economy, in favour of greater emphasis on value added 
service sector oriented economy and was a victim of its own economic success in so 
much that year on year increases in the standard of living resulted in higher costs to 
inward investors through, in part, increased wages. This led to a movement away 
from Singapore to lower cost geographical areas, one such being initially Malaysia, 
which in turn necessitated the active involvement of the government in attracting 
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replacement sources of investment and employment. Singapore does not suffer from 
the adverse economic effects of high unemployment. Indeed some 20 per cent of its 
labour force is comprised of foreign nationals, and as in Malaysia, a favoured 
response to rising unemployment is the reduction of foreign workers. Investment in 
new technologies has placed Singapore ahead of its close neighbours and claims that 
Singapore will be the first cyber based society are well under way to fruition. 
However, in one area, even the exhortations of the state have failed to result in a shift 
towards a positive outcome. Singapore is facing a demographic shift like no other in 
the region. Figures collated from the CPF Board, suggest that at age 62 Singaporeans 
can be, on average, expected to live for a further 15 to twenty years. In 2002 the 
number of Singaporeans aged 65 or older stood at 225,900, by the year 2030 this 
figure is expected to more than triple to 795,900. At present the ratio of economically 
active individuals to every elderly person stands at 10:1, by 2030 this will have 
dropped to 3.5: l (CPF, 2000) 
Singapore's approach to old age income provision has more than a degree of 
similarity to that which operates in Malaysia. Both were British colonial territories 
until the middle of the twentieth century. It is this shared colonial history which 
prepared the ground for subsequent development of the provident fund mechanism as 
the pre-eminent form of income provision in old age. A point worth noting; however, 
is that the British colonial administration initiated the forerunner of the Singaporean 
provident fund as a short-term stopgap measure (Aspalter, 2002). The intention of the 
administration was to move towards a social insurance based pension which was to 
cover all workers including the self-employed. A number of government 
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commissioned reports came to such a conclusion, and indeed the legislation for the 
development of the CPF into a social insurance pension was made ready for 
implementation prior to the accession of the PAP led government in 1959 (Chow, 
1981 ). The path taken by the PAP in securing viability of the fledgling Singaporean 
state through economic development led the development of a welfare system based 
not on social insurance principles, but on provision through individual savings. 
In both Malaysia and Singapore, there are separate old age income schemes for public 
and private employees. In both cases though there is a slight blurring of the 
boundaries in so far as the eligibility criteria for junior public sector employees has 
been tightened and those unable to meet the reformed entry requirements have been 
encouraged to opt into the provident fund mechanisms. In the case of Singapore, at 
present only senior civil servants, members of parliament, the judiciary and officers in 
the armed forces remain able to join the state funded pension scheme (Ramesh, 2000). 
Where Singapore differs markedly from the Malaysian model is the extent to which 
the Central Provident Fund (CPF) acts as provider to meet a broader range of a more 
fully developed set of social security requirements. In fact, the CPF is regularly 
referred to by a wide variety of sources as a social security system (W.K.M. Lee, 
2001; Aspalter, 2002; CPF, 2002). This is often qualified with the epithet of 'savings 
plan' which distinguishes the CPF from other, perhaps more traditional, notions of 
social security in which the state takes more than a regulatory role and acts as a part 
provider. This difference could be applied to any of the representatives of Esping-
Andersen' s (1990) three worlds. In short, the CPF is for the most part the main 
mechanism by which individuals are able to access housing, healthcare and savings 
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for retirement income. However, as noted below, the CPF itself is experiencing 
difficulties in meeting such a range of needs, and it is on this basis that the thrust of 
this chapter, and the thesis in general, argues that Malaysia should not seek to emulate 
too closely the Singaporean model of over reliance on the provident fund scheme. 
Rather Malaysia should seek alternative and more equitable methods of securing 
income for the elderly beyond retirement. 
To sum up then, the end result is that a sizable proportion of the population will be 
unable to save enough through the CPF to generate a post retirement income, let alone 
save in addition to their monthly contributions. In reality then the CPF is not 
fulfilling its own vision to be 'A world class social security organisation providing the 
best national savings scheme for Singaporeans to enjoy a secure retirement' (CPF, 
2005). Too few people are able to make sufficiently high contribution over the 
required period to accumulate the required level of funds. Those who are making 
regular contributions are faced with low, and in some cases negative returns and are 
being actively encouraged to seek higher returns through the purchase of equities in 
the form of unit trusts. This compounds the risk to long term savings by exposing the 
individual to the up and downs of the global market. As detailed below, there is little 
in the way of a safety net if an individual or cohort reaches retirement during a down 
cycle in the global economy. Singapore, which prides itself on its positioning the 
regional and global economy benefits from its proactive engagement with economic 
globalisation and is at the same time, is exposing its citizens to the increased risks 
associated with the global market. However, there are institutional brakes, both 
political, cultural and societal which make reform difficult. As shown above, there is 
no political desire to alter the way welfare is done in Singapore. The culture of 
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individualism and reliance on family is deep rooted in the Singaporean psyche as well 
as legislated by parliament and the levels of contributions to the CPF, for those who 
are members, would make further levies for an alternative scheme unworkable. 
Indeed such arrangements are indicative of an embedded institutional arrangement. 
Just as was noted in the case of the Malaysian EPF, there is an entrenched acceptance 
of the status quo which see not only housing paid for out of CPF accounts, but also 
health care and life insurance. It could be argued that the CPF is a victim of its own 
early success in that reform would be unpopular and so its developmental path 
negates the radical reform required if all Singaporeans were to benefit form a more 
equitable old age income scheme. Indeed, the promotion of individualism it is argued 
is an institutionalised approach to welfare in both Singapore and Malaysia. This in 
itself is no bad thing, however, the lack of movement towards alternative, more 
equitable mechanism carries with it an ethno-class dimension for both societies. 
Current arrangements privilege certain ethno-class factions over others, in the case of 
Singapore it is the Chinese majority who benefit most and the Malay minority who 
are least well served, in Malaysia it is the Malays over others. The important point to 
note here is in Singapore there is evidence which suggests that increasing numbers of 
CPF members are failing to save enough to provide them with an adequate income in 
old age. As Lee (200 1) stated Singaporean Malays, and particularly women, are 
increasingly likely to rely upon Public Assistance benefits. The real challenge to the 
embedded institutional approach to welfare in Singapore will come when increasing 
numbers of Singaporean Chinese find themselves reliant on Public Assistance. As 
always it will be those who are low paid and in insecure employment, in effect those 
in the lower socio-economic classes, who will be most likely to need financial 
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assistance from the state, which as was detailed above is neither generous nor easy to 
access. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to present Singapore as a comparator case in order to 
determine whether Malaysia should seek to emulate the development path of the CPF, 
given the similarities which exist in both states, such as a multi ethnic society, the 
privileging of an identified ethno-class faction and a demographic shift to an ageing 
population. To achieve this aim, the chapter has presented a detailed account of the 
Central Provident Fund which represents the dominant institutionalised mechanism 
for the procurement of income in old age. In addition alternative, though far less 
reaching and mean in terms of cash transfers, state schemes have given an insight into 
the manner in which Singapore addresses the issues of social security in a far less 
stable economic future. The PAP dominated government maintains a strong aversion 
to long term state responsibilities, preferring instead to strive to maintain individual 
and family provision whilst initiating ad hoc benefits which generally are not targeted 
at nor received by those individuals and families most in need. As the former Senior 
MinisterS. Rajaratnam has stated the continuing aim of the Singaporean state is to 
'reduce welfare to the minimum' (quoted in Quah, 1998: 115). What such 
pronouncements appear not to shrink from, is that such an institutionalised approach 
has resulted in, and will continue to effect, a serious and far reaching problem; namely 
how the rapidly ageing population will be able to afford the lengthening period of 
retirement. 
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It has been argued elsewhere that the CPF has reached the limits of its applicability to 
the changing nature of Singaporean society (Holliday and Wilding, 2003) and that at 
the very least major reform would be required in order to enable the current institution 
to meet the future needs of its members (Low, 1999). The current preference on 
behalf of the state for ad hoc payments do not represent the best policy for ensuring 
equity, nor do they allow individuals to better plan their savings strategy. 
Further to this it could reasonably be claimed that the CPF has in part become 
redundant. Singapore claims a home ownership rate of well over 90 per cent, in this 
instance there s appears little reason to continue with authorised withdrawals from 
members' Ordinary accounts for the purchase of housing, especially if this is used to 
purchase a second property. The benefits accrued for old age match neither the 
expectations, nor the needs of individual members or specific communities. Data 
presented in this chapter highlights the ethno-class dimension of the current 
institutional base. It is Singaporean Malays who are disproportionately more likely to 
require income supplement through the PAS and this will increase substantially over 
the next two to three decades. Indeed given the recent shifts in the global economy, 
and in the Southeast Asian region itself, economies and labour markets are more 
fragile than previous experience had indicated. This will have a direct impact upon 
individuals' ability to contribute to their old age savings through the provident fund 
mechanism. In short there will be fewer 'ideal' members of the CPF, which given 
that the scheme as it currently stands does not offer coverage to a sizeable minority of 
the population, will further inhibit the ability of individuals to meet their economic 
needs in old age. In addition, Ramesh and Asher (2000) argue that the use of 
members Medisave account to could lead to inflationary pricing in the health sector, 
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further straining the resources of the most needy. Those who are at greatest risk of 
poverty in old age are women due to the dual burden of work and caring 
responsibilities and cultural restraints which can inhibit female participation in the 
labour market (Davidson 1996). 
There are two major institutionalised obstacles to future social policy reform in 
Singapore. In the first instance the Singaporean state is avowedly against any welfare 
expansion which would place long-term commitment on the state, preferring to 
propound the notion of individual and family provision as the Singaporean way. 
Secondly, the CPF as it currently stands is a useful macro-economic tool which 
enables the state to counter downturns in the economy through manipulation of 
contribution rates for business, thereby going some way to maintain FDI and aid local 
enterprises. More recently, former Prime Minister Goh stated that in the case of a 
deep recession lasting 2 or 3 years the state would allow individuals to draw upon 
their CPF savings to pay for daily living requirements (The Straits Times Interactive, 
111112001). This not only has a negative impact on members' final balances, but also 
transmits mixed messages to the population as a whole with regards to saving towards 
retirement income. 
So then, is the Singaporean 'model' one to emulate and should Malaysia seek a 
similar developmental path with regards to future social security reform? Based on 
the evidence contained in this chapter the answer would have to be no. This is not to 
argue that there have been no benefits or advances made under the current 
Singaporean approach, this chapter has clearly proven this not to be the case as the 
example of home ownership would testify. In addition the administrative efficiency 
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of the CPF is a good example of cost effective management of resources which 
diverts the minimum from members' accounts and makes individual monitoring of 
accounts far easier through heavy investment in ICTs. However, as this chapter has 
also demonstrated, there are clear pitfalls in relying solely upon the provident fund 
mechanism. Unless Malaysia is seeking to further entrench the risk of poverty in old 
age and increase the burden on individuals and families through the states refusal to 
countenance extending social security, then to follow the CPF and insist upon a 
greater member involvement in 'managing' individual accounts, despite investor 
inexperience, whilst making little impact upon wage inequality - which to a greater 
extent accounts for low contributions and so low final balances for the majority of 
members - will not address the needs and concerns of an increasingly ageing society. 
There are parallels between the developmental paths of both provident funds thus far, 
with Singapore leading the way, an example being the instigation of a minimum sum 
scheme. To take this as a case in point, it can be argued that in its self such a scheme 
is both laudable and sensible. However, if individual members cannot meet the 
minimum sum target then, in the case of Singapore, they are left apply for the wholly 
inadequate PAS or rely on family members topping up their account, the result of 
which is to spread the risk of poverty and financial insecurity trans-generationally. 
These are very real pitfalls which Malaysia would do well to avoid as it begins to 
approach the issues of an increasingly older population, increasing income inequality 
and a shift to a class based society which favours one ethno-class faction over others. 
There are alternatives to such a residual approach which, as this thesis argues, would 
see the existing institutional base replaced with a more equitable mechanism. This 
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should take the form a social insurance based pension offering a minimum income 
guaranteed to last the increasing length of old age and thereby removing some, though 
not all, of the burden from individuals and families ill equipped to meet the challenge. 
268 
Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
This concluding chapter will summarise and distil the material discussed in the 
preceding chapters. The key aim is to make clear just why this thesis has argued that 
the Malaysian EPF is no longer 'fit for purpose'. To this end this chapter will revisit 
the broad framework of endogenous and exogenous pressures which broadly affect a 
number of states, but which come together and coalesce around the current 
arrangements for old age incomes in Malaysia. The 1997 economic crisis which 
affected Southeast Asian states differentially was not solely an economic crisis; rather 
it was also a social crisis. In Malaysia, as in others states in the region, it put paid to 
the taken for granted assumption that existing welfare systems, based on long term 
economic growth and high rates of (male) employment were sufficient to meet the 
needs of the population (Croissant, 2004). For the first time, the myth of the family as 
'traditional' welfare provider continuing to be equal to the task it had performed 
admirably in the past was exposed (Jomo, 2001 ). Regardless of the future role of the 
family as welfare provider, growing inequality in Malaysia will contribute towards 
increased levels of poverty amongst the growing number of older people. As Ramesh 
(2002: 156) states 'even if the family structure in the region remains intact and the 
aged continue to be looked after by the family, there will be people who face financial 
difficulties. Poor people often have poor relatives who do not have the resources to 
look after their elderly kin.' 
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In an era of heightened global interconnectedness and increased competition for 
economic growth, employment and trade, any state which maintains a pension system 
that relies solely on any one form of provision is doomed to fail a proportion of its 
citizens. This is compounded in a system in which the individual bears the 
responsibility for old age income and where the level of risk to which individuals are 
exposed is increasing. At the most basic level, in a system which relies on individual 
savings there will be those who simply are not covered by such a scheme, be it those 
who are self employed, those who find employment in the informal sector or those 
whose work history results in contribution gaps. Added to this there will be others on 
low incomes in insecure employment who are not able to accrue enough credits, or 
put more plainly cash, to provide an income for as long as their post retirement life 
lasts. Figures detailed in Chapter 3 illustrate that increasing numbers of Malaysians 
who are employed in the private sector are failing to save enough for old age. This 
has nothing to do with a wilful disregard for the need to save, as in the case of the 
EPF saving is mandatory. Rather it is a combination of barriers and pressures, both 
endogenous and exogenous, which place increasing numbers at risk of poverty in old 
age. 
Malaysian society has undergone massive social change in the last 30 or so years. 
Malaysia is no longer a predominantly rural based economy with few opportunities 
for economic development. Ethnicity has ceased to be the main focus of social 
division it once was. Instead social class defined by occupation and access to status 
and power increasingly cuts across ethnic identities (Brown, 1994 ). In part, this is a 
result of state intervention in the economy and as a driver of social change through 
policies such as the NEP and NVP. As was noted in Chapter 6, this does not mean 
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that one should dismiss or ignore the continuing importance of ethnicity in 
contemporary Malaysia, but rather that an intertwining of ethnicity and class has 
taken place which impacts upon the ability of individuals to save enough money for 
life beyond retirement. There has been a massive shift from an agricultural to an 
industrialised urban economy in which the realisation of Dr Mahathir's Vision 2020 is 
a distinct possibility. However, this process has not been without cost, and 
increasingly such costs are being borne by those who are least able to bear them. It is 
this ethno-class dimension which sees the growing Malay middle classes privileged 
over others, which will put increasing strain on Malaysian society. The rise in income 
inequality, insecure employment and a rising cost of living in urban areas have put the 
low skilled and their families at increasing risk of poverty across the life course. 
However, it is not just those engaged in the urban industrial economy who are at risk 
of insecurity and poverty, those who exist on the margins of the formal economy are 
often newly arrived migrants from the rural areas. In most cases it is the young who 
make this journey, leaving behind elderly relatives who are dependant upon 
remittances or intergenerational transfers sent 'home' by those who have left. 
Furthermore those who have migrated may be able to send remittances back to rural 
bound elderly relatives, but at what cost to themselves and their families economic 
security? Insecure work and low wages will impact upon the ability of the low skilled 
to earn enough money to cope with the expense of day to day living, let alone put 
monies aside for savings. Nowhere is this more evident than in the ability to provide 
oneself with an income for old age accrued through individual savings. 
However, having demonstrated that extensive social change has taken place, this must 
be qualified in so far as it has been shown that institutional arrangements impede 
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change and reform at a variety of levels. There are institutionalised social and 
cultural expectations which persist in Malaysia and which continue to view the family 
as the source of cash and care. In Malaysia this has been defined by Yaacob (2000) as 
balas jasa or repaying parents. There are institutionalised political and economic 
arrangements which reinforce this familialism and which promote individualism as 
the 'Asian' way. Ethnic identities and communalism similarly act as inhibitors to 
change as tradition is invoked as part of a broader Malaysian identity. The issue here 
is that there are no alternatives in place at present, if and when as expected, societal 
change leads to the current gaps in traditional provision widening resulting in more 
and more individuals and families falling through. Furthermore there is a tension 
which exists between the need and desire for change on the one hand and an 
institutional counter pressure which resists change and prefers the status quo. 
This preference for continuity originates not only from the political establishment 
who continue to promote individualism as the Asian way in an attempt to head off 
calls for increase state expenditure on social welfare, but also from individual 
members of the EPF. For many Malaysians the EPF serves its purpose as a savings 
scheme which enables increasing numbers to purchase housing and service housing 
loans, whilst at the same time generating interest on savings. Added to this, however, 
is the facility that the EPF has in the past presented as a low cost source of capital for 
the state, whether this be to part finance mega projects or to service unexpected 
budget deficits as in the case of the post crisis 1998 budget. In this respect then there 
is institutional inertia which is accepted at least by some and promoted by other 
interested parties. There maybe, as Asher (200 1) contends, an intellectual awareness 
in Malaysia for the need for reform but this has yet to translate itself into sustained 
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social and political pressure for, nor acceptance of, a reform process which would 
change the role and nature of the EPF. Indeed in his statement in the EPF Annual 
Report (2005: 29) the Chairman acknowledges that 'traditional schemes ... can no 
longer be sustained' and that 'many countries have begun to develop a new multi-
pillar pension system' but despite that, 'the EPF wiH continue to play an active role 
in ... the development of (the) social security system of the country'. 
The labour movement in Malaysia has historically been weak and remains so. The 
MTUC may periodically castigate the EPF for low dividend rates, but in its 12 point 
memorandum to the chairman of the EPF in 2003 the MTUC called for increased 
contributions from both employers and employees in order to enable individuals to 
accrue more savings to see them through old age (Labour Resource Centre, 2003). 
What such a proposal fails to acknowledge or come to terms with is that individuals 
alone cannot secure a comprehensive and equitable pension system, especially if other 
points on the memorandum such as increasing the proportion of EPF contributions 
available for housing were implemented. 
To counteract such 'domestic' institutional arrangements are the pressures which 
derive from Malaysia's engagement with the global economy. Here it is the desire 
and the need to curb costs to both the state and the international sources of FDI, which 
restricts the necessary radical reform of old age incomes policies. Malaysia needs to 
remain attractive to FDI in order to maintain and promote economic growth and to 
combat unemployment. However, there are now alternative, cheaper destinations for 
manufacturing based FDI, namely China, India and Vietnam, and Malaysia is in the 
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process of changing its economic base away from manufactures export led growth to 
value added exports, reliant on a skilled and flexible labour force. 
There is a direct relationship between world events and the operation of the Malaysian 
economy. External shocks, both economic and conflict based which may take place 
far away from Southeast Asia, do nevertheless impact upon Malaysia. An example of 
this is given by the World Bank (2004: 5) which in its predictions for rates of FDI into 
Malaysia for 2005 predicted that a slowing of economic growth in 'major source 
countries of Malaysian FDI (the US and Japan) in 2005, combined with continued 
expansion of China's manufacturing industries and opening up of its services' sector, 
could result in a further decline in total investment in Malaysia'. This introduces 
increased insecurity into the labour market, particularly those in the affected sectors 
such as electronics manufactures which is a disproportionate employer of women and 
has a negative effect on an individual's ability to save for old age. 
However, the external pressure of economic globalisation does not render the 
Malaysian state helpless or without choice. The effects of what happens in the global 
economy are passed through a local institutional filter and it is at this point that choice 
exists (Campbell, 2004). National governments are concerned with both the needs 
and the requirements of the economy and their population. Globalisation is not 
imported wholesale into national economies, nor are the needs of the electorate 
ignored by national governments, even in the semi-authoritarian state that is Malaysia. 
Economic globalisation does affect social policy choices of national governments but 
the effects are lessened because national governments continue to set their own policy 
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agendas. It is Malaysia's internal, national institutions, be they cultural, political or 
economic which act as a barrier to external global pressures. 
A key pressure which straddles both the endogenous and exogenous is that of ageing. 
Indeed, as noted in Chapter 5, international organisations such as HelpAge 
International (2002) claim that ageing has become a defining global issue and as such 
will shape both future economic and social policies. However, age in itself is not the 
issue, just as increased longevity is not a crisis rather an achievement. Age becomes 
an issue if political or social institutional arrangements hinder rather than smooth the 
demographic shift to an ageing society. Such policies cannot be reactive, they must 
be proactive. In the case of Malaysia this means raising the retirement age and 
therefore early access to EPF funds. There is little reason for continuing with the 
policy which sees all public sector workers forced to retire upon reaching their fifty 
sixth birthday. Nor, given the current life expectancies, is there a strong case for 
continuing with a blanket retirement age of 60 in the private sector. If, as the figures 
show, EPF balances are exhausted within 3 years for 70 per cent of members, then 
enabling individuals to work beyond age 60 would go some way to addressing this 
issue. The Malaysian government cites the pressure of unemployment amongst the 
educated young as a reason for maintaining current arrangements, but this does not 
obviate the introduction of flexible retirement. 
This thesis is not arguing that the statutory retirement age should increase overnight, 
but rather that a phased raising of the retirement age would be both politically and 
socially more acceptable. Similarly, the introduction of a system of flexible 
retirement could be introduced over a number of years to take account of the need for 
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employment opportunities for educated young Malaysians whilst enabling those at or 
close to the retirement age to continue working and saving, albeit at a reduced rate. 
Here the Malaysian EPF can learn from the Singaporean CPF. Under current CPF 
arrangements employer and employee contributions are lower for those aged 55 and 
above than for younger workers (see Table 7.4) thus facilitating the retention of older, 
more expensive (at least in wage terms) employees. However, as was argued in 
Chapter 7 the CPF itself, despite or more accurately because of its expanded remit 
will be unable to fully cater for all Singaporeans leaving those who earn least, 
Singaporean Malay women, without the required level of savings and thereby more 
reliant on the mean and discretionary Public Assistance. Clearly there are pitfalls in 
relying solely on the provident fund mechanism as the only vehicle for old age 
m come 
Even so this is not going to be a cure all solution. The EPF is a good mechanism for 
generating individual savings, but individual savings themselves are not enough to 
meet the need of increasing numbers of elderly people who are living longer. As 
shown in Chapter 3, the EPF only covers approximately 50 per cent of the labour 
force. Even allowing for those covered by the public sector Pension Trust Fund this 
still leaves approximately 45 per cent of the labour force are without coverage of any 
sort. Even those fortunate enough to be members of the EPF do not fare well as 
dividend rates, the interest paid on contributions, have not matched the rate of return 
of domestic banks (Valdes-Prieto, 1999; Palacios, 1999). Added to this is the shift 
towards increasing the levels of investment in equities at both an institutional and 
individual level. Such a policy carries inherent risks which are disproportionately 
borne by individuals and somewhat inevitably by those with least saved, these being 
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the low paid, and those with contribution gaps who are predominantly women. As 
was demonstrated in Chapter 4, domestic pensions policy is inexorably linked to the 
ebb and flow of the global economy. An investment strategy which increases 
exposure on the global equities market is inherently at risk of failure for a number of 
reasons which include investor inexperience, economic shocks and downturn and the 
herd mentality of institutional investors (Reisen, 2001; Mann, 2000). An article in 
Malaysiakini (09/07 /04) highlighted the risk of increased exposure to equities by the 
EPF stating that the EPF' s return on investment had dropped from 6.556 per cent in 
1999 to 5.089 per cent in 2003 a reduction of 1.467 per cent or the equivalent of 
RM437 million. The concern here is if professional investment managers at the EPF 
fail to maintain a steady return on investments, what chance for the individual EPF 
member. 
However, the performance of fund managers though relevant, is not the main issue 
facing the EPF. The key concern for both the organisation and its members is the 
plain fact that there simply are not enough ideal members. By this is meant that a 
scheme which relies on individual savings requires the individual to save consistently 
over an extended period of time. This requires two basic elements, firstly few or no 
gaps in employment and secondly a decent wage from which contributions are drawn. 
As was shown in Chapter 6 women and the low skilled immediately fall into an at risk 
category as both groups will fail to meet the two basic requirements. If, as was noted, 
early withdrawals from members' accounts are increased for housing and health care 
then this will simply result in less monies being available to fund life beyond 
retirement. Ethnicity is also a factor in the avoidance of poverty in old age. As this 
thesis has shown, Malays are privileged over Chinese and Indian Malaysians. Such 
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arrangements are institutionally embedded in legislation such as the NEP and its 
successors which, for instance, set quotas for Malay access to Higher Education and 
access to Public Sector employment. This form of positive discrimination is more 
likely to reduce the threat of poverty in old age, either through higher paid 
employment or through generous public sector provision. 
In short, the Malaysian welfare system is under pressure to reform to take account of 
current deficiencies. As is clearly stated by Ramesh (2002: 156- my emphasis) 'The 
only way social security benefits can be delivered in a comprehensive and equitable 
manner is for the state to provide them directly, from its own general revenues. 
Programmes that depend on the contributions from employers and/or employees 
unavoidably exclude the majority of the population ... While publicly funded schemes 
are no doubt expensive, they are both effective and equitable, especially if the tax 
system is progressive, as they allow collection of contributions according to income, 
regardless of employment status, and distribute benefits according to need'. What this 
requires then is a rethinking of social welfare policy and the ways of doing welfare in 
Malaysia. The old model of economic growth as the driver of social policy is 
outdated for the current global era. For sure the Malaysian economy will still need to 
maintain its attractiveness in order to lure in the much coveted FDI, but the state can 
no longer rely on failing traditional welfare systems, nor can the eradication of 
poverty be achieved by economic growth alone. As more Malaysians enter the formal 
labour market they do so in the insecure export led growth industries. As was detailed 
in Chapter 4, more than two thirds of exported manufactured goods were from the 
electronics sector which also saw the highest numbers of redundancies in the year 
2001/02. In a system which relies on individual savings, women are 
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disproportionately at risk of poverty in old age due to low wages, career breaks to 
fulfil social care arrangements, gender based income inequality and a longer life 
expectancy. This is further exacerbated in times of economic crisis, the effects of 
which are felt keenest in the sectors of the labour market which are the main 
employers of women. The 1997 crisis highlighted the failings in the welfare system 
and maintaining the status quo is not an option if poverty and inequality are to be 
avoided. 
Malaysia is in a better position than some of its regional neighbours in that the 
demographic shift to an ageing society is set to take longer. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of measures which Malaysia needs to adopt if the effects of such a shift are to 
be lessened, if not avoided. These would include: 
• The introduction of a universal social insurance based pension which covers 
all Malaysians financed from general taxation 
• Increase the retirement age to better reflect average life expectancy 
• Implement a minimum wage structure to boost earnings and savings 
• Social care pension credits towards new pension scheme to negate 
employment breaks 
• Address gender wage inequality, thereby boosting women's financial 
independence and their ability to save 
• Refrain from privatising the Malaysian health service which will increase 
costs on old age and disproportionately affect women 
Malaysia has a window of opportunity of about 15 years in which to set in place 
arrangements which at the very least would prevent increased numbers of elderly 
Malaysian from falling into poverty in old age. The implementation of a social 
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insurance based pension scheme would enable this to be achieved in a comprehensive 
and equitable manner for all Malaysians and would be consistent with the EPF's own 
stated objectives. 
To achieve the core aims as originally stated, the EPF should be reformed to reflect its 
primary responsibility of saving for financial security in old age. To facilitate this, 
there should be a halt on further reforms which draw monies away from this core 
objective. The evidence from Singapore in Chapter 7 clearly shows that ethnic and 
class divisions will be exacerbated if individual savings remain as the central plank of 
old age incomes policy in Malaysia. As has been demonstrated, there are clear 
institutional pressures which thus far have slowed the pace of necessary social policy 
reform. Change is a complex process, and the EPF has found it difficult to adapt to 
the rapid social and economic changes which have taken place in Malaysia and at 
present, the fund does not appear capable of meeting its primary responsibility which 
is to ensure the financial security of its members in old age. 
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